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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
 
The issue of inequality has been part of the debate in development studies ever since this 
discipline has existed, an interest that has been intensified since the Great Recession. 
Leading researchers have argued that inequality is one of the main social problems in the 
world (Milanovic, 2016; Piketty, 2014; Stiglitz, 2012). Meanwhile, international 
organizations such as the IMF and the World Bank have pointed out that excessive 
inequality can erode social cohesion, lead to political polarization and reduce economic 
growth. Currently, these institutions are promoting inclusive growth policies (Dabla-Norris, 
Kochhar, Suphaphiphat, Ricka, & Tsounta, 2015; IMF, 2017). 
 
Inequality has many dimensions, ranging from income distribution, educational outcomes, 
to life expectancy, to name just a few. On the other hand, inequality can manifest itself at a 
certain moment or it can be the result of a cumulative process that is later revealed 
spatially. Territorial inequality arises from an asymmetric distribution of public goods, 
which ultimately results in an uneven distribution of social opportunities. Latin America’s 
major cities are a perfect example of territorial inequality, since they are characterized by 
strong socio-spatial disparities and large differences in the provision of basic infrastructure 
across municipalities (Jordán, Rehner, & Samaniego, 2010). In some cases, the spatial 
asymmetries are the result of historical and geographical processes that shape societies 
(Portes, Roberts, Grimson, & Aliaga, 2005). However, territorial disparities depend also 
upon the interaction between social groups, governments and public policies, i.e., political 
economy. 
 
This Thesis Project focuses on two elements associated with political economy that affect 
territorial inequalities. The first is the relationship between urban form and the uneven 
distribution of urban infrastructure, that is, how spatial organization influences the 
allocation of collective resources and hence, the opportunities that people have. The areas 
that make up a city differ significantly in the provision of basic infrastructure, in their 
access to the communications network, in the availability of green areas, in their 
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environmental quality, etc., and this significantly affects the possibilities of citizens to live 
the lives they deem appropriate. 
 
At this point, the central hypothesis is that the distribution of public goods and social 
opportunities are related to, among other issues, the organization of urban space. In 
particular, the dissertation intends to provide answers to the following questions: what is 
the relationship between the main characteristics of urban form, such as density, diversity 
of uses (residential, economic, etc.) or the sprawl of the urban area, and urban inequality? 
How do these issues affect mobility or access to public goods? What role does metropolitan 
planning play in the provision of public goods? 
 
The second major element of political economy that is analyzed is the incidence of 
distributive politics in inequality. The alleged aim of territorial development policies is to 
pursue economic efficiency or spatial equity. In Latin America in particular, regional policy 
has been largely dedicated to narrowing the gap across areas. However, all too often, these 
programs do not reach the most disadvantaged, not due to an inefficient design, but because 
of an institutional framework that generates misaligned political incentives and weak 
governance (Diaz-Cayeros, Estévez, & Magaloni, 2016). In other words, the distribution of 
basic infrastructure is not only based on a decision driven by technical issues, but also by 
authorities’ electoral wishes. The underlying hypothesis is that politicians are moved by 
their desire to achieve or maintain power and, therefore, they will distribute public goods 
with the aim of maximizing their prospects at the polls.  
 
Although the incidence of electoral incentives has been widely analyzed in the realms of 
political science (Golden & Min, 2013), it is a novel area in territorial studies, despite the 
implications that an arbitrary distribution of resources has for the governance of regions 
and localities. Recently, authors such as Luca & Rodríguez-Pose (2015), Psycharis, Zoi, & 
Iliopoulou (2015) and Rodríguez-Pose, Psycharis, & Tselios (2016) have contributed to 
open the debate within the discipline. The questions that are sought to be answered are: is 
the allocation of public goods distributed following territorial equity criteria, or do electoral 
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considerations also have an influence? What are the implications for the provision of public 
goods and, overall, for the development of urban areas and regions? What institutional 
mechanisms can reduce the electoral bias? 
 
The Thesis Project focuses on how these issues affect the distribution of social 
opportunities in the Santiago Metropolitan Area (SMA) of Chile. The SMA is an 
appropriate case study for several reasons. It is the largest urban agglomeration in the 
country: it has 52 municipalities where more than 7.3 million people live (around 40% of 
the national population), accounting for 49% of national GDP. Moreover, it is one of the 
most unequal cities in the world. Its Gini index is 0.53 and the socio-spatial organization is 
marked by strong income differences across neighborhoods. Such sorting pattern is 
manifested in a strong socio-spatial segregation dynamic (Sabatini et al, 2001; Fuentes et 
al, 2017). As we will show throughout the Thesis, these differences affect the accessibility 
to public services of the different socioeconomic groups that inhabit the city 
 
From the administrative and institutional dimension, the SMA has particularities that 
distinguish it from other metropolises of the continent. Despite its size, this territorial entity 
does not have financial autonomy and the governor (regional head) is appointed by the 
president. While the municipalities that make up the SMA have legal autonomy, they also 
suffer from limited financial maneuver and large disparities in budgetary terms. In fact, 
there is a huge income gap between richer and poorest municipalities, the latter being eight 
times poorer than the former
1
. These asymmetries between municipalities are manifested in 
both, the local capacity to plan development initiatives, and the dependence on transfers 
from the central government, which result in municipalities with lower resources being 
more susceptible to political interference. 
 
All these issues are addressed throughout four articles, which have already been published 
in prestigious international journals. The first is “Urban form and environmental impact of 
commuting in a segregated city, Santiago de Chile”, published in 2013, in Environment 
                                                          
1
 In 2019, the per capita budget of the richest municipality in the SMA was USD 1,495, while the poorest 
municipality had a per capita budget of USD 183. 
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and Planning B. This journal’s Impact Factor in 2018 was 2,825, located in the first quartile 
within Urban Studies (See Annex 1).  
 
The second article is “Understanding Density in an Uneven City, Santiago, Chile: 
Implications for Social and Environmental Sustainability”, published in 2014 in 
Sustainability. The impact factor in 2018 was 2,592, situated in the second quartile of 
"Environmental Studies" (See Annex 2). 
 
The third article is “Distributive politics and spatial equity: the allocation of public 
investment in Chile”, published in 2018 in the Regional Studies. The journal’s impact 
factor was 3,074 in 2018, in the first quartile of Economics (See Annex 3). 
 
Finally, “Paving the electoral way: Urban infrastructure, partisan politics and civic 
engagement”, was published in 2019 in World Development. This journal achieved an 
impact factor of 3,905 in 2018, which situates currently in first decile in Economics (See 
Annex 4). 
 
Theoretical framework  
 
Given the nature of this Thesis Project, our theoretical framework is structured around two 
axes: the relationship between urban form and inequality; and the incentives of distributive 
policy and inequality. 
 
Urban form and inequality 
 
The first two essays address the incidence of urban form on different aspects of inequality 
within the metropolitan area of Santiago. Urban form is one of the engines of sustainable 
development (Habitat, 2016): the way in which human activities are organized in space 
affects the environment (Legras & Cavailhès, 2016), social equity (Lee, Ambrey, & Pojani, 




Certain characteristics affect mobility and energy consumption, since the structure of the 
city influences the modal choice, travel time and distance (Banister, Watson, & Wood, 
1997; Crane, 2000; Ewing & Cervero, 2010; Rickwood, Glazebrook, & Searle, 2008). 
Much of this debate has been focused on the incidence of urban sprawl. The European 
Environment Agency (EEA) has described it as “the physical pattern of low-density 
expansion of large urban areas, under market conditions, mainly into the surrounding 
agricultural areas” (Ludlow, 2006, p. 6). Urban sprawl also increases the distance between 
places of origin and destination, and encourages car usage because low density makes it 
more expensive to establish efficient public transport networks. The relationship between 
low density and automobile dependence is explained by the fact that expansive growth 
disperses economic activities, increasing travel times between homes and workplaces 
(Travisi, Camagni, & Nijkamp, 2010). 
  
There seems to be an academic consensus about the association between low density, urban 
sprawl and car use. “One of the cardinal features of sprawl is driving, reflecting a well-
established, close relationship between lower density development and more automobile 
travel” (Frumkin, Frank, & Jackson, 2004, p.117). On the contrary, in dense and 
multifunctional areas where complementary uses are close to each other, the distances 
traveled are normally smaller and the use of public transport is greater (Frank & Pivo, 
1994). Compact developments are environmentally more sustainable, socially cohesive and 
economically efficient: they help protecting natural spaces, stimulate the use of non-
motorized mobility and the use of public transport, they contribute to social cohesion by 
bringing together people from different social environments and allow more intensive and 
efficient use of resources (Ng, 2010; Williams, Burton, & Jenks, 2000). 
 
A central element to understand urban form and sustainability is density (Habitat, 2016). It 
provides a first approach to the growth pattern of a city, and is probably the variable that 
best summarizes the urban form (Navarro & Ortuño, 2011). In cities with market-oriented 
economies, population density generally decreases together with the distance from the city 
center (Clark, 1951; Newling, 1969). This is not always true because several factors alter 
this pattern, such as residential segregation (Garnica-Monroy & Alvanides, 2019; Lima, 
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2001), rapid population growth, suburbanization processes, immigration, differences in 
households’ typology, decongestion of economic activities and the use of information 
technologies (Kloosterman & Musterd, 2001). 
 
Densification has a number of benefits. From an environmental perspective, it is deem an 
alternative to contain population growth within the already built-up area, which allows a 
more efficient use of the previously developed space, protecting agricultural and natural 
land (Sokolow & Laird, 1996). It can also favor more sustainable transport options 
(Newman & Kenworthy, 2000). In dense and compact urban areas, people often walk, ride 
bicycles and use public transport more frequently due to better connectivity and shorter 
distances to final destinations (Ewing & Cervero, 2010). However, high density may also 
lead to the loss of open and recreational space in the built-up areas (Jenks, Williams, & 
Burton, 1996).  
 
From the social dimension, densification is related to equity and social diversity because it 
favors access to social infrastructure and encourages a more diverse, inclusive and 
habitable urban environment by facilitating opportunities for social interaction. It can also 
reduce social segregation and isolation by improving the local social capital (Boyko & 
Cooper, 2011). A higher residential density promotes the interaction of residents if it is 
well-combined with other attributes of physical design (architectural design, streets that 
promote urban life, public space, mixed land use) (Talen, 1999). The impacts of 
densification on social integration depend on how density is combined with other urban 
attributes and infrastructures, since otherwise density can limit equitable access to social 
opportunities (Bramley & Power, 2009). 
 
From an economic point of view, a minimum threshold is necessary for an efficient use of 
resources and to reduce the cost of providing infrastructure. Dense areas require less public 
spending on services and infrastructure than low-density urban developments (Carruthers & 
Ulfarsson, 2003; Hortas-Rico & Solé-Ollé, 2010). Additionally, it is related to productivity 
as higher density generates co-operation between companies and workers (Cervero, 2001; 
Ciccone & Hall, 1993; Rosenthal & Strange, 2004). A general conclusion in this regards is 
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that low-density cities face higher commuting rates (Wheeler, 2001), higher marginal 
transportation costs (Ciccone & Hall, 1993) and lower knowledge spillovers (Glaeser, 
1998). 
 
The academic debate about urban form and sustainability has focused mainly on cities in 
the US and Europe, where the above-mentioned characteristics have particular implications. 
However, in Latin American cities, the spatial structure represents a barrier to densification, 
due to the topographic conditions and the rapid urbanization processes with limited 
investment in infrastructure that characterized the twentieth century (Duque, Lozano-
Gracia, Patino, & Restrepo, 2019). From the socioeconomic point of view, the expansion of 
the city is not due to low-density residential developments for the middle classes but, in 
large part, due to the location of the popular classes and social housing in the periphery (de 
Duren, 2018). Density does not always decrease as the distance from the center increases, 
as usually occurs in European and North American cities. Finally, a distinctive feature of 
these cities is the marked socio-spatial differences and residential segregation (Janoschka, 
2002). These issues make worth a differentiated analysis for Latin American cities, to 
understand the incidence of certain characteristics of urban form on the distribution of 
social opportunities and inequality. 
 
Distributive Politics and Inequality 
 
If politics has to do with "who gets what, when and how" (Laswell, 1936), then distributive 
politics, which involves the allocation of government goods and services, lies at the heart of 
politics. In this Thesis Project, distributive politics is understood as that policy that involves 
taxes and/or transfers in decisions about the allocation of government goods and services to 
identifiable localities or groups (Golden & Min, 2013). A standard way of thinking about 
this is how public authorities distribute benefits to specific geographical areas, while the 





Political science literature has systematically studied the relationship between the electoral 
game and the distribution of public resources (Golden & Min, 2013; Kramon & Posner, 
2013), identifying different ways in which politicians can try to obtain electoral revenues. 
One way to classify these benefits is by attending to the type of program and beneficiary in 
question. On the one hand, we find allocation of benefits that follow some type of objective 
and public criteria in their distribution (i.e., programmatic distribution), while on the other 
hand, there is allocations where the distribution criteria are not known in advance (i.e., non-
programmatic distribution). Both types of policies can be directed to individuals as well as 
groups, and the benefits can be irreversible (i.e., roads) or reversible (i.e., employment 
programs). Each of these variants in distributive politics results in different political 
dynamics. 
 
Table 1. Political bias and type of program 














Programmatic Distribution rules  
(e.g., Formula-based 
transfers) 





Party Bias  
(e.g., Pork-barrel politics) 
Clientelism                          
(e.g., Patronage) 
Source: own elaboration based on Stokes et al (2013) 
 
More specifically, the programmatic distribution refers to a distribution where the 
allocation criteria are public and follow an actual distribution of benefits or resources. 
Often this type of allocation is subsequent to a public debate, understood as a governmental 
discussion or a bureaucratic process where distribution criteria are available for public 
deliberation.  
 
Non-programmatic distribution is one in which there are no public criteria, or public criteria 
are destroyed by private interests, regularly partisan interests. There may also be strategies 
where political actors elaborate public and formal rules of distribution, but in practice, these 
rules are set aside in favor of electoral criteria. In other words, political actors ignore 
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legislation or what bureaucratic practice demands, channeling the benefits to certain 
groups, locations or individuals, who would not receive these benefits if the official criteria 
were applied. 
 
The non-programmatic distribution can be subdivided if the delivery is individual 
(conditional) or collective (non-conditional). In the first case, the political authority 
provides a job or other type of individual advantages in exchange for political support (i.e., 
clientelism), while, in the second case, the political representative can assign public goods 
to certain electoral constituencies (i.e., pork-barrel politics). Under the first approach, the 
party offers material benefits on the condition that the recipient returns the favor voting or 
through other means of political support. In the second case, the distribution of benefits is 
driven by a non-conditional partisan bias, where the recipients can be certain territorial 
groups or units. The later strategy, which is more diffuse in terms of electoral revenues, is 
the focus of this Thesis Project. 
 
From this classification, the literature has identified two large distortions in allocation 
strategies. The first refers to the distribution of benefits according to the type of voter, i.e., 
whether allocations benefit core (strongholds) or swing (undecided) constituencies. The 
second strategy is related to the time in which the benefit is delivered (Political Budget 
Cycles, PBC). 
 
The main models for analyzing the distribution of public goods arise from Dixit & 
Londregan (1996), which is based on Lindbeck & Weibull (1987) and Cox & McCubbins 
(1986). In this model, politicians distribute public goods among groups of voters in an 
electoral district. The assumption is that voters have fixed ideological preferences and 
receive a given utility from the benefit they get; therefore, a voter will be able to modify his 
ideological preference to the extent that the rival party offers a transfer large enough to 
overcome her ideological attachment to her own party. In other words, because material 
outcomes can move constituents from their ideological preferences, votes can be "bought" 




Voters more loyal to their political party require larger transfers than undecided ones to 
change their preferences and support the rival party. As undecided (swing) voters can be 
purchased at a lower cost, political parties compete for this electorate. Likewise, poorest 
constituents require lower per capita transfers to change their preferences than richer ones, 
because for the same transfer they get greater utility. 
 
Although both political parties define their strategies towards the undecided population, the 
model also considers a scenario in which parties assign public goods to loyal voters. The 
latter is subject to information asymmetries. The argument is that, in a context where there 
is no information, distributing benefits to the undecided electorate is inefficient because 
part of this electorate will not change their vote once they receive the benefit. As a result, it 
is more efficient to assign assets to the party's electoral strongholds (core voters) because in 
these districts the benefits will never be misallocated. In short, to the extent that politicians 
have complete information on voter preferences, they can more effectively allocate 
transfers. 
 
The second political strategy is related to the allocation of benefits according to the 
electoral cycle (Political Budget Cycles, PBC). This literature has focused on the 
manipulation of fiscal variables as the election period comes closer. There are two 
approaches to explain PBC: partisan and opportunist. The first establishes that PBC is 
determined by the ideology of the government (Alesina, 1987; Hibbs, 1977). Although 
fruitful for understanding ideological preferences, this approach does not properly apply to 
Latin America because in these countries there is no traditional left-right spectrum (Block, 
2001; Shi & Svensson, 2006). The so-called opportunist approach (Nordhaus, 1975; 
Rogoff, 1990) indicates that politicians seek to maximize their chances of reelection, 
manipulating fiscal variables right before polls. In this context, the election period and the 
ideological distance from the opposition are key incentives for such manipulations. 
 
This approach assumes information asymmetry between the ruler and the electorate, since 
the ruler seeks to demonstrate his ability to produce public goods without raising taxes (Shi 
& Svensson 2002). According to Alt & Rose (2006), PBC is influenced by the incentives of 
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the ruler and his ability to manipulate public finances. Incentives are given by electoral 
competition: as the scrutiny approaches, one should opt for the distribution strategies that 
maximize re-election options. The second condition refers to the institutional environment, 
which defines the possibilities for a discretionary use of public resources. In this regard, it 
is essential to advance into the mechanisms that limit PBC. Greater transparency reduces 
budget deficit and debt (Alt & Lassen, 2006), or the existence of a fiscal rule can mitigate 
PBC too (Rose, 2006). 
 
There is extensive literature on PBC in developed countries (Block, 2001), and in recent 
decades the number of studies for developing countries has increased. The comparative 
analyses indicate that developing countries face more pronounced political cycles than 
developed ones (Block, 2001; Brender & Drazen, 2005; Shi & Svensson, 2006). However, 
many of these studies are at national level, with very little evidence regarding the 
institutionality that reduces political discretion at sub national scale. This Thesis Project 
seeks to deepen knowledge in distributive politics at urban and regional level, identifying 
both, the effects on territorial inequality, and the mechanisms that could reduce electoral 
bias in the distribution of benefits. 
 
Hypothesis 
Based on these theoretical considerations, we propose the following hypotheses: 
 
Urban Form and Inequality  
Hypothesis 1. The way in which human activities are organized in highly unequal cities is 
related to the distribution of public goods and the social opportunities of residents. 
 
Hypothesis 1.1. There is a relationship between the characteristics of the urban 
form and inequality in the SMA. 
 
Hypothesis 1.2. The urban form of SMA affects mobility patterns and access to 




Hypothesis 1.3. Sub-optimal metropolitan planning plays an important role in the 
unequal provision of public goods. 
 
Distributive policy and inequality 
Hypothesis 2: Politicians, motivated by their desire to maintain power, distribute public 
goods with the object of maximizing their reelection options, which affects the equity of 
territorial policies. 
 
Hypothesis 2.1. Electoral motivations affect the distribution of public goods among 
the municipalities of a region and among the different areas that make up the SMA. 
 
Hypothesis 2.2. Electoral motivations in the provision of public goods has 
implications for the development of metropolises and regions. 
 
Hypothesis 2.3. There are institutional mechanisms that can reduce partisan bias in 




The methodological strategy is based on quantitative analysis techniques. The study of the 
relationship between urban form and inequality leans on multiple regressions, while the 
essays on distributive politics use panel data analysis and fixed effects. In addition, 
throughout the research, Geographic Information Systems (GIS) are used to illustrate 
spatially the different variables. Some relevant aspects of the methodology are detailed 
below. 
  
1) Methodology for metropolitan inequality analysis. 
 
To calculate the levels of inequality in the Santiago Metropolitan Area, the multiple 
regression methodology has been applied, a standard methodological strategy in previous 
studies (Camagni et al, 2002; Lawrence, 1994). One of the advantages of this method is the 
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fact that it can eliminate the omitted-variable bias. The omitted-variable bias occurs when 
the omitted variable is correlated with the regressors included in the regression and when 
the omitted variable is a determining factor of the dependent variable. Therefore, if there is 
omitted-variable bias, the first OLS assumption             is not met, which makes the 
OLS estimator is inconsistent. That is, if an omitted variable is a determinant of    , then it 
is in the error term, and if it is correlated with      then the error term is correlated with   .  
Inasmuch as    and    are correlated, the conditional mean of    given    is non-zero. 
 
The multiple regression model extends the simple model by incorporating additional 
variables as regressors. This allows for the estimation of the effect on   of the variation of a 
variable      , keeping the remainder regressors              . The key issue is that, if 
data on omitted variables are available, then they can be included as additional regressors 
and therefore, the effect of a regressor can be calculated while keeping the other variables 
constant. 
 
The multiple regression model is: 
                                                                                   
Where 
    is the i-th observation of the dependent variable;                are the i-th 
observations of each of the k regressors; and    is the error term. 
 
 The population regression line is the relationship between Y and X on mean in the 
population: 
                                                              
 
    is the slope coefficient of   ,      is the coefficient of   , etc. The coefficient    
is the expected effect on    of change in     , holding constant          . The 
coefficients of the other Xs are interpreted similarly. 
 
 The coefficient    is the intercept term. It is the expected value of Y when all X is 
equal to 0. 
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2) Methodology for analysis of political influence in investment distribution 
 
The strategy used to determine the relationship between electoral factors and investment 
distribution has, as a common element, the fact that databases contain observations of 
individuals over time (with their respective characteristics). Specifically, they contain 
electoral, investment and socioeconomic information at the municipality level for several 
years. This methodological strategy is used regularly in the analysis of distributive policy at 
the subnational level (Luca & Rodríguez-Pose, 2015; Psycharis, Zoi, & Iliopoulou, 2015; 
Rodríguez-Pose, Psycharis, & Tselios, 2016). Because multiple regression is a limited tool 
when the omitted-variable bias occurs, this methodology becomes a common strategy to 
compare countries, regions, cities, municipalities, etc. This problem is even greater when 
the omitted variables that differentiate municipalities are variables that cannot be observed, 
such as cultural factors. 
 
To solve this problem, we work with databases called panel data, which contain 
information about individuals in time, that is, each municipality is observed for two or 
more periods. In this context, by studying changes in the municipalities over time, it is 
possible to eliminate the effect of the omitted variables that differ between municipalities, 
but which are constant over time. 
 
To exploit such panel data, the existing literature suggests employing regressions of 
individual fixed effects. Additionally, two-way fixed effects have been incorporated into 
the investigations, that is, fixed effect at the level of individuals (municipalities) and 
temporary fixed effect (years). Two-way fixed effects are used when there are non-
observable variables that are fixed over time, and together, non-observable variables that 
are constant between different municipalities but that change over time. 
 
The notation for panel data is expressed in the model (1) 
                                                          
 
Where the first subscript, i, refers to the municipality that is being observed, the subscript , 
refers to the period in which it is observed and u is the error term. 
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As noted, the methodological strategy employs regressions with fixed effects. In the case of 
individual fixed effects, the method considers those non-observable omitted variables that 
vary between municipalities but do not change over time. The individual fixed effects 
equation is expressed in model (2) 
 
                                                                                                                  
 
Where:  
  : (i=1… n) is the unknown intercept of each municipality 
    : is the dependent variable (e.g., Investment), where i = municipality and t = time 
   : represents the independent variable (e.g., Political Variable) 
  : is the coefficient for the independent variable 
     is the error term 
 
The individual fixed effects regression model presents n different intercepts, one for each 
municipality. These intercepts absorb the influences of all omitted variables that differ from 
one municipality to another, but are constant over time. The inclusion of fixed effects for 
each municipality allows for avoiding the omitted-variable bias, derived from the omission 
of factors that vary between municipalities, but are constant over time within a 
municipality. The cultural attitudes towards municipal management is an appropriate 
example. 
 
However, other factors could be affecting this regression leading to an omitted-variable 
bias. For example, during the sample period, technology could have been improving 
municipal management. As technological development affects in a similar way every 
municipality, including temporary fixed effects can eliminate its influence. 
 
That is, by means of individual fixed effects, those variables that remain constant over time, 
but differ between different entities (e.g., cultural norms) are controlled. Meanwhile, the 
temporary fixed effects allow to take into account the variables that are constant among the 
20 
 
individual entities (e.g., technology), but that evolve over time. Two-way fixed effects is a 
combined model of individual and temporary fixed effects: 
 
                                                                                                                      
 
Where    is the individual effect and     is the temporary effect. The combined regression 
model of fixed individual and temporal effects eliminates the omitted-variable bias that 
appears both, by unobservable variables that are constant over time, and by those 
unobservable variables, which are constant between municipalities but vary in time. 
 
Finally, another element incorporated is heterocedasticity and serial correlation control 
within an individual entity. In panel data, the variables are usually autocorrelated, i.e., 
correlated in time within an individual entity. In this sense, each estimate used works with 
clustered standard errors, in order to control for heterocedasticity and possible serial 
correlation, that is, temporal relationship in the sample that may affect the model. 
 
3) Geographic Information Systems (GIS)  
 
Apart from econometric techniques, Geographic Information Systems were used to 
spatially represent certain variables. Every essay considered at least the spatial distribution 
of the dependent variables, for example, density or investment distribution.  The program 
used was ArcGis. 
 
Structure of the Thesis 
 
 
The remainder of the Thesis is structured in four chapters, corresponding to the four papers 
already published, and a last chapter with general conclusions. In what follows, I provide a 
brief summary of each chapter
2
.  
                                                          
2
 Chapters are presented according to the format in which they were sent for publication following each 




Chapter 2: Urban form and the environmental impact of commuting in a segregated 
city, Santiago de Chile  
Written in collaboration with Xabier Gainza. Published in Environment and Planning B 
(2013). Quality indicators: JCR Impact Factor (2018): 2.825, 8/40 in Urban Studies (Q1). 
 
The literature on the relationship between the built environment and journeys to work has 
identified population density and the combination of land uses as key features of the urban 
form, since they affect travel patterns. However, in cities with strong socio-spatial 
disparities such as the Santiago Metropolitan Area, there is no substantial evidence to 
support the argument that these characteristics are equally important. 
 
The article performs a multiple regression analysis based on the methodology of Camagni, 
Gibelli, & Rigamonti (2002). These authors developed an environmental impact index that 
measures the performance of neighborhoods in a metropolitan area using modal choice 
indicators and travel time. We compute this index for the communes that make up the SMA 
and subsequently the identification strategy is based on estimating the effect of the 
variables of urban form (distance, density, diversity of uses) on this index. 
 
The results show how the characteristics of urban form affect a segregated city: distance 
increases the environmental impact of mobility, mainly due to the monocentric nature of 
the SMA; density reduces impact; and the communes that contain mobility within their 
areas have a lower incidence. On the other hand, the impact depends heavily on the modal 
choice, the greater the use of public transport, the less environmental impact. Finally, we 
question the factors that influence the mode of transport used, among which the density, 
distance to the center and the competitiveness of public transport stand out, although the 
latter does so in a way that would be expected (greater competitiveness, less use of public 





These results raise an interesting discussion and have significant implications for urban 
planning. To the best of our knowledge, containing the expansion of the city and creating 
compact areas that combine residential uses and economic activities would not only 
improve environmental performance, but it would also serve to reduce socio-spatial 
segregation if new employment is available in low-income areas. 
 
Chapter 3: Understanding Density in an Uneven City, Santiago de Chile: Implications 
for Social and Environmental Sustainability 
Written in collaboration with Xabier Gainza. Published in Sustainability (2014). Quality 
indicators: JCR Impact Factor (2018): 2.592, 44/116 (Q2) in ‘Environmental Studies’ 
 
In order to contain the population within the limits of the city already built, densification 
policies are being carried out in many parts of the world. The reasons are that compact 
developments are environmentally more sustainable, socially cohesive and economically 
efficient: they help protect natural spaces, stimulate walking and the use of public transport, 
contribute to social cohesion by bringing together people from different social backgrounds 
and allow more intensive and efficient use of resources (Ng, 2010; Williams, Burton, & 
Jenks, 2000). 
 
However, in unequal and segregated cities, the benefits of densification are not so obvious. 
The aim of this work is to identify and discuss some of the contradictions of densification 
in the SMA. In this sense, the working hypothesis is that the density depends on the 
distance to the center, the provision of amenities and the conditions of the neighborhood. In 
a polarized city like Santiago, where the distribution of these attributes and neighborhood 
conditions vary greatly between areas, access to social opportunities is strongly 
conditioned. The argument is that in Latin American cities density rates differ dramatically 
between areas and often do not follow a pattern as clear as in Europe, so there are huge 




To understand the differences in density rates within the city, multiple regression is used. 
The analysis shows that the density of housing depends on the distance from the city center, 
the socioeconomic conditions and the availability of urban attributes in the area. 
 
Based on these results, a discussion is raised regarding the implications it has for work-
related journeys, the distribution of social infrastructure and environmental services 
provided by green areas. Although, at the metropolitan level, densification can favor a more 
sustainable travel pattern, it must be achieved by balancing density rates and addressing 
spatial differences in the provision of social services and environmental services. We 
believe that a metropolitan approach is essential to correct these spatial imbalances and 
promote a more sustainable and socially cohesive growth pattern. 
 
Chapter 4: Distributive politics and spatial equity: the allocation of public investment 
in Chile  
Written in collaboration with Xabier Gainza. Published in Regional Studies (2018). Quality 
indicators: JCR Impact Factor (2018): 3.074, 49/363 in Economics (Q1). 
 
This study analyzes the weight of electoral factors in the allocation of investment from the 
central government to the municipalities. Specifically, three issues of distributive politics 
are analyzed. First, two types of electoral motivations are identified: if the investment is 
diverted to the municipalities governed by mayors of the central government party; and if 
there are political budget cycles, that is, if the investment varies throughout the term of the 
legislature, increasing as the elections approach and decreasing in subsequent years. 
 
Secondly, we attempt to determine if the municipalities where the ruling party has won by a 
wide margin, or where there is greater electoral competition, receive more resources. One 
of the most discussed issues in the literature is to determine the main strategy to follow: 
over-finance the bastions (core voters) (Cox & McCubbins, 1986), or focus where the party 
has won by a narrow margin and, by virtue of this, they can lose power and move over to 
the opposition (swing voters) (Dixit & Londregan, 1996). We analyze this issue, but we 
also discuss whether the interests of the central or local government prevail. In other words, 
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if by favoring core or swing municipalities, what is sought is to improve the electoral 
prospects of the central government or, conversely, to help in the re-election of mayors. 
 
Finally, the article addresses the implications for governance and discusses the mechanisms 
that could reduce electoral bias and improve investment allocation. We find four relevant 
elements: a) reforms aimed at increasing transparency and accountability in order to reduce 
arbitrariness; b) the development of multiannual budgets in order to reduce the influence of 
the political cycle; c) to create an independent investment planning office; d) mechanisms 
to address huge territorial inequalities. This is essential, not only in terms of social justice, 
but also to achieve a more balanced distribution of investment. 
 
Chapter 5: Paving the electoral way: Urban infrastructure, partisan politics and civic 
engagement.  
Written in collaboration with Xabier Gainza and José Acuña. Published in World 





This research analyzes the incidence of electoral factors in the Santiago Metropolitan Area. 
There is abundant literature on distributive politics at subnational level and countries, but 
very little research on the urban scale. In this sense, the research is new and represents an 
important contribution to the field. Another new feature in this research is that we question 
whether citizen participation can be an element in reducing arbitrariness. 
 
In order to analyze these issues, the distribution of two investment funds from the central 
government to the 52 communes of the SMA is examined. A significant difference between 
these two funds is that, while one is assigned to mayors directly, in the other it is citizen 
committees who manage resources. The different nature of the program allows us to see if 
the citizenry captures public resources for its own benefit when it is the administrator. 
 
This research shows that when the investment passes through the hands of the mayors there 
are electoral motivations, while, if it is managed directly by the citizens, this is not the case. 
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When the mayors are the administrators, the central government benefits those of its 
political party, particularly those facing greater electoral competition. On the other hand, 
electoral bias is not identified when the citizen committees are in charge, and, in addition, 
they do not capture the resources for their own benefit. 
 
Regarding the political implications of the results, it is suggested to favor citizen 
management to promote accountability and democratic practices. Concerning governance, a 
multilevel system composed of communes and a metropolitan authority is proposed, since 
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Chapter 2: Urban form and the environmental impact of commuting in a 
segregated city, Santiago de Chile  
 
Abstract. The literature on the relationship between the built environment and travel has 
identified population density and the mix of land uses as key characteristics of the urban 
form that affect travel patterns. However, in cities with strong socio-spatial disparities it is 
not clear if these characteristics account in the same way. In this article, we use regression 
analysis to estimate the influence of the spatial growth pattern of Santiago, Chile, on the 
environmental impact of commuting. Our findings can be summarized in three points: first, 
the travel impact increases as the city spreads out because of the monocentric nature of 
Santiago; second, the environmental impact of commuting could be reduced by containing 
commuters within the area they live; third, the use of public transport reduces the impact, 
but the modal choice does not only depend on the effectiveness of the transport system, but 
on the characteristics of the urban form and other socio-economic determinants. 
Consequently, we propose to reorient the growth pattern in three ways: redirecting land use 
policy to promote development within its already built area, developing compact areas 
where residential and economic activities are mixed and facing socio-spatial disparities as a 
way to encourage public transport use. This would reduce the environmental impact of 
commuting while, at the same time, tackling socio-spatial segregation. 
 
Keywords: Urban form, sustainable travel, socio-spatial segregation, Latin America 
Introduction 
 
In recent years there has been an intense debate on the relationship between the urban form 
and travel (Banister et al, 1997; Crane, 2000; Ewing and Cervero, 2010; Rickwood et al, 
2008). The way human activities are organized in the urban space affects travel and 
associated energy use, since the structure of the city influences the modal choice, the time 
spent travelling and the distance. Urban sprawl increases the length of daily trips and 
encourages the use of private transport, because lower densities make widespread public 
transportation networks unprofitable. By contrast, in dense and multi-functional areas 
where complementary land uses are closer, the trip distance is usually shorter and the 
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number of people using mass transit or walking is greater (Frank and Pivo, 1994). 
Therefore, the spatial growth (the distance) and the specific features of the urban form (the 
density, the functional diversity) seem to be the key issues when analysing sustainable 
travel patterns. 
 
The aim of this article is to estimate the effects of the spatial form of Santiago, Chile, on the 
environmental impact of commuting. Much of the studies regarding travel and the urban 
form have focused on the U.S and, to a lesser extent, Europe, where sprawling forms of 
suburban development are blamed for increased car use (Cervero, 1996; Ewing, 1997; 
Giuliano and Narayan, 2003; Glaeser and Kahn, 2003; Handy et al, 2005; Schwanen et al, 
2004; van de Coevering and Schwanen, 2006), but empirical analysis for Latin American 
cities is very rare. Nevertheless, the urban dynamic and the travel pattern of Latin American 
cities have specific features, so it is not clear if the characteristics of the built-up area 
account for travel in the same way. Firstly, most of Latin American megacities continue 
growing, which increases the distance of daily trips and the associated environmental costs. 
Secondly, strong disparities persist, both in socio-spatial characteristics and socio-economic 
conditions. Residential densities, for example, are much higher than in the U.S. and Europe 
and there are important disparities in residential density rates among the different areas of 
the city. Thirdly, the functional structure of many Latin American cities remains 
centralized, so balancing jobs and housing is a pressing issue as the city spreads out. 
Finally, accessibility and the modal choice are much more dependent on socio-economic 
conditions, despite the rapid pace of motorization of the past two decades.  
 
We conduct a regression analysis to estimate the influence of Santiago’s spatial structure on 
the environmental impact of commuting. The hypothesis is that the differences in 
commuting patterns, the modal choice and the time spent travelling, depend on the socio-
spatial characteristics of the comunas. To contrast this hypothesis, we follow the 
methodology developed by Camagni et al. (2002), who created an Impact Intensity Index 
that synthesizes the environmental performance of the neighbourhoods, depending on the 
transport mode chosen and the time spent commuting. This methodology is used to meet 
the following research questions. First of all, the effect of Santiago’s socio-spatial 
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characteristics on the environmental impact of commuting is analyzed. Next, we focus on 
the use of public and private transport to determine whether the environmental impact 
depends on the modal choice or not. Lastly, we explore the main reasons for using public 
transport by testing the influence of the characteristics of the urban form, its relative 
competitiveness and the average income of the area.  
 
The remainder of the paper is divided into four sections. In Section 2, the literature review 
is conducted, focusing on three issues: to start with, we place the debate on the relationship 
between urban form and travel from a general perspective; after that, we bring this debate 
to the specific circumstances of Latin American cities; then, we explore Santiago’s spatial 
growth and we characterize the travel pattern. In Section 3, the methodology to analyze the 
relationship between the urban form and the environmental impact of commuting is 
introduced. In Section 4, the most important results are displayed. Finally, the implications 
of our findings are discussed and the paper is concluded by raising some questions that 
should be borne in mind, not only to reduce the environmental impact of commuting, but 
also to achieve a fairer and more balanced travel pattern. 
Literature review 
 
On the relationship between urban form and travel 
 
Recently, Ewing and Cervero (2010) conducted a meta-analysis of the relationship between 
the built environment and travel. They simplified in “5 Ds” the main factors identified in 
the literature: density, diversity, design, destination accessibility and distance to transit. 
Density and the diversity of land uses are probably the factors most studied within the 
planning and transportation literature. In most of the studies there is a significant 
relationship between density and the transport mode, i.e. car use decreases and public 
transport use increases with higher density (Newman and Kenworthy, 2000). Therefore, 
higher densities lead to less energy consumption and a more environment friendly 
transportation choice, although this also means more congestion and, thus, more time 
travelling; however, even though vehicles are less fuel-efficient in dense areas due to traffic 
congestion, ultimately fuel consumption per capita is still substantially less because people 
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drive much less (Ewing, 2008). On the contrary, people drive more in low-density suburbs 
and the overall gasoline consumption is usually higher. 
 
Similarly, mixing different land uses influences transportation choices. Mixed land uses 
means a diversity of functional uses within a given area (residential, industrial, commercial, 
recreational), which usually reduces travel distance because compatible uses are in close 
proximity. The proximity of jobs and housing is probably the most important factor, since 
commuting accounts for a substantial part of the total distance travelled and the time spent 
on daily trips. Regarding commuting, linking jobs to housing usually increases mass transit 
usage and walking, whereas single-occupant vehicle usage declines (Frank and Pivo, 1994). 
Additionally, the distance travelled and the time taken on work-trips is usually less in 
multi-functional areas (Cervero and Duncan, 2006). Although it may seem obvious that 
living in a job-rich area may reduce work-trip time and distance, the relationship is not as 
strong as could be expected. In fact, Miller and Ibrahim found that balancing jobs and 
housing led to insignificant savings in the amount of distance travelled in their analysis of 
the Toronto area (Miller and Ibrahim, 1998). This could be explained by several factors. 
First, if work-places and households are mismatched, workers would have to commute 
outside their area of residence, even if they live in a job-rich area. Second, there are other 
factors for residential choice besides the access to work (Giuliano and Small, 1993), such as 
accessibility to non-work facilities, difficulties in finding a central residence between two 
workplaces in two-worker households, land use regulations, or the importance of housing 
and neighbourhood characteristics.  
 
At the metropolitan scale, the functional organization of the city also affects travel. Often, 
the spread of the urban area and the distance to the city centre are critical dimensions, since 
work-places tend to be more accessible at central locations. However, this depends on the 
specific structure of the city, i.e., if it is functionally monocentric or polycentric. In a city 
undergoing rapid urban expansion, a polycentric development could contain the growth of 
commuting distances, as found by (Zhao et al, 2010) for the case of Beijing. Moreover, 
theoretically sprawled cities can lead to better accessibility to the work-place if 
employment is decentralized close to residential areas (like in edge-cities); indeed, because 
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the aggregate gasoline consumption is reduced when people travel in less congested routes, 
the environmental damage could be smaller (Glaeser and Kahn, 2003). While this can be 
the case if firms and residences locate close to each others in the process of 
decentralization, the opposite happens if jobs and housing are mismatched or jobs remain 
centralized (Ma and Banister, 2007). Actually, this also depends on the city size, since 
larger cities tend to have higher densities and higher commute-times; nevertheless, once the 
city size has been controlled for, there is no evidence of commute-time reduction for 
sprawling cities (Ewing et al, 2002). As a result, the spatial growth pattern and the city 
structure, along with the density and the mix of land uses seem to be key issues to 
understand the travel pattern and its environmental effects.  
 
Urban form and travel in Latin American cities 
 
Latin American cities have their unique characteristics in the spatial structure and the socio-
economic conditions that affect travel pattern. Latin American cities in general and 
megacities in an increased manner are characterized by a process of urban sprawl and rapid 
growth of population in peri-urban areas (Jordán et al, 2010). In this region the spread of 
the built environment has not only been driven by low-density, suburban residential 
growth, but also by the displacement of lower income sectors to new developments, mainly 
in the periphery (Torres, 2008). Historically, the rural-urban migration accounted for the 
growth of the periphery. However, in the past few decades the residential pattern has 
changed. New residential suburbs are being built close to low income settlements, in some 
cases forming gated communities, in an increasingly fragmented scenario (Janoschka, 
2002). As a consequence, the urbanization of the periphery combines low-density, high-
class residential areas with high-density, low-income settlements. At the same time, the 
population of the central area is decreasing or at least stagnating in most of the megacities, 
although the city centre is still by far the densest area (Jordán et al, 2010).  
 
This spatial growth pattern has significant impact on travel. The difference in residential 
density between areas is usually very high and, unlike most North American and European 
cities, the density may increase with the distance from the city centre for some areas. 
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Furthermore, the relationship between residential density and trip time and even trip 
distance might be positive. Usually, the new suburbs of the upper classes are located all 
over the metropolitan area, but still close to the central transportation axis, especially 
highways and main roads; on the other hand, low-class neighbourhoods are becoming less 
approachable and more isolated (Janoschka, 2002). Consequently, in the less dense suburbs 
work-trips could be shorter in time and even distance than in the overpopulated 
neighbourhoods.  
 
The functional structure of most Latin American cities also differs from North American 
and Europeans. Historically, Latin American cities have been functionally monocentric, 
although nowadays there is a trend towards a more fragmented and polycentric spatial 
organization (Rojas, 2005). However, in spite of the decentralization of some economic 
activities, most Latin American cities remain more centralized around a Central Business 
District (CBD) than European and North American cities. This poses the question of 
distance and accessibility to the city centre, as well as the functional diversification of the 
areas, as critical issues when analysing commuting patterns. 
 
Travel and accessibility are also determined by socio-economic conditions. The access to 
cars is strongly correlated with income, despite the motorization of the past two decades. 
Besides, the growth of the city has uneven socio-spatial and socio-economic effects, since 
not all the areas or social groups are affected in the same way. As the city grows and 
congestion increases, travel costs rise in terms of money and time. In advanced economies, 
improving the quality of transportation makes up for these social costs, but in Latin 
American cities, lower income groups have no compensation (Monzón, 2005). In practice, 
public transportation is often less competitive and less accessible in peripheral areas, 
meaning low income groups usually have lower mobility rates (Monzón, 2005). 
 
The spatial organization of economic activities has also unequal effects on travel, 
depending on socio-economic conditions. The city centre hosts much of the employment 
whereas low-income workers usually live in the periphery, so distance and work-trip time is 
usually larger for the poor (Rodríguez Vignoli, 2008). In recent years, some jobs have been 
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suburbanized. Residential suburbanization attracts jobs to the periphery, especially services 
for medium and high income elites (housework, personal services, shopping mall 
employees, etc.). This results in a spatial mismatch since the new employment is 
decentralized to wealthier suburbs, whereas low skilled workers remain segregated in poor 
areas. The spatial mismatch hypothesis suggests worse labour market outcomes for inner-
city minorities who are disconnected from suburban jobs opportunities (Gobillon et al, 
2007), but it also impacts on travel. As service activities follow the peripheral migration of 
the upper classes, the distance between homes and workplaces is increasing for the 
unskilled workers who have to spend more time commuting to the wealthier suburbs. 
 
The spatial growth of Santiago Metropolitan Area and the current travel pattern 
 
The urbanization trends that characterize most Latin American megacities hold for Santiago 
de Chile. Santiago is a metropolitan region
3
 of 5.5 million inhabitants, 35% of the total 
population of Chile. Over the past sixty years, the population has grown around 4.5 million, 
spreading the urban area from 11.017 hectares in 1940 to 64.140 hectares in 2002 
(Galetovic and Jordán, 2006). From the forties the population grew at higher rates than the 
urban perimeter, but in the nineties the growth pattern reversed; the spatial growth rate 
exceeded the population growth rate, leading to lower residential density rates for the whole 
metropolitan area.  
 
There are two driving forces behind the spatial growth of Santiago. The first one is the 
housing policy, which traditionally located the new developments in the periphery (Ducci, 
1997; Hidalgo, 2007). In Chile, the housing facilities provided by the state have been 
extensive since its main objective was to reduce the housing deficit, no matter the living 
conditions or the localization; actually, from the fifties between the half and two thirds of 
the homes provided each year were built, commissioned or financed by the state (Tokman, 
2006). But the emphasis on reducing the housing deficit neglected the impacts on the urban 
                                                          
3 The Santiago Metropolitan Area (SMA) covers the 32 comunas of the Santiago province, plus San 
Bernardo and Puente Alto. 
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form. Public housing was systematically located in the periphery where the urban land was 
cheaper and plots were bigger, thus spreading the urbanized area. 
 
The other driving force has been the metropolitan planning strategy, especially since the 
neo-liberal reforms of the late seventies. In 1979, the Military Government launched the so 
called “National Policy of Urban Development”, which incorporated the free market 
principles into urban planning. According to these principles, the land market was the 
mechanism to decide between agricultural or urban uses and thus, there should be no limit 
but market forces for the sprawl of the urban fringe. Consequently, the Military 
Government established an urban growth boundary of 100.000 hectares, while the built-up 
area was around 35.000 hectares. The plans implemented since the nineties limited the 
growth to 72.000 hectares and proposed target density rates. However, the urban perimeter 
kept on growing and strong disparities in density rates have persisted.  
 
In fact, Santiago is socio-spatially segregated (Dammert, 2004; Sabatini et al, 2001): richest 
comunas cluster in the northeast, whereas the poorest spread to the south and the northwest 
(Figure 1). Residential density provides almost a mirror image: the lowest density rates are 
in the wealthy northeast, while in the city centre and some western and southern comunas 
the residential density rates are above 200 inhabitants per hectare. Residential segregation 
in Santiago has historical roots, but it seems that the driving forces of the spatial outgrowth 
have deepened its dimension and characteristics. Public housing systematically clustered 
low-income families on the urban fringe, while medium and high income families moved 
from the city centre to benefit from the amenities of suburban residential areas, in a 
Tieboutian sorting type (Tiebout, 1956). This residential location pattern spread the city 
eastwards and increased the gap between areas, thus reinforcing socio-spatial segregation in 








Figure 1: Socio-spatial segregation and main transportation infrastructures. 
 
Source: MIDEPLAN (2006)  
 
The growth of the city has gone hand-in-hand with the transportation infrastructure. In the 
past two decades, Santiago has undergone a rapid motorization, from 90 motor vehicles per 
1000 inhabitants in 1991 to 137 in 2006 (SECTRA, 2006); this motorization has been 
driven by all income groups, but in the richest comuna the rate is 15 times higher than in 
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the poorest. The public transport network comprises bus and metro, being the bus the most 
frequently used transport mode, followed by car and metro; nevertheless, the transport 
choice differs considerably among areas: in the south more than 60% of commuters use 
public transport, whereas in the wealthy northeast this rate is less than 30%.  
 
In 2007, the public transport was reformed into a system called Transantiago. Before the 
reform was undertaken, independent operators ran the bus network, so traffic congestion in 
the city centre was commonplace since most operators crossed main streets to gain 
travellers. Transantiago integrated bus and metro into a single fare system and bus routes 
were divided into local trips (routes within the same zone) and main trips (routes between 
different zones). Five years after its launch, no comprehensive evaluation of Transantiago 
has been conducted but some preliminary estimations show lights and shadows in the 
reform. The implementation entailed several problems, such as missing infrastructure, lack 
of buses in some routes, overcrowded buses and metros, too many transfers and increasing 
trip time in many routes (Pardo and Pedrosa, 2012). On the other hand, Transantiago 
introduced planning principles into transport, eliminated redundancies, improved the 
quality and the environmental standards of buses and benefited its users through the single 
fare system. The conversion to cleaner buses yielded environmental benefits, but even more 
important was the integration of bus and metro into a single fare, since it helped to increase 
the use of metro, particularly by low-income users (Pardo and Pedrosa, 2012).     
 
Regarding travel flows, two major characteristics stand out. Despite the urban outgrowth 
that has decentralized some economic activities, Santiago today remains monocentric 
(Rodríguez Vignoli, 2008). The most dynamic activities cluster in the city centre, so over 
40% of the commutes at peak hours end in the CBD. Apart from the CBD, just few 
comunas in the West (Maipú) and the East (La Florida) are strategic work-nodes due to the 
location of some industrial activities. But the travel pattern is not only from the periphery to 
the centre, also from the poorest to the richest areas. According to data from the latest 
Urban Mobility Survey (SECTRA, 2006), if comunas are classified by income quintiles, 
the richest areas (those of the fourth and fifth quintiles) attract almost 70% of the 
commuting trips. At the same time, the residents of the poorest areas have to commute to 
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the richest comunas and actually almost 60% of the commuters living in comunas of the 
first quintile and 50% of the second quintile travel to the richest comunas. As a result, the 
average work-trip time in poor comunas is more than twice the time of the richer comunas.  
Research design and methodology 
 
The spatial growth of Santiago has increased travel flows and, as a result, travel related air 
pollution is actually a major problem, as it stands among the most polluted Latin American 
cities. In this section we introduce the methodology to analyze the influence of Santiago’s 
spatial form on the environmental impact of commuting. The aim was to identify different 
commuting patterns, which had different environmental impacts, and to contrast whether or 
not these differences are determined by the socio-spatial characteristics of the comunas. 
The hypothesis was that the differences in travel patterns, the time spent and the mode 
chosen can, to a certain extent, be attributed to the urban growth pattern.  
 
Most of the research on the link between urban form and travel has been conducted using 
disaggregate models or, conversely, aggregate models. Disaggregate models have been 
used to test differences in individuals’ travel choices and the relative importance of a 
variety of urban factors in those choices, whereas aggregate models have been used to 
compare average travel characteristics in neighbourhoods of different design or cities of 
different densities (Handy, 1996). Consequently, disaggregate models allow to control for 
individual preferences and socioeconomic characteristics, and may be appropriate to 
understand how and why urban form is linked to travel through individual decisions. 
Meanwhile, aggregate models are useful for analyzing the influence of urban growth on 
travel patterns, since many aspects of the urban form are better measured at an aggregate 
level (the neighbourhood as a whole) and provide further evidence on the potential 
effectiveness of land use policy on reducing automobile dependence (Handy, 1996).  
 
In this paper we analyze the effects of the spatial growth pattern of Santiago on the 
environmental impact of commuting. Whereas it is possible to look at the effect of the built 
environment using disaggregate data (e.g. use GIS to measure land use diversity for buffers 
around individual households), our focus was on the influence of the metropolitan spatial 
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structure, so we conducted an aggregate analysis that considered the characteristics of the 
neighbourhoods as factors that may influence the commuting pattern. Therefore, the 
comuna was selected as the unit of analysis. 
 
Usually, travel pattern is characterized in terms of distance travelled (Vehicle Miles 
Travelled –VMT-) (Bento et al, 2005; Cervero and Murakami, 2010) or travel related 
energy used (per capita gasoline consumption) (Banister et al, 1997; Newman and 
Kenworthy, 1989). These data were not available for Santiago, so we applied the 
methodology proposed by Camagni et al. (2002) and developed by Travisi et al. (2006), but 
adapting it to the data available and the specific circumstances of Santiago. These authors 
constructed an “Impact Intensity Index” that reflects the environmental impact generated by 
commuting in each area, given the modal choice and the time-length of commute-trips. 
Based on this index, we tested if the travel related environmental performance is related 
with particular features of Santiago’s spatial structure. 
 
To obtain the Impact Intensity Index, we first weighted commute-trips by assigning a value 
to each trip, depending on the time of the journey and the transport mode chosen (Table 1). 
To avoid arbitrariness, we weighted trips based on two criteria. On the one hand, the car 
trip was weighted as the most polluting mode, followed by motorcycle and bus, metro, 
pedestrians, bicycle trips and transported passengers; conventionally, the car trip was 
weighted at 1.00 per passenger per minute, and the other modes, respectively: 1/3 
motorcycle and bus, 1/5 metro and zero pedestrians, bicycle trips and transported 
passengers (considering that the impact of the passenger is already absorbed by the driver). 
On the other, we assumed that the impact of a trip per unit of time decreases with the trip 
length (to take into account that for a vehicle with catalytic converter pollution is higher at 
the start of the trip and lower as the fluidity of traffic increases, that the number of bus and 
trains stops is lower in longer journeys, etc.) (Camagni et al, 2002). The weighting system 
was deemed appropriate with respect to the literature (that considers car as the most 
polluting mode, followed by bus and train) and the transport system of Santiago, where 




Table 1. Weights by travel time and travel mode 
Classes of trip time Weights for 
modes 
0–30 min 31–60 min 60 min or 
more 
Average trip time  15 45 75 
Weight per time unit  1.20 1.00 0.80 
Equivalent trip time  18 45 60 
Walking or other soft means 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Bus 0.33 0.13 0.33 0.44 
Private car (driver) 1.00 0.40 1.00 1.33 
Motorcycle 0.33 0.13 0.33 0.44 
Private car (passenger) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Train, underground 0.20 0.08 0.20 0.27 
Source: Camagni et al. (2002) 
 
After weighting commute-trips, we had two values for each comuna, commuters and 
equivalent impact commuters. By comparing these two values we obtained the Impact 
Intensity Index for each comuna, which measures the average impact that can be assigned 
to every commute-trip made. 
 







Where mij is the number of commuters moving within the k
th
 comuna plus the number of 
outward commuting trips generated in the k
th
 comuna for the i
th
 travel mode and the j
th
 trip 
time class; and wij is the weight assigned to the i
th
 travel mode and the j
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 trip time class 















Once the Impact Intensity Index was calculated for each comuna, we conducted a 
regression analysis to test if the environmental impact of commuting is explained by the 
spatial form of Santiago. The Santiago Metropolitan Area is divided in 34 comunas, thus 
the number of observations had to be limited to 34. The low number of observations did not 
allow reflecting the diversity of neighbourhoods by classifying comunas in different type of 
areas. Nevertheless, the estimations provided insights for a discussion on the relationship 
between urban form and travel pattern in cities with strong socio-spatial disparities.    
 
Our analysis was formulated to answer three research questions. First, we wondered about 
the characteristics of the built environment that account for the travel impact. The Impact 
Intensity Index was considered as the dependent variable and the following characteristics 
of the spatial growth pattern as independent variables: the distance of the comuna from the 
city centre (Distance_centre); the residential density of the comuna (Res_density); the 
number of productive businesses per capita by comuna (Prod_pop); and the mobility self-
containment capacity (Self_cont), a variable that estimates to what degree mobility is 
contained within an area, measured as the ratio between the number of commuters moving 
within the comuna and the number of commuters moving within and outside the comuna 




The model was estimated with Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) technique, so the hypotheses 
of constant error variance (homoscedasticity) and no spatial autocorrelation across 
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The hypothesis of homoscedasticity was not rejected
4
 and the level of spatial 
autocorrelation was not high
5
. Therefore, OLS technique was estimated as suitable.  
 
Second, we wondered whether the modal choice is related with the environmental 
performance and, if so, how does the share of public and private transport affect the travel 
impact. The share of public transport (Pub_trans_share) and private transport 
(Pri_trans_share) was calculated as the percentage of all commute-trips made by public or 
private transport. These variables were not included in model (1) because problems of 
multicollinearity due to the high correlation between Pub_trans_share and Pri_trans_share 
and other variables did not allow making inferences with respect to these variables. 
Therefore, the relationship between the environmental impact and the modal choice was 






Lastly, we wanted to identify the factors behind the use of public transport and, 
particularly, to test if the relative competitiveness of public transport was the main reason 
for its use, or other factors played that role. We assumed as an indicator of the 
competitiveness of public transport (Comp_pub_trans) the average time taken for trips 
made by private transport in comparison with public transport (time commuting in private 
transport/public transport). Apart from the competitiveness, we focused on income and two 
                                                          
4 White's test for heteroskedasticity -  Null hypothesis: heteroskedasticity not present 
  Test statistic: LM = 12.7606 
  with p-value = P(Chi-square(14) > 12.7606) = 0.545452 
5 Moran’s I=0.082 
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characteristics of the urban form as factors that may influence the modal choice, distance 
and residential density. As a result, the following model was estimated: 
 
 
The data used in the analysis comes from several sources. Travel data comes from the last 
Origin and Destination Survey of Household Travel (SECTRA, 2006), a household travel 
survey conducted by the Transport Planning Office of the Planning Ministry that brings 
together data on travel modes and trip times of over 6.000 respondents of the Santiago 
Metropolitan Area.6 The geographical variables are from Galetovic and Poduje (2006), 
income data from MIDEPLAN (2006) and information of business activities’ location from 




The estimation of the relationship between the characteristics of the growth pattern and the 
travel impact is displayed in Table 2. The Impact Intensity Index and the distance from the 
city centre are positively related, so the impact increases as the distance does, due to the 
monocentric structure of Santiago. Meanwhile, there is a negative relationship between 
residential density and the Impact Intensity Index: the higher the density, the smaller the 
impact. This outcome is consistent with the literature on urban sprawl, which considers that 
the environmental impact is usually smaller in denser areas. Regarding the variables of the 
functional diversification of the areas, the number of productive businesses per capita and 
the index are positively related, probably because of the commuters that the comuna attracts 
to the business activities. In this sense, containing mobility within the comuna reduces the 
travel impact, as shown by the coefficient relating the mobility self-containment capacity 
and the Impact Intensity Index. 
 
 
                                                          
6 The data of the survey are available at http://sintia.sectra.cl/ 
k43
210i







Table 2. Characteristics of the spatial growth pattern and the travel impact 
Dependent variable: Imp_Inten_Index 
 
  Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value  
const 0.271 0.036 7.430 3.46e-08 *** 
Distance_centre 0.007 0.001 5.062 2.13e-05 *** 
Res_density -0.0004 0.0001 -2.608 0.014 ** 
Prod_pop 0.712 0.186 3.823 0.0006 *** 
Self_Cont -0.203 0.066 -3.067 0.005 *** 
 
R-squared  0. 679  Adjusted R-squared 0.635 
No. of observations 34 
 
Apart from the characteristics of the spatial growth pattern, the environmental effects of 
commuting depend on the transport mode. The estimations show that the environmental 
impact is negatively associated with the use of public transport and positively with private 
transport (Tables 3 and 4). These are the expected outcomes, since we weighted commute-
trips depending on the transport mode and the time spent, assigning lower values to 
commute-trips on public transport. Thus, the outcomes would only have been different if 
the time spent on public transport would have been much longer than the time spent on 
private transport. It should also be noted that the estimations for the variables included in 
the first model are confirmed in the second and third models, i.e. the distance from the city 
centre and the number of productive businesses per capita in the comuna increase the 










Table 3. Public transport share and the travel impact 
Dependent variable: Imp_Inten_Index 
 
  Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value  
const 0.274 0.042 6.495 4.14e-07 *** 
Distance_centre 0.007 0.001 5.878 2.23e-06 *** 
Prod_pop 0.623 0.207 3.017 0.005 *** 
Self_Cont -0.213 0.069 -3.085 0.004 *** 
Pub_trans_share -0.140 0.063 -2.227 0.034 ** 
 
R-squared  0.662  Adjusted R-squared  0.615 
No. of observations 34 
 
Table 4. Private transport share and the travel impact 
Dependent variable: Imp_Inten_Index 
  Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value  
const 0.168 0.019 8.893 6.53e-010 *** 
Distance_centre 0.005 0.001 4.965 2.57e-05 *** 
Self_Cont -0.139 0.054 -2.591 0.015 ** 
Pri_trans_share 0.236 0.034 6.962 9.82e-08 *** 
 
R-squared  0.762  Adjusted R-squared  0.738 
No. of observations 34 
 
Our next step was to identify the reasons for the use of public transport. We focused on 
three set of factors: the competitiveness of public transport; the characteristics of the urban 
form that may have influence on the modal choice, such as the distance to the city centre 
and residential density; and income (Table 5). According to our estimations, there is an 
evidence of inverse relationship between the competitiveness of public transport and its 
share, i.e., despite the relative competitiveness of the public transport in the comuna, 
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commuters choose private transport. This may seem counterintuitive, but the reason seems 
to be that the modal choice is also influenced by the characteristics of the urban form and 
income. Regarding distance, the further the comuna from the city centre, the greater the use 
of public transport. In many cities longer trips are more often made by car, but in Santiago 
mass transport usage increases as the distance does, probably because of the peripheral 
location of low-income commuters. Residential density is also positively related with the 
share of public transport. According to the estimations of model 1, density has a favourable 
effect on the environmental impact of commuting. This means that, despite longer trips due 
to congestion in denser areas, the wider use of public transport in the most populated 
comunas exceeds the negative impact of longer trips. Last, there is a negative relationship 
between income and the public transport share, meaning that the richer the comuna, the 
lower the use of public transport. 
 
Table 5. Factors for the public transport share 
Dependent variable: Pub_trans_share 
  Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value  
const 0.421    0.084     5.033    2.32e-05  ***  
Comp_pub_trans -0.183    0.084    -2.185    0.037     **  
Distance_centre 0.005    0.002    2.183    0.037     **  
Res_density 0.001    0.0003    3.226    0.003     ***  
Income -6.89e-08 2.69e-08 -2.558 0.016 ** 
 
R-squared  0.706  Adjusted R-squared  0.665 
No. of observations 34 
 
Discussion and conclusions 
 
Santiago has grown in the last decades at an accelerated rate, but the growth was socially 
and spatially uneven. The growth of the periphery was boosted by the housing policy, 
where new dwellings could be built at a lower cost; by contrast, in the well-off northeast 
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low-density suburban development expanded the city eastwards. Regarding the functional 
structure, the spread of the city did not lead to a significant decentralization of the 
economy, but on the contrary centripetal forces played their role attracting the most 
dynamic activities to the CBD. 
 
The spatial growth pattern of Santiago has far-reaching social and environmental effects. 
According to the analysis, urban form characteristics have influence on the modal choice 
and the time spent commuting, thus affecting the environmental performance of the 
comunas. Our findings could be summarized in five points. First, the distance from the city 
centre and the environmental impact of commuting are positively related; as the city 
expands while functionally remaining monocentric, work-trip time and the associated 
energy consumption increase. Second, like in North American and European cities, in 
Santiago the environmental impact of commuting is lower in denser areas. Third, the 
functional diversification of the areas could reduce the impact if commuting is contained 
within the comunas. Our estimations show a positive relationship between the number of 
productive businesses per capita and the Impact Intensity Index and a negative relationship 
between the mobility self-containment capacity and the Impact Intensity Index; thus, a 
functional redistribution would increase the environmental impact in those areas where new 
businesses locate, but the pressure on the CBD would be reduced and the overall effect on 
the metropolitan area would be positive by containing commuters within the area they live. 
Four, the use of public transport reduces the environmental impact, whereas the use of 
private transport increases it. Five, the use of public transport depends on its relative 
competitiveness but there is a negative relationship, meaning that the more competitive the 
transport in the comuna, the lower its use. This is so because aside from its relative 
competitiveness, public transport use depends on the wealth of the comuna, the distance 
from the city centre and density.  
 
Judging by the results, it seems that containing the spread of the city and creating compact 
areas where residential and economic activities are mixed would improve the 
environmental performance by facilitating commuting within the comuna. In addition, it 
could also help reducing socio-spatial segregation if the new employment is located closer 
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to low-income comunas, since workers from the whole metropolitan area would be 
attracted to the new employment subcentres.   
 
Obviously, limiting the spatial growth of the city and encouraging a different functional 
organization raises several questions. On the one hand, the effects of land use regulations 
and, particularly, growth boundaries for slowing down suburbanisation and reducing auto 
use remain unclear (Jun, 2004). Furthermore, the several growth boundaries established in 
Santiago since the late seventies were modified as the urban perimeter grew, which limited 
the effects in containing the spatial growth. Thus, it seems that redirecting land use policy 
to encourage development within the already built area and promoting brownfield 
redevelopment programmes could be more effective. In Santiago, an inner city recovery 
program was launched that, despite its problems (increases in real estate values, the 
construction of new urban artefacts in traditional neighbourhoods, the loss of the traditional 
nature of the area) has redirected new citizens towards the centre, as well as yielding other 
social benefits (preservation of green spaces, cost savings in infrastructure and public 
goods, employment creation) (Rojas et al, 2004).  
 
Fostering a more dispersed and polycentric functional organization also entails difficulties. 
A functional redistribution of the economic activities would not lead to a more balanced 
commuting pattern if workers have to cross-commute to the new employment subcentres. 
In addition, firms seek localization advantages in their location decisions and these depend 
on proximity to other firms, meaning the conditions and the scale of localization economies 
should be considered. Similarly, not all the jobs are equally movable. It seems that 
productive activities could be easier redirected to low-income comunas, since personal 
services for medium and high classes, which account for much of the employment for low 
income citizens, will remain in peripheral suburbs as long as the upper classes are not 
attracted to the centre.  
 
Apart from the distribution of households and employment, the impact of mobility depends 
on the transport choice. Increasing the use of public transport reduces the impact, but in 
Santiago the modal choice depends on the relative effectiveness of the transport system, as 
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well as on income and urban characteristics. According to the literature, not only do higher 
densities lead to longer trips due to congestion, but also to more environment friendly 
transportation choices. These results are confirmed for the case of Santiago, since the 
greater use of mass transit in denser areas offsets the longer time spent by commuters, thus 
the overall environmental impact is lower in the densely populated comunas. However, 
unlike in many western cities where longer trips are more often made by car, in Santiago 
the distance increases the use of mass transit. This is probably because low-income 
workers, that are the main users of public transport, commute from the peripheral comunas 
to the city centre. In this sense, results show that the modal choice also depends on 
socioeconomic determinants, particularly income. The use of a car is a matter of social 
status, despite its democratization in the past two decades. Consequently, it seems that 
improving the transportation network would have limited effects, as long as changes in the 
growth pattern, the transportation habits and the social conditions are not addressed.  
 
All in all, this paper presents a preliminary study on the relationship between the urban 
form and travel in a city characterized by strong functional, socio-spatial and socio-
economic disparities. Nevertheless, the research has found some limitations. The 
unavailability of direct data did not allow quantifying the effect of particular characteristics 
of the growth pattern on the environment, i.e. how many miles travelled or how much 
energy would be reduced by changes in particular features of the built environment. Also, 
the methodology used to overcome data limitations was based on weighting of commute-
trips, which made results dependant on those weights. However, trips were weighted based 
on realistic criteria (car as the most polluting mode, followed by motorcycle, bus and train), 
especially considering the circumstances of Santiago (overcrowded buses and metros). 
Lastly, just commute-trips were considered and, despite their share in total trips, other trip 
purposes are becoming more important.  
 
In spite of these limitations, the results provide a starting-point for future research on the 
implications for travel of the spatial growth pattern of Latin American cities. Particularly, 
we believe two topics deserve further research. On the one hand, comparative analysis 
between Latin American cities, in order to gain understanding on how socio-spatial 
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disparities affect travel. On the other, the policy implications of Latin American megacities’ 
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Chapter 3: Understanding density in an uneven city, Santiago de Chile: 
implications for social and environmental sustainability 
 
Abstract: Efforts to promote infill development and to raise densities are growing in many 
cities around the world as a way to encourage urban sustainability. However, in cities 
polarized along socio-economic lines the benefits of densification are not so evident. The 
aim of this paper is to discuss some of the contradictions of densification in Santiago de 
Chile, a city characterized by socio-spatial disparities. To that end, we first use regression 
analysis to explain differences in density rates within the city. The regression analysis 
shows that dwelling density depends on the distance from the city centre, socioeconomic 
conditions and the availability of urban attributes in the area. After understanding the 
density profile, we discuss the implications for travel and the distribution of social 
infrastructures and the environmental services provided by green areas. While at the 
metropolitan scale densification may favour a more sustainable travel pattern, it should be 
achieved by balancing density rates and addressing spatial differences in the provision of 
social services and environmental amenities. We believe a metropolitan approach is 
essential to correct these spatial imbalances and to promote a more sustainable and socially 
cohesive growth pattern.    
 
Keywords: density; urban sustainability; socio-spatial segregation; travel; social services; 
green areas; Santiago de Chile 
Introduction 
 
Looking at the big picture, building dense cities and densifying urban areas are desirable 
planning goals. In several parts of the world densification policies are being implemented to 
contain population growth within the built area and to reduce suburbanization. The 
rationale for infill development and densification is that high-density, compact 
developments are meant to be more sustainable, socially cohesive and economically 
efficient urban forms since they help protecting farmland and open space, they encourage 
walking and the use of mass transportation, they contribute to social cohesion by bringing 
together people from different social backgrounds and they allow a more efficient and 
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intensive use of urban resources because less public expenditure is required to support 
services and infrastructures (see [1-4] for an overview of this debate and [5, 6] for a critique 
of the arguments for densification and compact urban forms).  
 
However, density is a multifaceted concept. Depending on its meaning and definition, the 
rationale, the specific objectives and the scale, density and densification can have several 
meanings. Moreover, the distribution of buildings and population within a city is very 
uneven, so although increasing overall density rates may be a desirable planning goal at the 
metropolitan scale, it can deepen contradictions within the city depending on how it is 
obtained. For instance, promoting infill development and containing suburban sprawl may 
contribute to a more efficient use of services and a more sustainable transportation choice, 
but at the expense of housing affordability and more access to green space in particular 
areas of the city [7]. Density also allows for a better access to services because social 
infrastructures are closer, but it may worsen neighbourhood problems and area 
dissatisfaction [8].  
 
These contradictions are further complicated in cities polarized along socio-economic lines. 
In Latin American cities (and in much of the non-Western world) density rates differ 
dramatically across areas and as such, there are strong differences in mobility, accessibility 
and the use of social infrastructures and amenities. In this social context, the debate on 
density and sustainability should go beyond the coordinates “suburbanization” vs. 
“compactness” and consider critically the living conditions and the accessibility to 
opportunities for people from different social strata due to the spatial distribution of houses, 
jobs, services and urban amenities.  
 
The aim of this paper is to provide a framework for discussing densification in cities where 
strong socio-spatial disparities persist. We illustrate these issues for Santiago de Chile, a 
socio-spatially segregated city [9] where the debate on densification as a mean to contain 
built-up area sprawl is going on. To that end, we first analyze the relationship between 
density and several urban attributes, in order to understand what the drivers of densification 
are. Economic theory has shown that the density profile of a city is basically a function of 
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income, accessibility and living space, i.e. as income rises, households tradeoff between 
accessibility and living space, so density declines with the distance from the city centre 
where workplaces, services and amenities are closer to each other. However, residential 
choices also vary depending on the availability of urban attributes, so the density profile 
may also be explained by the distribution of these urban features across the city. Our 
hypothesis is that density depends on the distance from the centre and the functional 
organization of the city, as well as on the availability of urban attributes, such as social 
equipment and green areas, and the neighbourhood condition. In a city polarized along 
socio-economic lines where the distribution of urban attributes and the neighbourhood 
condition vary strongly across areas, the access to social opportunities is severely affected. 
Thus, our research aims at understanding the role of these urban features in explaining the 
density profile, in order to discuss its implications for social equity and environmental 
sustainability.    
 
We focus on two issues we believe deserve particular attention. First, on accessibility and 
travel. The academic literature has advocated for densification as a way to reduce 
automobile usage and to encourage a more sustainable transportation pattern. In Santiago, 
the spread of the built-up area and rising incomes are leading to a rapid motorization that 
has major consequences for congestion and air pollution, so land use intensification could 
help containing population and foster the use of mass transit, walking and cycling. 
However, given the strong disparities in density rates, densification policies may need to be 
compensated in high-density areas to attain a more rational transportation pattern. Second, 
we discuss the implications for the distribution of social infrastructures and the 
environmental services provided by green areas. High-density areas of the periphery lack 
adequate social infrastructures and green areas, so understanding the implications of density 
and densification policies is a key question for redressing these deficits in the provision of 
social and environmental services.   
 
We support our claims on GIS, regression and statistical analysis. The geographical 
analysis lied in mapping the density profile and the distribution of economic activities, 
social equipment and green areas. The distribution of these urban features was analyzed at 
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the census district level, the scale that fits best the neighbourhood. Regression analysis 
correlated dwelling density with neighbourhood attributes and socioeconomic variables. In 
addition, mobility and socioeconomic indicators were analyzed at the comuna 
(municipality) level, to discuss the implications of the density profile for mobility and 
accessibility to economic activities, social infrastructures and the environmental services 
provided by green areas.  
 
The remainder of the paper is organized in eight sections. Section two provides a literature 
review of the relationship between density and sustainability, underlying the implications of 
densification for sustainable planning. We focus on three issues: the theories that explain 
the density profile of a city; the impacts of density on the environmental, social, and 
economic dimensions of sustainability; and the problems and contradictions that arise when 
promoting densification. After the literature review, the density profile of Santiago is 
explained. In section four the research methodology and the data are explained. Section five 
presents the results of the regression analysis. In sections six and seven the implications for 
accessibility and the urban living conditions of the density profile are discussed. Finally, 
the paper concludes by raising some key issues that should be considered when discussing 
densification in cities characterized by socio-spatial polarization.             
Literature review 
 
Explaining the density profile of a city 
 
Density is probably, the single variable that summarizes best the urban form [10]. In 
general terms, density can be defined as the number of physical units or people in a given 
geographical unit, but this simple definition masks an elusive concept that depends on what 
is being considered in the numerator (people, dwellings, jobs, etc.) and the denominator (total 
area or residential area, gross or net), the data source and the analytical tools (census statistics, 
GIS, satellite images) and the scale (the dwelling, the block, the neighbourhood, the district, the 
municipality, the city, the metropolitan area, the country) (see [11] for an exhaustive 
overview).   
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In fact, although density provides a first approach to a city’s growth pattern, the distribution 
of people in different parts of the city can vary significantly. The density profile reflects the 
spatial variations in density rates within a city. In cities with market-oriented economies 
population density usually declines with the distance from the city centre. As explained by 
the Alonso-Mills-Muth model, households tradeoff between accessibility to workplaces and 
services, which are usually set in central areas, and living space. Consequently, densities 
are higher closer to the Central Business District (CBD) as competition for land increases 
prices and living space has to be reduced to make real estate investments profitable, 
whereas in the suburbs lower pressure on land allows bigger dwellings. In theoretical terms, 
this location pattern has been summarized by a population density distribution in which 
density declines exponentially with the distance from the city centre [12, 13]. However, 
cities are increasingly complex so, rather than a single centre, a polycentric structure fits 
better the contemporary city’s functional organization. As a result, high density areas may 
be close to the several subcentres. On the other hand, distance alone fails to explain much 
of the spatial variation of densities, but these are also related to the spatial distribution of 
other urban attributes. Indeed, neighbourhood amenities and services play an important role 
in the determination of densities, not only at the intra-metropolitan level [14, 15] but also 
between metropolitan areas [16].       
 
Density and sustainability 
 
Density is a key dimension of urban sustainability. It reflects the intensity of land use and 
thus has major consequences for a sustainable use of urban resources. Densification, for 
instance, is seen as an alternative to contain population within the already built area, which 
allows for a more efficient use of previously developed urban area and helps protecting 
agricultural and undeveloped land. It can also favour more sustainable transportation 
choices. In dense and compact urban areas people usually walk, cycle and use mass transit 
more frequently because of the better connectivity and the shorter distance to final 
destinations. In social terms, density is related to social equity and diversity because it 
favors access to social infrastructures and encourages a more diverse, inclusive and livable 
urban environment by facilitating opportunities for social interaction. Economically, a 
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minimum density is necessary for an efficient use of urban resources and to reduce the cost 
of providing infrastructure. These arguments have been very influential in planning and 
there have been widespread claims to raise density as a mean to achieve a more sustainable 
urban growth pattern, although they have also been criticized for not being empirically 
grounded and not guaranteeing the alleged benefits. Let’s discuss in more detail some of 
the implications of density and densification for sustainable planning.  
 
The relationship between density and travel is probably the most widely studied. In 
their seminal work, Newman and Kenworthy [17] associated transport energy 
consumption to density. Other studies confirmed that density is related to distance [18], 
modal choice [19] and energy consumption [20]. The density effect is due to better walking 
conditions, shorter distances to transit service, and less free parking in dense areas 
compared to low-density, suburban areas [21]. The impact on travel time is ambiguous 
because shorter distances are offset by congestion [22] but ultimately fuel consumption per 
capita is usually less because people drive much less in densely populated areas [4]. These 
arguments have been criticized in several ways. Some argue that the impact of urban form 
on travel cannot be reduced to a single variable because other variables also have influence 
[23]. In addition, density and travel may be correlated but this does not necessarily mean 
causality between them [24]. Last, the implications of density and compactness have been 
very influential in urban planning, although their benefits were not fully tested [6].  
 
Dense residential developments may also contribute to a more efficient use of land, 
resources and infrastructure. Higher density benefits land preservation by putting less 
pressure to convert habitat and farmland to urban uses [25]. Nevertheless, high density 
may also result in the loss of open and recreational space within the built -up area [1]. 
Less open space is likely to have adverse effects on urban biodiversity and on the 
ecosystem services provided by green areas; additionally, it can also limit recreational 
opportunities. There is also evidence that high-density development patterns require 
lesser public expenditures to support services and infrastructures than do low-density 
developments [26-28]. The relationship however may not be linear but U-shaped, that 
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is, expenditures decrease first as density increases, but beyond a threshold expenditures 
increase with higher densities [29].  
 
Other dimensions that are linked to density are social equity and the quality of urban life, 
although the direction of this relationship is far from clear. Higher residential density 
promotes resident interaction and sense of community if well combined with other physical 
design attributes (architectural design, streets that encourage urban life, public space, mixed 
land use) [30]. In this sense, it can reduce social segregation and isolation by enhancing 
local social capital [11]. The impacts on social integration depend, however, on how density 
is combined with other urban attributes and infrastructures since otherwise can limit equal 
access to social opportunities. In this vein, Bramley and Power found contradictory results 
on the impacts of compact urban forms on social sustainability; according to their analysis, 
density worsens neighbourhood problems and area dissatisfaction, while improving access 




Despite the, sometimes, ambiguous effects of high-density, concerns about raising densities 
are growing in several parts of the world [2, 3]. There are essentially three ways to 
densification [31]: direct state-driven interventions (through, for example, public housing 
provision); supply-side policies via stimuli (incentives) to market producers or, contrary, 
land use regulations; or demand-side measures, for example using taxation to influence 
households’ location preferences (i.e., taxing differently various housing types, or 
increasing the cost of using car).       
 
However, densification is a complex process that often faces several problems. Housing 
consumption patterns in Europe, North and South America reveal that a large part of the 
population prefers low-density, suburban developments, although certainly there are groups 
who seem to attach relatively more value to centrality and live at higher densities than 
would be expected from their incomes. If this is the case, urban planning has to reorient 
individual preferences and correct market outcomes in the name of improving social, 
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economic and environmental performance. In addition, fostering infill development may be 
particularly troublesome in already built-up areas, as people often oppose densification 
because it is associated with crowding and thus perceived by residents as a factor that 
erodes the aesthetic quality of the neighbourhood [32]. Lastly, densification may not be the 
most effective solution in every case. The potential of fostering infill development is 
limited because it operates at the margins represented by new construction since new 
buildings are just a small portion of the housing stock [33]. In fact, depending on the 
specific planning objective other tools may be more effective, for example, changes in 
transportation costs for reducing car dependency or zoning and land use regulations for 
preserving natural land [34].  
 
The density profile of Santiago 
 
The Santiago Metropolitan Area (SMA) is an urban area of 6.1 million inhabitants, the 35% 
of the total population of Chile (INE, Estimated population density 2012). SMA is 
composed of the 32 comunas (municipalities) of the Santiago province, plus the adjacent 
comunas of San Bernardo and Puente Alto and covers 84,000 ha and a continuous urban 
area that is estimated to slightly exceed 60,000 ha [35]. Population and the built footprint 
have expanded steadily over the past three decades driven by the economic dynamism of 
the city, although the built area has grown at a higher rate than population, meaning a 
decrease in density rates [36]. Nevertheless, residential density within the built-up area is 
84 inhabitants per ha, which is medium by international standards (see 
www.demographia.com for international comparisons).  
 
There are strong differences in density rates within the metropolitan area. As mentioned 
above, for most cities with market-oriented economies density declines with the distance 
from the city centre. This pattern holds for Santiago (Figure 1). However, density also 
depends on households’ socio-economic conditions. Figure 2 shows dwelling density at the 
census district level (mind that the darkest areas represent the 75, 90 and 99 percentiles 
respectively, to show where the very high density areas are). The densest districts are 
located in the city centre and the low-income peripheral comunas of the South and the 
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Northwest. Accessibility to employment and services explain the density of the central area 
whereas social housing is responsible for the high density rates in the periphery. In Chile 
the housing facilities provided by the state have been extensive since its main objective was 
to reduce the housing deficit [37], but the emphasis on reducing the housing deficit 
neglected the impacts on the urban form. Maximizing housing supply led to peripheral 
locations and numerous houses per project in order to reduce construction costs, thus 
spreading the urbanized land and concentrating large parts of population in these areas.  
 
Figure 1. Relationship between dwelling density and the distance from the centre (km), 
sorted by district 
 












Figure 2. Dwelling density at the census district level  
 
Source: Author’s own elaboration based on the Pre-census data 
 
The density profile of SMA reflects the spatial distribution of households along socio-
economic lines. Santiago stands among the most unequal cities in the world, with an 
income based GINI of 0.55 (UN set the alert line of inequality on an income based GINI of 
0.40; other Latin American cities above this line are Bogotá (0.61), Mexico City (0.56), 
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Quito (0.54), Rio de Janeiro (0.53), Buenos Aires (0.52) Guatemala City (0.50) and 
Montevideo (0.45) whereas below stands Caracas (0.39)) [38]. Santiago is socio-spatially 
segregated [9, 39]: richest comunas are clustered in the northeast cone (Providencia, 
Vitacura Las Condes, Lo Barnechea) whereas the poorest spread to the south and the 
northwest (Figure 3). Residential segregation in Santiago, as well as in other Latin 
American cities, has historical roots, but it seems that recent changes in the urbanization 
pattern by both the public and the private sector are changing its dimension and 
characteristics. Social housing is being decentralized further out the metropolitan area, 
which is deepening accessibility related inequalities and worsening living conditions since 
they often lack basic social services and infrastructures [40].  Additionally, new residential 
patterns for the elite are also emerging on peri-urban land and some working-class 
comunas. Since the 1990s intra-metropolitan migration from inner city to the periphery is 
taking place (almost every central comunas lost population, whereas some peripheral 
comunas experienced population growth rates of 200%). New residential developments in 
peri-urban areas include low-density, scattered mega-projects (up to 50.000 inhabitants), 
many of them designed as gated-communities [36, 41]. Along with the urban fringe, upper-
income groups are also moving to traditional comunas where social housing prevails. This 
is quite a new phenomenon since historically socio-spatial division was at the comuna 
scale, but the new residential patterns of middle- and high-income dwellers are 
transforming the homogeneous social structure of these comunas. This phenomenon, 
however, is not leading to a social mix but to a reduction on the geographical scale of 
segregation [9]. Richer and poorer neighbors locate closer to one another but this results in 
‘tectonic’ juxtapositions of polarized socioeconomic groups rather than in socially 
cohesive communities [42] (pp. 2458). Nevertheless, some positive effects for social 
integration have also been pointed out, such as bringing jobs into the neighbourhoods, 
improving public services and even sparking a renewed sense of pride among lower‐ class 
residents [43]. Regarding densities, the new location pattern of upper-classes is balancing 
density rates at the comuna level but increasing fragmentation inside the comunas, as lower 





Figure 3. Household income by comuna 
 
Source: Author’s own elaboration based on SINIM data 
 
Along with the housing policy and households’ location preferences, planning has been a 
major force in shaping the density pattern of Santiago, particularly since the orthodox 
neoliberal reforms of the late seventies. In 1979 the Military Government launched the so 
called “National Policy of Urban Development”, which incorporated free market principles 
into urban planning. The land market was the mechanism to decide between agricultural or 
urban uses and thus, market forces guided the spread of the urban fringe [44]. In fact, an 
urban growth boundary of 100,000 ha was established, when at that time the built-up area 
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was around 40,000 ha. These radical changes had major consequences as the boundary had 
no real effect in controlling the spread of the urbanized area and low-density residential 
patterns emerged in the periphery and along main transportation axis. In 1994 a new plan 
was approved to correct some of the spatial imbalances produced by the neoliberal policies.  
 
The Santiago Metropolitan Regulatory Plan (SMRP) was committed to control the 
excessive spatial growth and the urban area was reduced to 60,000 ha. It also increased 
density rates to 150 inhabitants per ha and reinforced central government’s role in planning 
[45]. However, in 1997 the SMRP was modified to extend the urban area 17,000 ha and to 
stop the densification process started three years before. It also introduced conditional 
planning, by which the private sector was responsible for providing the infrastructures 
needed in the new residential developments. Conditional planning introduced the private 
sector into planning and contributed to a further segmentation of the housing market since 
the new residential areas were targeted for middle- and high-income households, whereas 
almost no social housing was constructed in these areas [46]. In 2003 the SMRP was again 
updated to include some southern and western areas within the city limit and in 2013 a new 
amendment was approved to extend the city other 10,000 ha and to define average and 
maximum density rates.  
 
The many changes in metropolitan planning during the past two decades reflect the 
difficulties of regulating the spatial growth pattern of Santiago. The successive extensions 
of the urban area were aimed at regulating the inorganic growth of some areas but, on the 
other hand, encouraged new residential developments in the periphery, contributing further 
to the spread of the urban footprint. By contrast, densification was not considered as a mean 
to reorient urban growth within the city limits, with the exception of the 1994 SMRP and 
some local plans. In the central comuna of Santiago an inner-city recovery program was 
implemented to attract middle- and high-income residents, but at the metropolitan scale 
densification has not been a priority. The latest amendment included average and maximum 
density rates for different areas of the city, but these were intended to meet technical norms, 
not strategic goals. 
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Data, research strategy and variables  
 
After characterizing the density profile of SMA, in this section we deal with the research 
strategy and the data used to understand the role of urban attributes in explaining density 
and its social and environmental implications.  
 
The research strategy comprised three stages. First, a geographical analysis was conducted 
at the neighbourhood level to understand the density profile of SMA. The census district 
was chosen as the scale for the analysis because it is the geographic unit closest to the 
neighbourhood. Block and census district data came from the 2011 pre-census, the 
information gathered previously for the 2012 census. The 2012 census data was not 
available due to technical problems in the census design and the previous 2002 census was 
considered too old given the socio-demographic changes of the past decade, so the 2011 
pre-census information was judged as optimal. The pre-census compiled physical 
information of dwellings, commercial and productive activities, social infrastructures, green 
areas and the streets’ state of conservation. This information was geocoded and analyzed at 
the block and census district level using ArcGIS 10 software. Geographical analysis 
included mapping the density profile of Santiago, the distribution of productive and 
commercial activities, green areas, social equipment and transport infrastructures.  
 
In addition, regression analysis was carried out to analyze what neighbourhood attributes 
have an influence on the density profile. As mentioned, the academic literature has 
explained density variations as a product of the functional organization of the city, i.e. the 
distance to the city centre, the distribution of productive activities, and the availability of 
services and amenities in the area. Given this theoretical framework, the following equation 
was considered to investigate the relationship between density and urban characteristics in 
Santiago 
                 (1)  
 
where d, dwelling density, is a function of: the functional organization of the city (FO), 
including the distance to the city centre and the distribution of productive and commercial 
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activities; the social equipment (SE), including schools, sport facilities and other social 
services; the neighbourhood condition (NC), including the quality of streets and sidewalks 
and the availability of facilities; and the green areas (GA). Dwelling density was considered 
as the dependent variable instead of population density, because it reflects land use 
intensity and, besides, it was the only variable available from the pre-census (nevertheless, 
in the 2002 census dwelling and population density were correlated, R
2
=0.84). The distance 
to the city centre was calculated as straight-line (Euclidean) distance between census 
district centroids and the city centre (Plaza Italia). For the distribution of productive, 
commercial, educational, social, sport and neighbourhood facilities densities were used, i.e. 
number of units per census district area. The density of neighbourhood facilities included 
the amount of bike lanes, benches, garbage bins, street lights, roofed bus stops and 
playgrounds per area, so this variable, as well as the quality of streets and sidewalks, were 
deemed as proxies of the neighbourhood condition. The quality of streets and sidewalks 
was derived from the number of streets and sidewalks in bad conditions reported in the 
pre-census, i.e. the lower the amount of streets and sidewalks in bad state, the better the 
neighbourhood condition. Last, green areas were calculated as total vegetation per 
square meter, including designated and non-designated green space. This information 
was provided by the Ministry of Housing and Urbanism (MINVU). Although just 
designated areas would be a better indicator of the social and aesthetic services 
provided by parks and green areas, total vegetation was considered because it reflects 
better the environmental services provided by urban vegetation.  
 
As little is known about the exact nature of the relationship between neighbourhood 
attributes and the density profile of a city, extent testing was conducted to determine the 
best possible fit between dependent and independent variables. The following model was 
estimated as it seemed satisfactory with respect to the theoretical framework and the 
empirical fit: 
 
                                                            
                                                 




where ε represents the stochastic error term. The model was estimated with Ordinary 
Least Squares (OLS), given the linear relationship between variables.  
 
Apart from neighbourhood characteristics, a second regression model was estimated 
introducing socioeconomic variables. Model 2 incorporated the following variables: 
disposable budget per capita, in order to understand the influence of municipal 
expenditures; and a dummy variable for neighbourhoods belonging to rich and poor 
comunas to analyze whether household’s average income has a different influence on 
dwelling density depending on socioeconomic status. These variables were only available 
at the comuna level since the pre-census did not provide socio-economic information. 
Santiago is divided at the local level into comunas that, despite their size (from 50,000 to 
850,000 inhabitants), represent the lowest statistical unit. Using data from different scales 
entailed some limitations. The analysis would benefit if socioeconomic data would have 
been available at the census district level because the potential influence of a wider range of 
socioeconomic variables could have been tested. Moreover, comuna-level socioeconomic 
data may soften spatial inequalities since disparities between neighbourhoods are somewhat 
compensated at an aggregate level. While acknowledging these limitations, the research 
strategy and the data used provided an adequate framework for understanding the influence 
of the functional organization of the city, the availability of urban attributes and the 
neighbourhood condition in explaining the density profile. 
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of the variables 
Variable name N Mean S.D. Min Max 
Neighbourhood-level 339     
Density 339 38.76 25.82 0.128 215.2 
Distance 339 9518.3 4975.1 0 22718 
Productive facilities 339 61.203 92.785 0 935 
Commercial facilities 339 219.50 188.31 3 1731 
Educational facilities 339 18.133 15.206 0 118 
Sport facilities  339 5.2212 4.9627 0 39 
Public  services 339 3.9911 8.2316 0 107 
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Neighbourhood facilities 339 121.6 106.06 0 809 
Streets in bad condition 339 385.76 299.46 5 2324 
Sidewalks in bad condition 339 371.83 277.13 5 2153 
Vegetation 339 64.696 61.739 0 475 
Comuna-level 34     
Household Income (USD) 34 2,204 1,617.3 924.5 7,464.6 
Disposable budget per capita (USD) 34 361.5 331.5 112.6 1,182.3 
 
Understanding density in Santiago 
 
The estimation of the relationship between neighbourhood attributes and dwelling density 
is displayed in Table 2 (Model 1). It is worth noting that all variables are measured in 
densities except distance (meters) and vegetation (square meters) to reflect the relative 
intensity of urban attributes in an area. Similar to other cities, in Santiago also density 
declines with the distance from the city centre, although probably less because of the 
housing policy, which located large segments of population away from the urban core, and 
because of the inorganic growth pattern of the city; in fact, the coefficient relating density 
and distance is small in absolute values (0.06 percentage points per km). The other two 
variables of the functional organization of the city, the density of productive and 
commercial activities show a negative and positive relationship, respectively. Dwelling 
density declines where more productive facilities are located because some industries are 
designated in non-residential areas. By contrast, commercial activities are a magnet for 
residents, so dwelling density increase in denser commercial areas. Regarding the variables 
related to social equipment, the density of schools and sport facilities increase dwelling 
density, whereas public services decrease density. This is so because the stock of school 
and sport facilities depend on population, but the distribution of public services in the 
metropolitan area is decided mainly by the regional or the national government. Authorities 
cluster public services in the centre of the neighborhood to ease accessibility, causing 
dwelling density to be lower where public services are concentrated. The availability of 
neighbourhood facilities and the quality of sidewalks also have positive impacts on density, 
while the quality of streets has a negative impact; beware that the fewer streets and 
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sidewalks in bad state, the better the neighbourhood condition, so the negative 
coefficient reflects that dwelling density rises where sidewalks are in better condition, 
whereas it declines where streets are in worse state. This may be due to the distribution of 
responsibilities among authorities at different spatial scales. Local governments are 
responsible for neighbourhood facilities and sidewalks, whereas regional and national 
governments are mainly in charge of streets. As a result, neighbourhoods vary in their state 
of conservation depending on local authorities’ expenditures. Thus, local governments’ 
expenditure on facilities has an impact on density since the better the neighbourhood 
condition, the higher the density. Last, vegetation is negatively related to density. This is 
the expected outcome since in neighbourhoods where large designated and non-designated 
green areas exist there is less urban land for residential uses.    
 
Table 2. Regression of neighbourhood level attributes and economic condition on dwelling 
density (N=339) 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 
Coeff.       P>|t|      Coeff.       P>|t|      
distance -.0000678    0.000     -.0000612    0.000     
lg_ prod -.1725768    0.000     -.1647651    0.000     
lg_ comer .2867376    0.000      .2328639    0.001      
     
lg_ edu .3235016    0.000      .3133129    0.000      
lg_sport .1337914    0.026      .1233934    0.040      
lg_ pub_serv -.0963492     0.043     -.0944277    0.045     
     
lg_neighb_facil .2277922    0.037      .2294492    0.039        
lg_sidewalk -2.106483    0.000     -2.224725    0.000     
lg_streets 2.0396    0.000      2.204095    0.000      
     
vegetation -.0048482    0.000     -.0045535    0.000      
     
budget_sq      1.08e-06    0.023      
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poor_dummy   .3305232    0.023       
rich_dummy   (dropped)  
     
 cons 1.829137    0.000      1.424186    0.008      
     
R-squared      0.4129  0.4312  
Adj R-squared 0.3874  0.4013  
 
The results are basically explained by diverse location preferences and complex 
interactions underlying market outcomes, land use planning and the distribution of 
responsibilities among authorities at different scales. Distance and the density of 
commercial activities reflect the priority given by households to accessibility to work 
(proxied by distance) and shops relative to space. Other urban attributes also influence 
location choices and concentration in particular areas of the city, such as the density of 
schools, sport facilities, neighbourhood infrastructures and sidewalks’ condition. On the 
other hand, land use planning and zoning is the reason why density decreases where 
productive activities are located, since large part of industrial activities are located just in 
designated areas. Vegetation also is more abundant where density rates are lower due to 
zoning, but also because less land has been converted to urban uses. Last, local 
governments’ expenditure help to understand the distribution of urban attributes across 
neighbourhoods, thus influencing residential location choices and dwelling density. 
 
In fact, Model 2 supports the positive influence of municipal expenditures on dwelling 
density, as illustrated by the coefficient relating dwelling density and disposable budget per 
capita. Model 2 also shows that income and density are inversely related in high- and low-
income areas, i.e., while in rich comunas, the higher the income the lower the density, in 
low-income areas the opposite is true, the higher the income the higher the density. The 
results suggest high income household’s preferences for low-density living whereas low-
income households value accessibility and the greater availability of urban attributes in 
dense areas at the expense of reduced living space and environmental services. This is 
reasonable considering the lack of social services, infrastructures and connectivity in low-
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income peri-urban areas [40], reflecting low income households' preferences for living in 
better connected dense areas where basic services are available.   
Implications for accessibility and travel 
 
Mobility is a critical issue that has far reaching social and environmental implications. In 
the past three decades Santiago has undergone a rapid motorization that has increased 
traffic congestion and air pollution. Nowadays Santiago suffers from among the worst air 
pollution problems in Latin American cities, due to the high concentration of PM 10, PM 
2.5, CO and NOx [35]. From a social perspective, there are significant differences in 
motorization and mobility rates depending on socioeconomic status despite the rapid 
increase in auto ownership of all income groups, thus affecting equal access to social 
opportunities [47].  
 
The urban growth pattern and neighbourhood characteristics influence accessibility and 
travel. On the one hand, although income dominates the household vehicle ownership 
decision, some built environment characteristics also have an influence, such as dwelling 
unit density, local land use mix, street layout, distance to CBD and proximity to Metro [48]. 
On the other, the modal choice, the time spent travelling and the environmental impact are 
also affected by the urban form and the spatial organization of the city [49]. Despite the 
urban outgrowth that is gradually transforming the city into a metropolitan region with 
several employment nodes, Santiago today remains, to a large extent, monocentric. 
Productive activities cluster in Santiago and some other comunas of the first ring, whereas 
commercial activities are even more centralized (Figure 4). The spatial organization of 
economic activities defines the commuting pattern and, thus, over 40% of the commutes at 
peak hours end in the CBD [50]. As mentioned, the city centre also hosts densest districts 
because of the priority given by residents to accessibility to employment and commerce. 
Consequently, the city centre is where a higher percentage of commuting is contained 






Figure 4. The distribution of productive (a) and commercial (b) activities    










b) Location of commercial activities  
 
Source: Author’s own elaboration based on the Pre-census data 
 
However, the mobility pattern is not only from the periphery to the centre, but also from 
low- to high-income areas. If comunas are classified by income quintiles, the richest areas 
(comunas of the 4th and 5th quintiles), attract almost 70% of commuting trips. Moreover, 
the commuters from the richest comunas move within their area and there are almost no 
work-trips to the poorest areas. By contrast, almost 60% of the commuters of the first 
quintile and 50% of the second travel to the richest comunas. This is particularly important 
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for populated comunas of the periphery. Maipú, San Bernardo, Puente Alto, La Florida, 
where more than 2.3 million people live, lack productive and commercial activities so 
people have to commute to the CBD or cross-commute to rich areas. As a result, average 
work-trip time in these comunas exceeds 40 minutes, more than twice the time of richer 
comunas [50]. 
 
This mobility pattern has far-reaching implications for social and environmental 
sustainability. As the city expands while functionally remaining monocentric, travel time 
increases, especially for those living further out, and the environmental impact of 
commuting worsens [49]. From a social perspective, the time spent on working trips is an 
important source of inequality for those workers that have to commute to the city centre or 
have to cross-commute from poor to rich comunas. In fact, the uneven distribution of jobs 
could be used as a proxy for measuring conditions of social exclusion since people living in 
job-poor neighbourhoods would have to travel greater distances to participate in the 
workforce than people in job-rich areas, holding other effects constant [51].    
 
Land use policy could be used to achieve a more sustainable and fairer mobility pattern. At 
the metropolitan scale, containing the spread of the built-up area and promoting infill 
development could reduce the environmental impact of commuting. On a previous work we 
showed that, like in other cities, in Santiago also densification favours a more 
environmental friendly transportation pattern because of the wider use of mass 
transportation [49]. However, in dense areas trips are also longer due to the peripheral 
location and the traffic congestion, although the overall environmental impact is lower 
because the wider use of public transport offsets the negative impact of longer trips. Thus, 
while for the metropolitan area promoting infill development would contain 
suburbanization, at the comuna level balancing density rates would support more rational 
transportation choices, meaning increasing density in some areas and reducing density in 
others. Reducing density rates in the periphery and promoting densification in areas close to 
the city centre is no easy task. The housing policy, responsible for much of the residential 
developments of the periphery, considered only the price of the land and building costs, but 
not the cost of communications nor other social infrastructure, so social housing areas have 
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high density rates but lack adequate accessibility, social infrastructures and amenities [52]. 
Redressing these deficits would reduce traffic congestion while improving the living 
conditions in these areas. Additionally, there is room for densifying some areas of the well-
communicated comunas of the north and the well-off northeast. To that end, a combination 
of incentives and regulations on the housing supply and demand, and direct state-driven 
interventions (i.e., public housing provision) may need to be employed.    
 
Along with infill development and balanced density rates, a better jobs-housing balance 
would allow commuters to move within their area of residence. While the decentralization 
of some industries could lead to a new spatial equilibrium, we believe promoting more 
compact areas where residential and economic activities are mixed would be more 
effective. Our regression analysis showed that dwelling density is related to the density of 
productive and commercial activities, so creating compact areas where residential spaces 
mingle with productive and commercial activities could also help balancing density rates. 
Obviously, the conditions and the scale of localization economies should be weighted. Firms 
seek localization advantages in their location decisions and these depend on proximity to other 
firms. Nevertheless, the positive effects should be considered, not only for mobility, but also for 
reducing residential segregation and improving the living conditions through more compact 
communities. 
 
Implications for the provision of social and environmental services 
 
Dwelling density is also relevant for the distribution of social infrastructure and the 
environmental services provided by urban vegetation. According to our estimations, social 
services are related to dwelling density, meaning densest areas have the densest network of 
social, educational, sport and neighbourhood facilities. This may be the expected outcome 
since the distribution of social services and infrastructures depend on population, but it is 
somewhat interesting given the socio-spatial polarization that characterizes the SMA. 
Nevertheless, differences in access to social services are not due to their spatial distribution 
but to their quality in different areas of the city. The northeast cone hosts high quality 
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services typical of a global city, whereas social infrastructures in other comunas, 
particularly in the periphery, lack quality standards [53].   
 
By contrast, the distribution of vegetation is more uneven. Regression model showed that 
dwelling density and the urban vegetation are inversely related. The East and, particularly, the 
low density northeast cone hosts the greatest amount of urban vegetation, whereas in high 
density areas such as the central comuna of Santiago and some comunas of the west and the 
south, green areas are significantly scarcer (Figure 5). However, rather than on density, the 
distribution of vegetation depends on income. The five richest comunas have 34% of total 
surface while in the five comunas with the lowest income barely exceeds 8%. If instead of total 
vegetation, only parks are considered it holds that the higher the household income, the greater 
the total green surface, the bigger the size and the better the accessibility [54]. 
 
Figure 5. The distribution of urban vegetation. 
 
Source: Author’s own elaboration based on MINVU data 
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Land use policy favours the proliferation of green areas in low-density settlements. Current 
regulation for calculating the amount of green surface sets different minimum standards for 
low- and high-density settlements. In areas where residential density is below 70 
inhabitants per ha the required minimum green surface is 10 sq meter per inhabitant, 
whereas in high-density settlements minimum surface is much less [55]. As such, in high-
density comunas where social housing is localized average green area is 1.3-3.5 sq meter 
per inhabitant [56]. Another significant side-effect is the scatterization of small areas at the 
expense of big parks because a minimum size is not defined [54]. While small parks are 
usually more accessible, social and ecological functions of green areas require a minimum 
surface, as well as vegetation cover and design characteristics [54].  
 
Green areas are essential for the quality of life and urban sustainability. Contemporary 
research has shown the aesthetic, psychological, health, social, economic and 
environmental benefits of natural features [57]. The latter are particularly important in 
Santiago considering the scope of the environmental problems, particularly air pollution. 
Green areas provide basic environmental services such as air and water purification, wind 
and noise filtering and microclimate stabilization, key functions for the urban metabolism. 
As such, the uneven distribution of vegetation does not allow fulfilling these functions in 
particular areas of the city. In addition, the East and the South, where low-income families 
reside, also present worst environmental conditions, such as higher concentration of air 
pollutants and lower protection levels against natural hazards like floods [58]. While the 
distribution of environmental conditions is the result of the urbanization process and more 
affluent peoples’ location choices in areas of better environmental standards (under the 
Andean cordillera, where air pollutants and water flow downstream), the uneven 
distribution of urban vegetation does not provide adequate natural conditions to alleviate 
environmental problems in low-income settlements, thus reinforcing environmental 
injustice and segregation [59]. 
 
A major limitation to overcome inequalities in social and environmental service provision 
is the governance structure. Comunas are responsible for budget, land use planning and 
public service delivery, but in practice municipal autonomy is limited. This is particularly 
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harmful for lower-income comunas where social housing is located, since while the central 
government decides its location in a top-down process, municipalities remain responsible 
for providing public services as paving, lighting, drainage, basic health care, and primary and 
secondary education. Local authorities rely on property and other local taxes (i.e. business, 
vehicular taxes, etc.) but the tax scheme reinforces income gaps between wealthier and poorer 
urban areas because tax revenues are much lower in low-income areas [60]. Wealthier 
municipalities are able to levy more resources through the property tax because land and asset 
prices are much higher [61] and because they can also obtain more revenues from other taxes 
(for instance vehicular taxes, since more residents own a car). Complementary funding 
sources exist but they do not compensate for income and revenue disparities, in part 
because money transfers from the central government do not fully account for the social 
services provided by low-income comunas given their limited revenues, and also because 
wealthier municipalities have more negotiating power with the central government [53]. 
The result is a self-reinforcing mechanism for socio-spatial disparities in which wealthier 
municipalities are able to provide better public goods and services. 
 
Different institutional mechanisms could be adopted to reduce spatial disparities in social 
and environmental services provision, from reforming cooperation mechanisms between 
comunas to re-shaping or even creating new governance structures at the metropolitan scale. 
While the former could yield some partial benefits if compensatory mechanisms are well 
designed and rich areas are efficiently enforced to redistribute wealth, a metropolitan 
governmental authority can favour policy coherence and improve service delivery across 
municipal boundaries [60]. Currently there are no strategic, metropolitan-wide planning 
mechanisms, despite major metropolitan problems, such as urban sprawl, transportation, 
housing policy, the spatial dimension of social services’ provision or the environmental 
problems. A metropolitan authority would provide a comprehensive, city-wide, approach to 
urbanism, thus better coping with the challenges that pose urban growth and densification with 







The aim of this paper has been to introduce some issues that should be borne in mind when 
considering densification in cities characterized by socio-spatial polarization.  To that end, 
we first have analyzed the role urban conditions have for explaining density in different 
areas of the city. Leaving aside the uncertainty about causality, regression analysis has 
shown that dwelling density in the SMA is related to the functional organization of the city, 
the availability of urban attributes in the area, the neighbourhood condition, local 
authorities’ expenditures and the socioeconomic conditions. The city centre hosts the 
densest districts due to the high concentration of commercial activities in the area, although 
some peripheral comunas also have very high density rates because of the housing policy. 
On the other side, high-income areas adjacent to the CBD have low density rates, thus 
having better access to employment, services and amenities while maintaining good 
environmental standards. Given this density profile, density declines with the distance from 
the city centre, although less than in other cities with market-oriented economies. 
Commercial activities are a magnet for residents, thus increasing density, whereas 
productive activities decrease density because much of them are clustered in non-residential 
areas. Other urban attributes also help understanding dwelling density. The availability of 
social services, collective facilities and good neighbourhood conditions have positive 
impacts on density, while the quality of streets has a negative impact. This may be due to 
the distribution of responsibilities among authorities at different spatial scales, since 
comunas are responsible for providing public services and neighbourhood infrastructures 
whereas regional and national governments are in charge of streets. Thus, comunas’ 
expenditure on social services attracts residents to the area and, in fact, regression analysis’ 
results show that municipal budget also has a positive influence on dwelling density. On the 
other hand, vegetation is negatively related to dwelling density because where urban space 
is designated as green area, less land is available for residential use. Last, income has the 
opposite influence on density in rich and poor areas, i.e., in rich areas density decrease as 
income rise whereas in poor areas the reverse happens. This points out to divergent 
preferences for the rich and the poor, the former valuing low-density living and the latter 
better accessibility and availability of urban attributes at the expense of higher density rates.      
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These results suggest that any policy related to densification needs to be taken cautiously 
and should consider the scale, its objectives and the specific benefits of a density policy. 
While at the metropolitan scale promoting infill development and increasing density rates 
could help containing urban sprawl and favour a more sustainable mobility pattern by 
reducing travel distance and encouraging public transport usage, it may deepen disparities 
between comunas if specific objectives and density targets in different areas of the city are 
not considered. As such, raising density at the metropolitan scale should be complemented 
by balancing density rates between comunas and favouring a more decentralized 
organization of economic and commercial activities, in order to favour the jobs-housing 
balance. Regarding the provision of social services and environmental amenities, the 
priority should be correcting spatial imbalances. In some peripheral comunas where social 
housing is located, density is too high and lack adequate social and environmental 
conditions, so reducing density rates would improve the living conditions while facing 
socio-spatial segregation. By contrast, density could be raised in some areas close to the 
city centre with better social and environmental conditions, dealing with spatial imbalances 
in these comunas, while coping with the general goal of densification at the city level.   A 
metropolitan approach is essential for a comprehensive urban planning that aims at tackling 
the implications of the urban growth pattern for environmental sustainability and socio-
spatial equity. Major challenges, such as suburban sprawl, transportation, the housing 
policy, the distribution of social services and environmental amenities are metropolitan in 
scope, so metropolitan-wide governance mechanisms should be considered. While 
reforming actual coordination mechanisms could yield some benefits if richer comunas are 
efficiently enforced to transfer resources to poorer comunas to compensate for their lack of 
adequate social and environmental conditions, we believe a metropolitan authority would 
be a better institutional response for the challenges the city faces. 
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Chapter 4: Distributive Politics and Spatial Equity: The Allocation of 
Public Investment in Chile  
 
This paper analyzes the influence of electoral concerns on investment distribution from the 
central government to Chilean municipalities. Drawing upon panel data, the paper shows 
that investment is mediated by pork-barrel and political budget cycles, as well as favouring 
the relatively better-off areas. Estimations also reveal that resources are channelled to the 
municipalities where the vote margin in local elections is larger whereas national results are 
not relevant, indicating that local governments’ lobbying capacity is prioritized over 
national electoral interests. Based on these results, the implications for regional governance 
and for reducing the margin of arbitrary allocations are discussed. 
 
Keywords: Distributive politics; pork-barrel; political budget cycle; equity-efficiency trade-




How is public investment allocated? Is it distributed in response to social equity or 
economic efficiency criteria, or mediated by political considerations? Economic and 
regional development literature has traditionally analyzed the role of public investment as a 
trade-off between equity and efficiency (Richardson, 1979). This debate has recently 
intensified with the contributions of the new economic geography literature, which state 
that spatial agglomerations of economic activity may benefit national growth and, thus, 
policies that seek to reduce regional economic inequalities may in fact be nationally 
inefficient (Martin, 2008). Intermingled in this debate stand the questions about the spatial 
organization of the state and whether decentralization may favour a more efficient and 
balanced spatial pattern or, conversely, be a further source for spatial inequalities and 
inefficiencies (for a theoretical discussion, see Rodríguez‐Pose and Gill (2005); for 
empirical evidence of the effects of devolution on regional disparities Rodríguez-Pose and 




Beyond efficiency and equity considerations, in the past two decades a burgeoning 
literature on distributive politics has documented the significance of partisan and electoral 
concerns for public resource distribution in many countries around the world (Golden and 
Min, 2013; Kramon and Posner, 2013). The underlying hypothesis is that politicians are 
motivated by the desire to retain public office and, consequently, elected officials allocate 
specific types of goods to specific groups of constituents in electoral districts at specific 
times in the electoral cycle (Golden and Min, 2013, p.78). Political interference includes 
manipulating fiscal variables along the electoral cycle to convince voters that the politicians 
have recently been doing ‘an excellent job’, i.e. the political business cycle (Rogoff, 1990), 
showing political favouritism for culturally constructed population subgroups (Kramon and 
Posner, 2013) or benefitting particular areas to maximize their re-election chances, i.e. 
‘pork-barrel’ (Tavits, 2009).  
 
This paper analyzes the existence of political concerns in the distribution of investment 
funds from the central government to municipalities in Chile, and its implications for 
territorial cohesion. In particular, it drives attention to three aspects of distributive politics. 
First, the existence of electoral concerns in investment distribution is explored and 
contrasted with the capacity of municipalities to generate revenues and to formulate 
investment projects. The aim is to test whether public investment, when mediated by pork-
barrel and political business cycle considerations, pursues efficiency by concentrating on 
the relatively better-off areas, at the expense of spatial equity. Second, the paper explores 
how grant allocation varies along the electoral cycle in both, municipalities that are ruled 
by political parties of the central government’s ruling coalition, and rival municipalities. 
Third, it examines whether the central government transfers resources to the municipalities 
where the vote margin in local and national polls is larger or, conversely, where 
competition is stronger. The purpose is to determine not only whether core or swing 
municipalities are benefitted, but also if distribution follows national government’s interest 
or, on the contrary, is due to municipal governments’ capacity to put pressure on the central 
government, encouraged by their electoral power. Based on these results, the paper 
explores the implications for area governance and the mechanisms to reduce the chances 
for a political bias on investment fund allocations.   
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The analysis draws on panel data of public investment funds from the central government 
to the 345 Chilean municipalities over the period 2004-2014. The period covers three local 
polls and three national polls, in which the winning coalition was from both political 
branches, two left-wing and one right-wing. The political variables considered are 
municipal and national electoral results, whereas socioeconomic data includes municipal 
revenues per capita, municipal staff expenses per capita, population and the percentage of 
people below the national poverty line. The econometric analysis relies on fixed-effects and 
generalised method of moments (GMM) (Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 
1998) to control for potential endogeneity.   
 
This paper adds three novelties to the literature on the relationship between distributive 
politics and regional development. Firstly, it analyzes how the burden of using investment 
for electoral concerns is distributed along the electoral cycle and between allies and rival 
local governments. Other studies of which the authors are aware focus on the variations of 
fiscal transfers or taxes in election years, but how the effects of this fiscal manipulation are 
distributed along the term in office and across localities with different political alignment 
remains understudied. Another original contribution is that it is tested whether political 
influence is exercised to benefit the electoral prospects of the central government or, 
conversely, it is due to local governments’ lobbying capacity in a bottom-up process. This 
result is particularly important because understanding the nature of the political game is 
fundamental for the success of any policy meant to reduce the margin for discretionary 
allocations. One last novelty is that the paper explores, for the first time, the existence of 
political influence on investment grant transfers to Chilean municipalities. Previous 
analyses focused on the influence of economic variables for presidential elections (Cerda 
and Vergara, 2007) and on the access to publicly funded benefits from the perspective of 
voters (Calvo and Murillo, 2012) but, to the best of the authors’ knowledge, no study has 
revealed the influence of political factors in public investment distribution in Chile. The 
existence of a political bias is relevant because, being Chile a highly unequal country, the 
goal of balancing socio-spatial differences may be undermined if redistribution is mediated 
by electoral concerns. Beyond this particular case, the paper also discusses the institutional 
101 
 
mechanisms to cope with political distortions, contributing in this way to the debate about 
their implications for regional development.  
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section the theoretical 
framework is built from the literature on distributive politics. In section three, the case 
study is characterized in terms of Chile’s socio-spatial characteristics, the multi-level 
governance system and the sub-national finance mechanisms. Section four presents the data 
and the methodology for the empirical analysis. In section five the results are explained. 
The paper concludes by contextualizing the results and discussing their implications for 
local governance.  
 
Distributive politics and regional development 
 
In broad terms, distributive politics refers to how public authorities confer geographically 
concentrated benefits while diffusing costs across voters (Weingast, Shepsle and Johnsen, 
1981). This definition, though, may be too broad, since it includes pork-barrelling as well 
as resource allocation in lagging areas, which may be a political goal under territorial 
cohesion criteria. To narrow the conceptual framework, Stokes et al. (2013) differentiate 
among distributive strategies according to their programmatic vs. non-programmatic nature. 
For a distribution to be programmatic, rules of distribution have to be formalized and 
public, and they have to shape the distribution of resources, whereas in non-programmatic 
distributions the criteria for allocations are not rendered public.   
 
Within non-programmatic distributions, two of the most spread political distortions are 
concentrating resources in particular geographical areas with electoral motifs and 
manipulating the timing of the fiscal variables. Political business (or budget) cycle (PBC) is 
the term used to identify the variations on budget expenditure or taxes along the electoral 
cycle. The existence of a PBC has been widely studied by macroeconomists, showing that 
monetary and fiscal policies tend to be expansionary before an election (Willett and Keil, 
2004). Empirical analyses have demonstrated the existence of a PBC in several countries 
around the world, but the magnitude differs across countries. This is so because PBCs 
102 
 
depend on the institutional conditions under which incumbent political leaders have greater 
ability and incentives to manipulate policy variables along the electoral cycle (Alt and 
Rose, 2006).  
 
Although the bulk of the literature on PBCs has used national-level data and 
macroeconomic variables, other studies have focused on the local level. In fact, Veiga and 
Veiga (2007) argue that the hypothesis of the PBC is better suited to the local level because 
the economic evaluation of local service delivery, such as education, infrastructures or 
amenities, is easier than the economic assessment of national services such as defence, 
legal institutions or income redistribution. Evidence of manipulating fiscal variables at the 
local level has been found in both, developed and developing countries. In France, 
Foucault, Madies and Paty (2008) found that local governments increased all categories of 
public spending in pre-electoral periods. Likewise, opportunistic behaviour has been 
reported for Portugal, but Veiga and Veiga (2007) suggest that mayors tended to reduce 
taxes and increase expenditure on highly visible items shortly before elections, whereas 
expenditures remained the same or even decreased for the less visible items. Along the 
same line, Drazen and Eslava (2010) showed for Colombian localities that politicians 
targeted infrastructure spending prior to elections while other types of expenditure, such as 
interest payments, transfers to retirees, and payments to temporary workers, fell in election 
years. In Brazil, over the period 1980-2005 a decrease in the fiscal surplus occurred in 
election years because local expenditure increased while local tax revenues and investment 
declined (Sakurai and Menezes-Filho, 2011).  
 
Empirical analyses on arbitrary spatial allocation of resources are based on two different 
formal models. For the ‘core supporter model’ politicians will channel resources to support 
groups because the optimal strategy for risk-averse candidates is to redistribute to core 
supporters (Cox and Mc Cubbins, 1986). Assuming that swing groups are riskier 
investments, Cox and Mc Cubbins (1986) predict that politicians will invest little in 
opposition groups, somewhat more in swing groups, and the most in their support groups. 
By contrast, Dixit and Londregan (1996), building on Lindbeck and Weibull (1987), state 
that if political parties are equal in their abilities to allocate redistributive benefits, they will 
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woo groups that are most willing to switch their votes. Alternatively, if parties differ in 
their ability to target redistributive benefits to different groups, they will favour their own 
core constituencies (‘machine politics’).  
 
Empirical evidence on ‘pork-barrels’ supports both the core and the swing voter hypothesis 
or, to be more precise, core vs. swing ‘districts’ hypothesis, as research overall is based on 
data from electoral units rather than individual voters (Golden and Min, 2013). Moreover, 
there is no pattern of tactical distribution depending on the electoral system, the grant 
allocation scheme, the scale, the spending type or the geographical context. Analyses of 
grant allocations to core areas include advanced democracies such as the U.S. 
(Ansolabehere and Snyder, 2006), Greece (Rodríguez-Pose, Psycharis and Tselios, 2016) or 
Scandinavia (Tavits, 2009), as well as new and developing democracies like Albania (Case, 
2001), Mexico (Costa-I-Font, Rodriguez-Oreggia and Lunapla, 2003) or South Africa 
(Kroth, 2014). On the contrary, evidence on targeting swing areas has been reported for 
countries of the Global North (i.e. Australia (Denemark, 2000), Sweden (Johansson, 2003), 
England (John and Ward, 2001), South Korea (Kwon, 2005), Canada (Milligan and Smart, 
2005), Portugal (Veiga and Pinho, 2007)) and the Global South (i.e. Ghana (Banful, 2011) 
and Brazil (Brollo and Nannicini, 2012) (see Table A1 in the Appendix for a selection of 
the empirical research).     
 
Several studies have analyzed the implications of electoral distortions for regional 
development, placing them within the equity-efficiency trade-off. Castells and Solé-Ollé 
(2005) found that in Spain efficiency criteria played a limited role, while infrastructure 
needs and political factors mostly explained the geographical distribution of infrastructure 
investment. In Turkey, Luca and Rodríguez-Pose (2015) concluded that regional 
investment is motivated by politics and efficiency, as the state concentrates resources in 
relatively better-off areas rather than distributing them to the poorest areas. In Germany, the 
councils with the same political affiliation as the state received more grants, and efficiency 
considerations appeared to be less important than redistributive concerns (Kemmerling and 
Stephan, 2002). Last, Cadot, Röller and Stephan (2006) found evidence of electoral motifs 
for regional transport infrastructure investment in France, despite its economic returns 
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being low. As they summarize graphically: roads and railways are not built to reduce 
traffic jams: they are built essentially to get politicians re-elected (Cadot, Röller and 
Stephan, 2006, p. 1151). 
 
The Chilean institutional context 
 
Chile is a highly centralized country, in spite of some mild steps towards decentralization 
since 2002. Spatially, it is organized in three government tiers. The national government is 
the major institution as it controls the different ministries, sub-secretaries and departments, 
and the governance of lower tiers. At the regional scale, the regional government has 
limited autonomy because it represents national government’s interests and it has no 
revenue raising capacity of its own. The regional government is also the administrator of 
the National Fund for Regional Development (NFRD). Given the dependence of the 
regional government from the national government, the Chilean governance framework 
works in real terms as a two-tier system (national and local). At the local level, comunas are 
legally autonomous, but in practice decision-making capacity and autonomy are limited as 
local authorities are highly dependent on central funds.  
 
Local budgets are financed through their own sources of revenue, a horizontal transfer 
system and the central government grant mechanisms, such as the NFRD. Comunas 
generate their own revenues through commercial licenses (34% of the total), property taxes 
(32%), circulation permits (11%) and other fees (OECD, 2013). The high dependence on 
commercial licences and property taxes reinforces income gap between wealthier and 
poorer areas since poorer comunas collect much less revenue from these. This disparity is 
reinforced because low-income properties (mostly social housing) are exempt from paying 
the property tax. The municipalities with the highest municipal revenues are located in 
remote regions of the north and south, and in the Metropolitan Region of Santiago (see 
Figure B1 in the Appendix).  
 
The Municipal Common Fund (MCF) works as a horizontal equalisation fund, but it barely 
compensates for imbalances between the revenues that municipalities generate on their 
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own. This is partly because the disparities are too large to address completely, and partly 
because the MCF mainly accounts for operational expenditure (OECD, 2013). As a result, 
large income disparities persist. 
 
The NFRD is the most important fund for regional development. The distribution of funds 
across regions is determined largely by the territorial characteristics and the population 
under social vulnerability conditions of each region, thus it is meant to pursue equity. 
Nevertheless, there is no spatial correlation between poverty and public investment because 
investment is greater in the remote regions of the south and the north than in the rest of the 
country (see Figure B2 in the Appendix). Municipal governments apply for the NFRD in a 
competitive process for which applications are evaluated through a standard methodology 
based on costs and benefits, and their technical feasibility. Afterwards, the regional 
government decides which proposals will be sent to the National Budget Office, which then 
determines whether proposals fit the national guidelines. Since the regional government and 
the National Budget Office are appointed by the central government and the NFRD is not 
formula-based, there is wide margin for targeting funds with electoral motifs. Furthermore, 
this scheme has significant pitfalls for local autonomy. First, because applications must 
match nationally defined guidelines, municipalities may not receive funds if proposals are 
not aligned with the National Budget Office’s priorities. Second, given the revenue 
shortages resulting from the municipalities’ own sources of funding, the NFRD has become 
a major source for municipal operational financing, despite being intended as a fund for 
long-term projects (OECD, 2013). 
Data and methodology 
  
The empirical analysis considers NFRD investment transfers, electoral and socioeconomic 
data for 345 Chilean municipalities for the period 2004-2014. Effective public investment 
per capita is regarded as the dependent variable because the NFRD is by far the most 
important transfer mechanism, accounting for 75 percent of the total regional investments 
defined at the regional level in the period analyzed. Data for this variable comes from the 




Independent variables are related to local and national election results. Since independent 
variables are related with political factors, the years of local and national polls and their 
results are taken as variables which are exogenous to fiscal policies. In Chile, local 
elections are held on October’s last weekend once every four years, and the fiscal year 
starts on January 1
st
 and finishes on December 31
st
. Local polls, therefore, take place during 
the last term of the fiscal year, which means that, following the assumption of PBC 
literature that voters are backward-looking and short-sighted (Alesina, 1989), investment 
expenditure in election years can be a factor that influences voting. Moreover, polling dates 
are fixed and decided exogenously from local authorities’ interests, although considering 
that all municipalities hold elections on the same day, sensu stricto, election effects could 
possibly be caused by general time effects that coincidentally occur in the election years, 
and not necessarily by elections. The time period of the dataset includes the result of three 
local polls (2004, 2008 and 2012) and three national polls held one year after local elections 
(2005, 2009 and 2013).  
 
The following political variables are considered: coalition, a dummy variable that takes the 
value 1 if the mayor is from one of the political parties of the central government coalition, 
and 0 otherwise; year of the term of office (yt=0...3), where 0 is the year of municipal 
election; and vote margin of municipal and national elections. Vote margin is the 
percentage difference between the number of votes of the election winner and the second 





Apart from political variables, four control variables related with municipal performance 
and local socioeconomic conditions are included: municipal revenues per capita; staff 
expenses per capita, i.e. the expenditure in salaries for municipal staff, which is regarded as 
a proxy for local governments’ technical capacity to formulate project proposals; poverty, 






Table 1. Descriptive statistics of the variables  
Variable Description N Mean S.D Min Max 
Investment              
per capita 
Effective public investment  per 




11,469 0 1,858,503 
 
Coalition A dummy equals 1 if the mayor 
belongs to central government’s 
coalition  
3795 0.4158 0.4929 0 1 
Year 0 Year of municipal elections 3851 0.2688 0.4433 0 1 
Year 1 One year after municipal 
election and year of national 
elections 
3851 0.2688 0.4433 0 1 
Year 2 Two years after municipal 
elections  
3851 0.2688 0.4433 0 1 
Year 3 Three years after municipal 
elections 
3851 0.1792 0.3836 0 1 
National                
vote margin 
Margin of victory in national 
election 
3775 0.02572 0.1768 -0.6857 0.7216 
Municipal   
vote margin 
Margin of victory in municipal 
election 
3791 0.1626 0.1342 0.0002 0.8168 
Poverty Percentage of people below 
national poverty line 
3791 17.493 8.8644 0.11 58.33 
Population Total estimated population  3795 48,954.68 
 
75,448.93 134 602,203 
Staff              
expenses 
Expenditure in municipal staff 
salaries per capita (thousands of 
Chilean pesos)   
3795 69.3551 
 




Municipal revenues per capita 
(thousands of Chilean pesos)   
3795 59.213 96.716 1.0552 2391.3 
Note: All fiscal variables were adjusted to thousand pesos of 2014 and these are found to per capita 
level to compare properly between comunas 
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Five econometric models were developed. These adopted a fixed-effects (FE) 
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation robust estimation with municipal effects. Robust 
standard errors were estimated clustering them at the municipality level to control for serial 
and spatial correlation. Model (1) aimed to test the existence of pork-barrels and PBC in 
investment allocations, considering coalition as a proxy for pork-barrel and municipal 
election year (y0t) as a proxy for PBC. Additionally, Model (1) intended to assess whether 
investment funds pursued equity by being concentrated in lagging municipalities or, 
conversely, were directed to the most dynamic areas for efficiency reasons. The variables 
municipal revenue, staff expenses, poverty and population accounted for characteristics of 
local technical capacity and socioeconomic conditions. These variables are expressed in 
logarithms and grouped in vector Zit in all the econometric models. 
 
Log (public investment per capita it)= α + β1 coalitionit + β2 y0it + γ Zit + σi + τt + uit (1) 
 
Another research purpose was to analyze how investment grants are distributed during the 
term of office and whether the time-distribution varies between municipalities ruled by 
mayors from different political parties. Two models were developed. Model (2) aimed to 
determine the effect of election years for localities ruled by mayors belonging to a party of 
the central government’s coalition and non-coalition municipalities, whereas Model (3) 
sought to identify whether there are differences between coalition mayors and non-coalition 
mayors in the years after local elections. Both models worked with interaction terms 
between the variables year and coalition. 
 
Log (public investment per capitait) = α + β1 coalitionit + β2 y0t + β3 (coalitionit x y0t) + γ 
Zit + σi + τt + uit                (2) 
 
Log (public investment per capitait) = α + β1 coalitionit + β2 y1t + … + β4 y3t + β5 
(coalitionit x y1t) + … + β7 (coalitionit x y3t) + γ Zit + σi + τt + uit                    (3) 
 
Two final questions refer to whether resources are concentrated in core or swing 
municipalities, and whether the national government’s or local governments’ interests are 
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prioritized when channelling resources. Models (4) and (5) aim to determine whether the 
coalition government allocates more resources to core or swing local governments but, 
while Model (4) considers municipal election vote margin, Model (5) includes national 
election vote margin.  
 
Log (public investment per capitait) = α + β1 coalitionit + β2 y0t + β3 municipal vote 
marginit + β4 (coalitionit x municipal vote marginit) + γ Zit + σi + τt + uit         (4) 
 
Log (public investment per capitait) = α + β1 coalitionit + β2 y0t + β3 national vote marginit 
+ β4 (coalitionit x national vote marginit) + γ Zit + σi + τt + uit         (5) 
 
FE estimations may suffer from potential endogeneity, since higher/lower investment at 
election t may increase/decrease votes given to the governing party at subsequent polls 
(Luca and Rodríguez-Pose, 2015). By the same token, socioeconomic conditions and the 
variables related with the local technical capacity may also be affected by reverse causality 
as it seems plausible that they are, at least partially, explained by investment grant 
allocations. To control for the robustness of FE results, every model was estimated with the 
lagged investment using generalised method of moments (GMM). These models were 
tested using difference-GMM (Arellano and Bond, 1991) and system-GMM (Arellano and 
Bover, 1995). While the former includes only past differences, the latter instruments 
variables with past levels and levels with past differences. Although both yielded similar 
results, system-GMM was selected since political and socioeconomic factors could be 
persistent over time and, according to Blundell and Bond (1998), this extended estimator is 
preferable under time series persistence. Consequently, a robust two-step estimator was 
finally adopted.  
 
System-GMM was calculated using the extension proposed by Roodman (2006) for Stata 
as it provides wider margin for treating the variables and displays the Hansen test for the 
validity of instruments. When using this methodology, variables must be treated as 
exogenous, predetermined or endogenous. Political variables were considered exogenous 
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whereas socioeconomic variables were deemed to be endogenous since territorial 




In Table 2 the results are summarized. According to Model (1), Mayors belonging to the 
central government’s coalition parties received 10 percent more public investment than 
non-coalition mayors, suggesting pork-barrel politics. It seems too that there is a political 
budget cycle because investment increased 10 percent during municipal election years. 
Model (1) also captures what municipalities funds were directed to, accounting for 
socioeconomic conditions and local governments’ technical capacity. The distribution of 
investment is positively related with local governments’ revenues and staff expenses: when 
municipal revenues and staff expenses increased one percent, public investment per capita 
grew 0.34 and 0.3 percent, respectively. Therefore, investment distribution does not seem 
to align with its territorial equity objective since those comunas with higher revenues and 
higher staff expenses received more funds. The latter result reinforces a non-equitable 
distributive pattern because richer comunas tend to expend more on staff, thus having 
greater capacity to apply for investment projects. Besides, population appeared to be 
negatively associated with public investment per capita, a reasonable result since most 
populated areas tend to receive fewer funds per inhabitant. Finally, the percentage of people 
below the poverty line is not related with investment distribution. 
 
Table 2. FE estimation results  
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
      
coalition (dummy) 0.103*** 0.0860** 0.150*** 0.0988*** 0.0916*** 
 (0.0337) (0.0343) (0.0463) (0.0334) (0.0340) 
y0 (dummy) 0.102*** 0.0757***  0.102*** 0.102*** 
 (0.0196) (0.0272)  (0.0197) (0.0196) 
y0 x coalition (dummy x dummy)  0.0641*    
  (0.0382)    
y1 (dummy)   -0.0895***   
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   (0.0281)   
y2 (dummy)   -0.0806**   
   (0.0313)   
y3 (dummy)   -0.0454   
   (0.0367)   
y1 x coalition (dummy x dummy)   -0.0833**   
   (0.0391)   
y2 x coalition (dummy x dummy)   -0.0421   
   (0.0460)   
y3 x coalition (dummy x dummy)   -0.0694   
   (0.0566)   
Municipal election, vote margin (%)    -0.132  
    (0.166)  
Municipal election, vote margin x 
coalition (% x dummy) 
   0.540**  
    (0.221)  
National election, vote margin (%)     0.165 
     (0.132) 
National election, vote margin x 
coalition (% x dummy) 
    -0.148 
     (0.226) 
 Municipal revenues (log) 0.338*** 0.338*** 0.334*** 0.331*** 0.342*** 
 (0.0647) (0.0647) (0.0648) (0.0642) (0.0646) 
Population (log) -0.970*** -0.969*** -0.973*** 0.0669 -0.0126 
 (0.351) (0.351) (0.351) (0.342) (0.359) 
Staff expenses (log) 0.297*** 0.296*** 0.302*** 0.300*** 0.290*** 
 (0.0694) (0.0694) (0.0702) (0.0686) (0.0707) 
Poverty (log) -0.0502 -0.0528 -0.0464 -0.0428 -0.0463 
 (0.0370) (0.0371) (0.0375) (0.0364) (0.0365) 
Constant 17.60*** 17.61*** 17.69*** 10.34*** 11.12*** 
 (-3.447) (-3.449) (-3.450) (-3.362) (-3.522) 
Municipal FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Within 0.110 0.110 0.111 0.114 0.111 
Observations 3,776 3,776 3,776 3,776 3,760 
Number of id (municipalities) 345 345 345 345 345 
Notes: The dependent variable and all explanatory variables are expressed in logarithms. Robust, 




Models (2) and (3) were intended to estimate how investment is distributed along the term 
of office, but while Model (2) captures public investment allocations to coalition- and non-
coalition mayors in election years, Model (3) identifies whether there are differences in the 
years after local election. According to the estimations, in election years investment 
increased 7.6 percent (Model 2), whereas in the subsequent year after the municipal 
election investment dropped by 9 percent and two years after the municipal election the 
decrease was 8 percent (Model 3). 
 
Although investment fluctuates along the term in office countrywide, there are significant 
differences between areas depending on their political alignment. Because Models (2) and 
(3) work with interaction terms between the variables year and coalition, the following 
equations were calculated to capture the interaction terms, and thus reflect the time-effect 
for the different municipalities: 
 
 The estimated equation from Model (2) is: 
Estimated per capita investment = 17.61 + 0.0860(coalition) + 0.0757 (y0) + 0.0641 (y0 x 
coalition) + γ Zit + σi + τt + uit                         (6) 
 
The estimated equation from Model (3) is: 
Estimated per capita investment = 17.69 + 0.15 (coalition) - 0.0895(y1) - 0.0833 (y1 x 
coalition) + γ Zit + σi + τt + uit                          (7) 
 
Equation (6) captures the performance of investment in election years. In non-coalition 
municipalities, investment increased by a factor of 0.076 in election years (the y0 
coefficient), whereas in those aligned with the central government, investment was raised 
by a factor of 0.14. From Equation (6) too, the different levels of investment that would 
result depending on the budget cycle (municipal election year vs. non-election year) and the 
mayor’s political affiliation were estimated (Table 3). Apart from significant differences 
depending on their political alignment, these results indicate that investment is more stable 




Table 3. Expected values of investment according to mayors’ political affiliation and year   
 
Coalition Non- coalition Difference 
Year of election 30.906 28.795 2.111 
Non year of election 27.575 28.476 -901 
 Difference 3.331 319 3.012 
Note: the expected values of investment were adjusted to thousand pesos of 2014 and these are 
found to per capita level  
 
Based on Model (3), Equation (7) displays the interaction between mayors’ political 
membership and the subsequent year after the election. This equation shows that the burden 
falls mostly on localities ruled by mayors of political parties in the ruling coalition at the 
national level since, given the interaction terms, the net effect in coalition municipalities is -
0.17 and -0.09 in non-coalition municipalities. So, while the level of public investment 
decreased in the years after municipal elections without political distinction, comunas with 
coalition mayors were particularly responsible for ‘footing the bill’. 
 
Finally, it was estimated whether investment is directed to core or swing areas and whether 
national or local election results were taken into account. Models (4) and (5) included vote 
margin as an indicator for core or swing municipalities, but while Model (4) considers 
municipal election results, Model (5) introduces national election data. The municipal vote 
margin of the mayors aligned with the central government’s coalition appears to be 
relevant, whereas the national vote margin is not.  Thus, the central government 
concentrates more investment in core comunas, but only municipal electoral prospects are 
considered when distributing resources. These results suggest a bottom-up political 
influence as funds are channelled to areas where coalition mayors have a bigger vote 
margin in local polls, while national election results are not relevant. The rationale may 
well be that distributive politics is mediated by local governments’ ability to obtain more 
funds, encouraged by their electoral results.  
 
In addition, investment distribution to coalition and non-coalition localities depending on 
the municipal vote margin was estimated (see Figure C1 in the Appendix). The coalition 
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variable changes both the intercept and the slope of the municipal vote margin, indicating 
that municipal vote margin increases investment in coalition localities, whereas is slightly 
reduced in non-coalition localities.   
 
In order to test for possible endogeneity, Table 4 presents GMM results for the five models. 
The consistency of system-GMM relies on two hypotheses: instrumental variables must not 
be correlated with the error terms, and a negative first-order autocorrelation (AR1) in 
residuals may be observed, but no second-order autocorrelation (AR2). The Hansen test 
indicates that instrumental variables are valid, while the Arellano-Bond tests for AR1 and 
AR2 show no second-order serial auto-correlation, thus indicating valid GMM estimations. 
Moreover, these are overall consistent with FE results for the five models, since all political 
and socioeconomic variables except municipal revenues appeared to be significant in the 
GMM estimations.  
 
Table 4. System-GMM estimation results  
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
      
Investment per capita (log) 0.476*** 0.484*** 0.508*** 0.485*** 0.459*** 
 (0.0304) (0.0304) (0.0312) (0.0267) (0.0320) 
coalition (dummy) 0.209*** 0.281*** -0.146 0.202*** 0.170** 
 (0.0767) (0.0702) (0.191) (0.0750) (0.0777) 
y0 (dummy) 0.139*** 0.280***  0.132*** 0.130*** 
 (0.0247) (0.0671)  (0.0264) (0.0241) 
y0 x coalition (dummy x dummy)  -0.406**    
  (0.182)    
y1 (dummy)   -0.210***   
   (0.0774)   
y2 (dummy)   -0.288***   
   (0.0666)   
y3 (dummy)   -0.352***   
   (0.0829)   
y1 x coalition (dummy x dummy)   0.0815   
   (0.201)   
y2 x coalition (dummy x dummy)   0.510***   
   (0.185)   
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y3 x coalition (dummy x dummy)   0.632***   
   (0.214)   
Municipal election, vote margin 
(%) 
   -0.888**  
    (0.378)  
Municipal election, vote margin x 
coalition (% x dummy) 
   1.585***  
    (0.509)  
National election, vote margin (%)     0.0403 
     (0.272) 
National election, vote margin x 
coalition (% x dummy) 
    0.673 
     (0.527) 
      
 Municipal revenues (log) 0.0426 0.0412 0.0429 0.0371 0.0476 
 (0.0375) (0.0381) (0.0372) (0.0386) (0.0401) 
Population (log) -0.200*** -0.193*** -0.195*** 0.831*** 0.797*** 
 (0.0356) (0.0352) (0.0361) (0.0325) (0.0364) 
L.1  Staff expenses (log) 0.281*** 0.287*** 0.261*** 0.293*** 0.271*** 
 (0.0530) (0.0510) (0.0525) (0.0498) (0.0542) 
Poverty (log) -0.0302 -0.0366 -0.0210 -0.0200 -0.0264 
 (0.0313) (0.0310) (0.0321) (0.0318) (0.0339) 
Constant 6.147*** 5.966*** 6.084*** -1.061* -0.534 
 (0.645) (0.630) (0.670) (0.561) (0.662) 
      
Observations 3,427 3,427 3,427 3,427 3,415 
Number of id (municipalities) 345 345 345 345 345 
Number of instruments 266 266 266 301 265 
      
Arellano-Bond test for AR (1) -10.07  -10.11  -10.22 -10.22  -9.92  
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Arellano-Bond test for AR (2) 1.06  1.11   0.79  0.80  0.97  
  (0.291) (0.269) (0.428) (0.425) (0.331) 
Hansen test  272.90  272.35  257.09  290.73  269.60  
  (0.250) (0.244) (0.417) (0.493) (0.253) 
Notes: GMM dynamic panel data-two step (Stata command xtabond2). The variables municipal 
revenues, population, staff expenses and poverty are considered to be weakly exogenous. Robust 
standard errors in parentheses for GMM estimates, p-value in parentheses for Hansen and Arellano-
Bond tests. Level of statistical significance ***p<0.01,**p<0.05,*p<0.10. 
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Discussion and conclusions 
 
Like other countries of the Global North and South, in Chile investment grant allocations 
are mediated by electoral concerns, and not only by equity or efficiency goals. The analysis 
above shows the existence of pork-barrel politics because the municipalities with mayors 
belonging to a party ruling the national government receive 10 percent more investment 
funds than the rest of the municipalities. These results align with other studies that argue 
that when local (or regional) governments are ruled by the party in charge of the central 
government, they obtain more benefits than those others  controlled by the opposition 
(Bertelli and John, 2010; Solé-Ollé, 2013).  
 
Additionally, elected officials consider timing since on election years investment is up to 10 
percent greater. The burden of such a political business cycle is distributed unevenly across 
time and space: the fiscal excesses of election years are paid mainly during the subsequent 
two years and, although investment increases on election years countrywide, it is mainly 
coalition municipalities that benefit from the political cycle’s fluctuations. Subsequently, 
coalition comunas have to pay mainly for this higher level of investment, whereas in non-
coalition comunas it remains more stable. This result highlights the importance of taking a 
dynamic and spatial perspective in the analysis of political business cycles, an issue not 
adequately addressed in the literature. Other studies have focused on the opportunistic 
behaviour in election or pre-election years, but understanding how fund distribution varies 
throughout the electoral cycle and between allies and rivals is necessary for appropriate 
institutional responses to cope with timing in the manipulation of fiscal variables. Some of 
these are discussed below.      
 
One of the key issues to understand the nature of the distributive game is determining 
whose interests are furthered by a discretionary fiscal allocation. In Chile, municipal 
election results are related with investment distribution, whereas national election results 
are not relevant. Investment is channelled to coalition municipalities with a higher vote 
margin in municipal elections, pointing to core comunas as the main beneficiaries of such 
investment. Our estimations, thus, side with the empirical evidence supporting a tactical 
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distribution in favour of core areas. Tavits (2009) argues that targeting core municipalities 
is the most likely strategy to be followed because voters require less stringent cognitive 
capacities since, if the ruling party is the same on the local and national level, there is no 
confusion about whom to reward. In a similar vein, Brollo and Nannicini (2012) state that if 
voters are not able to distinguish the source of transfers and political credit spillovers occur 
in favor of municipal governments, aligned municipalities receive more transfers.   
 
Nevertheless, rather than suggesting a conservative strategy by the central government to 
protect itself from the cognitive asymmetries of the electorate, for the authors this result 
highlights local governments’ ability to put pressure on central policy-making. The central 
government decides on disbursements, but municipal electoral results give local politicians 
a stronger capacity to exercise influence in the competition for grants. The importance of 
lobbying is reinforced by the fact that in every model staff expenditures are positively 
related with investment. In this sense, the hypothesis would be that comunas with strong 
mayors and larger bureaucratic structures have a greater capacity to formulate sound 
proposals and to put pressure on disbursers.  
 
The latter is a particularly relevant contribution of this paper. In the academic literature 
remains understudied whether the distribution of national grants is mediated by central 
governments’ interests or local governments’ power. However, determining if fund 
allocation responds to top-down or bottom-up pressures is fundamental to design efficient 
control mechanisms and has significant consequences for regional development. In a 
centralized state moving slowly towards devolution, local governments’ lobbying capacity 
is a further distortion, particularly when territories are highly heterogeneous and may 
therefore have different, perhaps opposing, interests (Rodríguez‐ Pose and Gill, 2005). 
Such distributive pattern penalizes the territories not aligned with the central government, 
but it could also lead local governments benefitted from political favouritism to a fiscal trap 
because the incentives for prudent local budgets are suppressed (Psycharis, Zoi and 




Apart from the particular concerns of the electoral game, the analysis yields important 
implications for territorial cohesion. Chile has the third-highest Gini coefficient on income 
distribution in South America (ECLAC, 2014) and also registers the second-highest level of 
territorial disparity among OECD countries (OECD, 2013). Under these socio-spatial 
conditions, spatial equity seems a rather relevant policy to aim for and yet, investment is 
concentrated in municipalities with higher municipal revenues and higher local staff 
expenses. Determining the particular causes for such a regressive distributive pattern lies 
beyond the scope of this paper, but it may well be due to an efficiency bias in investment 
planning. Investment favours the relatively better-off because concentrating resources in 
these areas is usually more efficient from a cost-benefit perspective, despite increasing 
territorial disparities. As such, the NFRD is meant to be a regional redistributive fund but 
this function is clearly limited, especially if it is mediated by political influence.      
 
Different policy procedures and instruments could narrow the incentives for arbitrariness 
and lead to a more equitable spatial distribution. First, if non-programmatic allocations are 
fed by the absence of formalized and public rules of distribution, policy reforms should be 
oriented to increase transparency and accountability. Indeed, the level of influence of 
electoral cycles on the fiscal balance depends on the degree of transparency (Alt and 
Lassen, 2006). Increasing transparency and accountability mainly requires political will, 
although overcoming politicians’ lack of enthusiasm for such reforms may be a rather 
difficult obstacle.   
 
Second, mechanisms for mid- and long-term investment planning could be considered. The 
actual design of the NFRD allows local governments to rely on investment grants to finance 
operational expenditures (OCDE, 2013), but this is a pitfall that distorts its strategic nature 
and increases the margin for discretionary distribution. In addition, the design of the fund 
generates “December fever”, since it has to be disbursed before that fiscal year finishes 
(December 31
st
) in order not to be penalized in subsequent years (Tarschys, 2003).  
 
In this context, the introduction of an independent planning office for regional investment 
would help with the recovery of such a strategic perspective. For this body to operate 
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alongside electoral purposes it is not only necessary to separate the political sphere from the 
administrative sphere, it is likewise necessary to set up stable finance mechanisms. Multi-
year budgeting could be a valuable fiscal policy because it can give local governments 
greater certainty about future funding, which enables them to plan and manage their 
expenditure more effectively. Although multi-year budgeting is not free of political clout, it 
could decrease political influence if the time frame of the budgeting period and investment 
planning differs from the term of office. Besides, consideration can be given to the use of 
fixed multi-year ceilings, similar to the United Kingdom or Sweden (Hawkesworth, 
Melchor and Robinson, 2012).  
 
A third policy change should go in the direction of designing institutional mechanisms to 
reduce the gap between comunas. From the authors’ perspective, one of the most striking 
results of the above econometric analysis is the importance of municipal revenue and staff 
expenses for investment distribution. Local public employees’ capacity to design sound 
proposals is essential because selection is based, inter alia, on the proposals’ technical 
feasibility. Horizontal transfer mechanisms should be improved in order to reduce income 
disparities. Increasing the contributions to the equalisation fund would level the provision 
of public goods between areas, while reducing differences in municipalities’ capacities to 
formulate projects if they are used to improve local bureaucracies’ skills and resources. An 
alternative method for resolving this problem is exploring the mechanisms by which 
different comunas could temporarily join up when applying for investment grants. Local 
collaborations would not only lead to agglomeration economies by sharing staff resources 
and technical expertise, they would reinforce the strategic perspective of investment 
planning too if, beyond each comuna’s interests, the wider context were considered.  
 
Let us not sound naïve and pretend that these policy recommendations will remove every 
political obstacle. The political bias is a constitutive element of the distributive game 
because politicians are office-motivated and the electorate enjoys receiving benefits, even 
at the expense of inefficiencies imposed on the majority. As a result, any attempt to erase 
completely the electoral influence will be unsuccessful. However, these policy proposals 
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would limit the scope of unjustified political discretion and lay the basis for a more 




Coalition and vote margin variables change over time and across municipalities. Year of 
the term of office variable changes over time, but it is constant across municipalities 
because elections are held the same day in all municipalities. 
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Paper Country Grant transfers Political bias 
 




State transfers to counties 
 
Core counties 
Banful (2011) Ghana Intergovernmental 
transfers to local 
governments 
Swing districts 




Calvo and Murillo (2004) Argentina Federal spending and 
revenues to provinces 
Core provinces 
Case (2001) Albania Social assistance block 




and Lunapla (2003) 
Mexico Federal public investment to 
regions 
Core municipalities 
 Denemark (2000) Australia Constituency level grants Swing  
constituencies 








Kwon (2005) South Korea National subsidies to 
provinces 
Swing provinces 
Kroth (2014) South Africa Intergovernmental transfers 
to provinces 
Core provinces 




Remmer (2007)  Argentina Provincial level spending Swing provinces 
Rodríguez-Pose, Psycharis and 
Tselios (2016) 
Greece Regional public investment Core constituencies 
Tavits (2009) Denmark, 
Finland, Norway, 
and Sweden 
National government grants 
to municipalities  
Core municipalities 





Figure B1. Municipal Revenues Per Capita, 2014-2014 (thousands of pesos) 
 




Figure B2. Public Investment Per Capita, 2004-2014 (thousands of pesos) 
 















Chapter 5: Paving the electoral way: Urban infrastructure, partisan 
politics and civic engagement 
 
This paper analyses the incidence of political factors and social capital on the allocation of 
public investment in the Santiago Metropolitan Area, Chile. Considering panel data on a 
decentralized investment program distributed through local governments and a program 
that is geared directly to citizen organizations, the paper explores whether investment is 
equally subject to electoral concerns and rent seeking under different program designs. Our 
estimations show that decentralized investment favours aligned municipalities where 
competition is stronger, but long-lasting local leaders also seek their own benefits. By 
contrast, transfers directly channelled to beneficiaries are free from political clout and, 
additionally, there is no sign of capture by organized interests. Based on these results, the 
paper discusses the implications for metropolitan governance, highlighting the potential 
role of the local social capital and a two-tier governance scheme to retain the gains from 
decentralization, acquire economies of scale in metropolitan service provision and reduce 
the margin for pork barrelling. 
 
Keywords: Distributive politics, Pork-barrel politics, Social capital, Urban governance, 




The allocation of public resources within different city areas is a key question for urban 
governance because it affects the provision of local infrastructure and shapes the urban 
growth pattern. General explanations place this issue somewhere between the metropolitan 
governance structure, the ideology of incumbents and technical considerations imposed by 
bureaucratic decision standards, but different social and political factors may mediate 
investment decisions. The recent wave of decentralization has strengthened the role of local 
governments as service providers, introducing questions about the distribution of 
responsibilities between different government tiers and the adequate transfer system to 
finance urban infrastructure. Decentralization favors flexible ways of providing services 
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(Ahmad & Brosio, 2009; Kahkonen & Lanyi, 2001); yet, local governments may pursue 
their own electoral aims in the distribution of public goods (Livert & Gainza, 2018). As the 
literature on distributive politics stresses, since politicians are motivated by their wish to 
retain public office (Golden & Min, 2013), local governments may allocate urban 
infrastructure bearing in mind their re-election chances.  
 
In a similar vein, the delegation of powers to local authorities has motivated participatory 
reforms to include citizens in decision-making. Civic engagement in public affairs is a 
quest for deepening democracy and improving the quality, accountability and flexibility of 
services because social capital increases citizen control over public goods (Gaventa & 
Barrett, 2012). However, associations can also capture local resources if organized groups 
free ride the public good for their own advantage (Platteau, 2004).   
 
This paper explores the influence of political factors and social capital in the allocation of 
investment from the central government to the municipalities of the Santiago Metropolitan 
Area (Chile), and its impact on the urban dynamic. The paper focuses on three potential 
determinants for urban investment distribution. First, we analyze if partisanship mediates 
intergovernmental transfers, in particular, if distribution favors urban areas ruled by mayors 
aligned with the central government. The aim is not only to test the existence of ‘pork-
barrel’ politics, but to understand the sources of such a political bias. Theoretically, 
distribution could be driven by the electoral aspirations of the national government or, 
instead, may be due to the capacity of municipal governments to put pressure on central 
policymaking, encouraged by their electoral results. Second, we examine the role of social 
capital interceding in grant allocations. As mentioned, the participation of community 
organizations in urban governance can improve responsiveness and accountability by 
reducing the margin for pork barreling. However, it runs the risk of capture and rent 
seeking. Third, we evaluate tactical distribution under different transfer systems. We 
contrast if political interests and the local social capital are likewise to influence 
redistribution when mayors are the intermediaries or when beneficiaries administer grants 
directly. Based on the results, the paper discusses the impact of these potential determinants 
over urban governance. 
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The analysis draws on a unique panel dataset that includes information on electoral results, 
the local social capital, municipal finance, area characteristics and investment from the 
central government to the 52 municipalities of the Santiago Metropolitan Area (SMA) over 
the period 2009-2017. Two investment grants are scrutinized as dependent variables: a 
decentralized program channeled through local governments and another geared directly to 
self-organized citizen committees without the intervention of local governments. The 
intention is to test whether different institutional designs are equally tied to capture by 
electoral concerns and interest groups. The identification strategy relies on fixed-effects 
considering heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation robust estimation, and generalised 
method of moments (GMM), to control for potential endogeneity.   
 
We follow the assumption underlying the literature on distributive politics that politicians 
hold electoral goals when allocating collective goods. However, different causal 
mechanisms may drive the distribution of investment in the two programs we inspect. In 
one case, the rationale is highly partisan, i.e., the links between the central government and 
aligned mayors mould the distributive pattern to raise the outcomes of the party in national 
or local ballot. By allocating larger amounts of funds to areas controlled by their co-
partisans, incumbent governments can boost the reputation of aligned mayors, which, in 
turn, is likely to enhance the expectations of the party on national elections (Tavits, 2009). 
Yet, if voters associate political credit spillovers with municipal governments, a bottom-up 
logic to support the electoral strategy of mayors would prevail.  
 
When investment does not go through different government tiers, though, the procedure is 
rather indirect. Incumbents may strive to please the constituency concentrating 
disproportionate amount of assets in districts where they obtain electoral advantage. We 
expect, thus, stronghold areas to be benefited even when users themselves administer funds. 
This research adds four important contributions. First, despite a burgeoning research on 
larger scales, the literature has paid scant attention to tactical distribution on a city level, 
albeit having profound implications for urban governance. Second, the paper sheds light on 
whose electoral prospects are furthered from the distribution of intergovernmental grants. 
Most studies implicitly assume a top-down agency to benefit the central government, but 
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our estimations point also to local strongmen’s power at attracting funds for their 
constituents. Third, the paper evinces the role of community-based organizations reducing 
the margin for parochialism in the distribution of public goods. The literature has not 
sufficiently addressed how civic engagement can limit electoral motivations in the 
allocation of collective resources, and this article attempts to fill this gap. Finally, the paper 
discusses the margin for tactical arbitrariness under different metropolitan governance 
frameworks. For the authors, the latter is a particularly relevant contribution as it yields 
significant policy implications. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we summarize the 
academic literature on the two main issues we address: the electoral motifs in the 
distribution of intergovernmental transfers and the potential role of community 
organizations to foster civic engagement or capture public resources. After the theoretical 
framework, the research hypotheses are displayed. Next, we characterize the SMA in terms 
of its governance framework and the local political context. Section five presents the data 
and the methodology for the empirical analysis, and section six summarizes the main 
results. In section seven, we explore the implications for urban governance. The paper 




Intergovernmental transfers and tactical distribution 
 
Over the last two decades, several studies have documented how politicians use their 
control over intergovernmental transfers to reinforce their electoral prospects. Golden & 
Min (2013) give an exhaustive overview of research on distributive politics. In some cases, 
the tactics include over financing co-partisan local strongholds (Lara & Toro M., 2018; 
Luca & Rodríguez-Pose, 2015; Timmons & Broid, 2013), or punishing unaligned mayors 
(Brollo & Nannicini, 2012). Another strategy to persuade undecided voters consists in 
increasing transfers as the electoral race approaches, the so-called political budget cycles 
(Corvalan, Cox, & Osorio, 2018; Livert & Gainza, 2018; Veiga & Veiga, 2007). One 
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further type of manipulation is to favor the electoral expectations of fellow politicians by 
concentrating investment in either core (Kauder, Potrafke, & Reischmann, 2016; Tavits, 
2009) or swing (Johansson, 2003; John & Ward, 2001) constituencies. Although not 
particularly tied to the urban arena, this research provides useful insights for understanding 
how urban governance is shaped by electoral aims, since most metropolitan areas are 
governed by a complex mishmash of municipalities that rely on transfers from senior levels 
to complement their own revenues (Bird & Slack, 2007). In the end, intergovernmental 
fiscal transfers constitute a powerful instrument that politicians use to win, exercise, and 
retain power (Bonvecchi & Lodola, 2010, p.179). 
 
Parochialism is often associated to authoritarian regimes or new democracies of the Global 
South, but there is also ample evidence of government discretion in mature democracies of 
the Global North. In general, the literature shows that local incumbents politically aligned 
with the center obtain higher levels of discretionary grants, but there is no clear-cut pattern 
depending on the geographical context, the electoral system, the type of good delivered, the 
allocation mechanism or the institutional source for political coercion (see Golden & Min 
(2013), Kramon & Posner (2013) and Livert & Gainza (2018) for inventories).  
 
Some argue that electoral systems influence distributive policy outcomes. In single-member 
systems, the linkages between elected authorities and the constituency are very tight 
because a sole representative reaps the merits for a given project brought to the district; on 
the contrary, in multimember districts, several representatives can claim the credit, so 
voters do not know whom should they reward (Ashworth & Bueno de Mesquita, 2006; 
Lancaster, 1986). Although this discussion refers to national electoral rules, to some extent, 
metropolitan governance can be seen through the lens of a single-member system. Each 
municipality within a metropolitan area elects one representative (the mayor) that will try to 
attract government expenditure on public goods toward its constituency. Consequently, 
mayors have strong incentives for engaging in political opportunism as they can claim the 




One of the hottest debates is what procedure yields the highest electoral advantage, 
concentrating goods in core areas or targeting swing districts where fellow politicians 
confront stronger competition. Theoretically, two alternative hypotheses are derived from 
electoral competition models. Assuming that swing voters are riskier investments, Cox & 
McCubbins (1986) argue that an optimal strategy for risk-averse candidates is to 
redistribute to core supporters. On the other hand, Dixit & Londregan (1996) predict that if 
political parties are equal in their abilities to allocate redistributive benefits, they will 
support those that are most willing to switch their votes. Empirical research on transfers to 
local areas has found support for both hypotheses. Tactical distribution to core areas has 
been documented in the U.S. (Ansolabehere & Snyder, 2006), Mexico (Costa-i-Font, 
Rodriguez-Oreggia, & Lunapla, 2003), the Nordic countries (Tavits, 2009) and Greece 
(Rodríguez-Pose, Psycharis, & Tselios, 2016), whereas evidence in favor of swing 
municipalities include Brazil (Brollo & Nannicini, 2012), Sweden (Johansson, 2003) and 
Portugal (Veiga & Pinho, 2007). 
 
Another factor that shapes the distributive pattern is the nature of the resource transferred. 
As Kramon & Posner (2013) show, the answer to the question who benefits from 
distributive politics varies depending on the patronage good. In broad terms, the resources 
local governments obtain from senior levels can be sorted in either transfers or purchases of 
goods and services (grants, investment programs, etc.). Transfers complement the fiscal 
resources of local governments: since municipalities have limited revenue-raising capacity, 
they rely on senior levels to close the gap between revenues and expenditures. Apart from 
central-to-local, most countries have horizontal equalization transfers to tackle the 
differences in revenue rising among areas (Bird & Smart, 2002). 
 
Compared to transfers, public goods are rather exposed to targeting along geographical 
lines because they can be used to please the residents where they are located while 
excluding those outside the district (Milesi-Ferretti, Perotti, & Rostagno, 2002). Following 
the discussion above around electoral systems, these authors argue that the incentives for 
politicians to rely on transfers or public purchases depends on electoral rules, proportional 
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systems being more prone to higher spending on transfers, while majoritarian to public 
good spending.  
 
The distribution criteria and the institutional design of the allocation mechanism affect the 
structure of opportunities too. A general distinction is between programmatic vs. non-
programmatic. Specific purposes earmark programmatic assignments, whereas in non-
programmatic transfers the incumbent government has full discretionary power. Likewise, 
distribution can follow a pre-arranged formula based on area characteristics or not
7
. As a 
rule, earmarked and formula-based distribution reduces the margin for the arbitrariness that 
allows politically motivated targeting, but technocratic allocation schemes are not free from 
tactical politics. Banful (2011) and Timmons & Broid (2013) attest that even under a 
formula, intergovernmental grants can be handed out according to partisan criteria. Looking 
at the source of political interferences, Litschig (2012) shows that in Brazil the population 
estimates entering the formula were manipulated. 
 
One final key issue is to understand whose electoral prospects are furthered by tactical 
targeting, central or local incumbent’s. In much of the literature the prevailing assumption 
is that, since the central government decides on disbursement, distribution follows its 
interests. Veiga & Veiga (2013), for instance, showed that the Portuguese central 
government used transfers to the municipalities along the electoral cycle to secure votes in 
legislative elections. Tavits (2009) also argues that, by supporting their strongholds, central 
level incumbent parties can boost the image of those local leaders which, in turn, is likely to 
enhance the electoral return for the party on national elections. From a theoretical approach, 
Borck & Owings (2003) propose an explanation that follows a similar storyline: according 
to their model, grant distribution is partly determined by the lobbying efforts of interest 
groups and local governments, but then the central government transfers money across 
areas pursuing its re-election expectations.  
 
                                                          
7
 Formula-based allocation schemes usually include demographic and socioeconomic conditions. In 




The above-cited research assumes, albeit implicitly, a top-down agency following the 
electoral plans of the central government. However, Migueis (2013) found evidence that 
aligned local leaders increased their vote share in municipal elections as a consequence of 
the extra-transfers they managed to get from the central government, whereas municipal 
incumbency did not report any reward in national elections. A similar result was reported 
by Livert and Gainza (2018), who showed the importance of vote margin in municipal 
elections, whereas the vote margin in national ballot was not significant. These authors go 
even further and hypothesized that local leaders’ lobbying capacity over central 
policymaking is the key source to attract funds, rather than national disburser’s electoral 
prospects.  
 
Social capital, civic engagement and capture 
 
Recent literature on urban governance has stressed the positive outcomes of civic 
engagement for deepening democracy and extending accountability and control in the 
provision of public goods. Collective decision-making fosters the construction of 
citizenship, harbors empowerment and inclusion and improves the performance and the 
quality of public services (Gaventa & Barrett, 2012; Andrews, 2012). The cooperation 
between local governments and the civil society yields different advantages. By playing an 
active role, citizens and local governments are able to engage into a synergetic relationship 
that is not to be found in centralized, hierarchical governance forms (Ostrom, 1996). 
Community organizations develop expertise and capacities for addressing social problems 
too, hence matching users’ preferences and lowering production costs. Last, civic 
engagement improves responsiveness and accountability as it entails wider forms of control 
and influence over public service providers (Ackerman, 2004).  
 
Civil society organizations can also attract resources to the community since, in several 
discretionary grant programs, eligible groups apply to secure funds from the central 
government. In this regards, Lowry & Potoski (2004) found evidence of a positive 
relationship between the associational density and the grants attracted, implying that 
organizations have the capacity of influence discretionary spending from senior levels. A 
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similar conclusion is drawn from Lowe, Reckhow & Gainsborough (2016), but in this case 
the authors warn about the asymmetries across organizations. The capacity of developing a 
competitive application varies widely because some civic actors lack the necessary 
resources and the levels of involvement in grant seeking differ. In spatial terms, these 
authors found that competition for federal awards could exacerbate disparities between and 
within regions (Lowe, Reckhow & Gainsborough, 2016).    
 
There are further cautions. Under some circumstances, citizen engagement can have 
negative consequences stemming from disempowerment and a reduced sense of agency, 
lack of accountability and representation in networks, denial of state services and resources, 
and reinforcement of social hierarchies and exclusion (Gaventa & Barrett, 2012). One 
reason for the inaccuracy of the outcomes is that very different items tend to be gathered 
under the participatory governance umbrella. For instance, the seminal work by Putnam, 
Leonardi, & Nanetti (1993) that links institutional performance with the presence of 
networks of formal and informal associations and the accompanying norms of generalized 
trust and reciprocity involves both, social structures (networks, formal and informal 
associations) and the intangibles steaming from these (trust, reciprocity). However, each 
dimension is likely to have a different impact (Andrews, 2012). In fact, Knack (2002) 
found that, while generalized reciprocity and social trust improve government performance, 
there is no effect for aspects of social capital identified with civic engagement, such as 
activity in associations. This is so because the beneficial effects of membership depends not 
only on its purpose, diversity and inclusiveness, but on the intensity of activities (Stolle and 
Rochon, 1998, cited in Knack (2002)).  
 
Moreover, civic engagement may impose risks in terms of capture and institutional 
underperformance (Sidel, 2005). Organizations can free ride the public good and place 
particularistic ambitions before the collective aim. Although capture may occur in different 
government tiers, proximity and the institutional design of the local state may aggravate it 
because local level politics suffers from less scrutiny and politicians find stronger pressure 
for coercion. On this point, Bardhan & Mookherjee (2000) assemble a formal model of the 
determinants of capture, including the greater cohesiveness of special purpose groups and 
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the higher level of voter influence at the local level. According to these authors, if local 
governments have no capacity to raise resources on their own and spending depends on 
intergovernmental transfers, pressures for patronage would be greater because local 
institutions do not have to pay the cost of their own outlays (the moral hazard argument).  
 
Following this line of enquiry, Khemani (2010) argues that grants-financed spending at the 
local level enables politicians to target benefits to organized groups in exchange for 
political support. The capture of public resources not only affects the provision of public 
goods, but it influences the institutional design of intergovernmental transfers too. When 
higher tier politicians face increasing participation by swing voters, they will have 
incentives to decentralize spending because it enables them to win elections by dividing 
swing voters and targeting core supporters on the local level (Khemani, 2010). 
 
Research hypotheses  
 
Based on the above theoretical framework, we posit the following research hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Municipalities ruled by mayors aligned with the central government will 
receive more investment.  
 
Hypothesis 2: The greater the electoral power of the mayor, the greater the investment 
obtained thanks to the lobbying efforts of local strongmen. 
 
Hypothesis 3: The greater the presence of specific-purpose organizations
8
, the greater the 
investment attracted to the municipality as they try to capture resources for their own 
benefit.   
 
Hypothesis 4: The institutional design of the transfer system moulds the distributive 
pattern. Decentralized investment is rather exposed to capture by strong local mayors, 
                                                          
8
 We define specific-purpose organizations as entities created to fulfill a common goal on specific 
issues. In the analysis, specific-purpose organizations stand for neighborhood associations.   
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whereas specific-purpose organizations will attract more investment if transfers are directly 
geared to eligible groups. 
 
The Santiago Metropolitan Area 
 
The multilevel governance framework 
  
The Santiago Metropolitan Area is made of 52 municipalities (comunas) that inhabit over 
7.3 million people. It is by far the largest metropolitan area of Chile as it stands for 40% of 
the population and 49% of the national GDP. Like other Latin American metropolises, the 
SMA is characterized by high levels of inequality and residential segregation (Jordán, 
Rehner, & Samaniego, 2010).  
 
The political geography of the SMA is formally organized in three scales (local, regional, 
central), but in real terms decision-making is confined just to the local and the national 
level. The regional government has limited power because the governor (intendente) is 
appointed by the national cabinet and follows its guidelines. Moreover, unlike in many 
other OECD countries, the regional government does not have financial autonomy and, 
besides, subnational government expenditure and revenue are concentrated at the municipal 
level (OECD, 2017). Below the regional scale, there is no metropolitan authority and 
comunas are responsible for basic duties, such as planning and regulation, local ordinances, 
community development, urban service delivery and so on. Following Slack's (2007) 
typology, the SMA’s governance can be characterized as one-tier and fragmented, in which 
52 autonomous governments deliver services within their own boundaries.  
 
Since Chile is a highly centralized country, local governments have limited competencies 
and subnational revenue and spending is very low compared to other OECD countries
9
. 
Municipalities generate their own revenues through commercial licenses, property taxes, 
                                                          
9
 In 2014, subnational spending accounted for 13.1 of total expenditure and 3.0% of GDP, 
compared to 40.2% and 16.6%, respectively, for the average OECD countries. Concomitant, local 
revenue is among the weakest: 3.2% of GDP compared to 16% OECD average (OECD, 2017). 
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circulation permits and other fees, but they barely cover the local expenditure 
responsibilities (OECD, 2013). Consequently, municipal governments suffer from limited 
financial maneuver and have to rely heavily on grants and subsidies from the central level
10
 
(OECD, 2017). A horizontal transfer mechanism works as an equalization fund to tackle 
the strong disparities in revenue raising across comunas, but this mechanism does not 
compensate for the large income disparities (OECD, 2013). 
 
Central government transfers include grants for education and health, current transfers for 
operational spending and investment transfers. There are several regional funds and grants 
by different ministries, and most programs follow a similar scheme: municipalities submit 
project proposals and these must surpass a technical evaluation and a complex set of filters 
and intermediaries. This framework has been criticized on different fronts (OECD, 2017). 
On the one hand, it favors the fragmentation of projects and deters local governments from 
designing strategic proposals that involve the coordination of various actors. On the other, 
most grants are awarded to projects that follow the guidelines from the national 
government, but these do not necessarily meet local demands.  
 
There is a further risk. Although earmarked, these programs do not follow a pre-established 
formula and are appointed by central institutions, thus, leaving room for tactical targeting. 
In fact, recent research has focused on electoral motivations in the allocation of investment 
from the central government to Chilean municipalities (Corvalan, Cox & Osorio, 2018; 
Lara & Toro M., 2018; Livert & Gainza, 2018). Using national level data, these studies 
have found evidence of political budget cycles and distributive distortions to benefit 
partisan mayors. However, we lack understanding if urban investment is also tied to capture 





                                                          
10




The political context 
 
Electorally, the SMA is divided along the traditional right wing/left wing axes. In national 
elections, political parties of both ideological spectrums go together in party coalitions, 
Concertacion on the left and Alianza on the right, because a “binomial” electoral rule
11
 
encourages major parties to include their candidates into larger inter-party agreements 
(Valenzuela, Somma, & Scully, 2018). Moreover, coalitions are stable over time and 
opponents do not swap from one block to the other, which means there are permanent links 
between allied parties. Our sample covers two national elections won by the right (2009 
and 2017) and one by the left (2013). 
 
Vote concentration around the two coalitions splits in municipal polls and several 
contenders compete. Parties that join for presidential elections do present their own 
choices; hence, the highest vote share in municipal ballot does not usually exceed 20%. 
Additionally, local politics depends more on comunas’ particular circumstances and the 
specific nature of indigenous competition. In Chile, municipal dispute tends to be rooted 
more in the personal appeal of the candidates and less in programmatic and partisan 
commitments (Luna, 2014). As such, the local arena does not fully reproduce national level 
rivalry: national parties cannot easily control the organization, local groups and 
independent candidates contend, and powerful mayors exert their dominance (Suárez-Cao 
& Muñoz, 2017).  
 
In spite of the local party diversity, comunas can be sorted into right or left depending on 
organizations’ support for one or the other block in presidential disputes. Figure 1 captures 
the electoral map in the three municipal elections that make our sample. The vote for leftist 
candidacies tends to concentrate in the city centre, the south side of the inner ring and some 
southwest comunas, while traditionally the northeast cone, the north and the south supports 
right-wing parties. To some extent, the electoral cartography reproduces the socioeconomic 
                                                          
11
 The “binomial” electoral formula created districts that elected only two representatives, forced 
partisan lists to run only two candidates per district  and assigned both sits to the winning list only if 
obtained twice the vote of the runner up list (Valenzuela, Somma, & Scully, 2018, p. 136).  
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divide across areas: the poorer comunas of the southern inner ring and the west are 
bulwarks for the left, whereas the right dominates the wealthy northeast and the periphery. 
Taken as a whole, the right holds the greatest municipal power, especially when local 
elections coincide with its victory in national elections.      
 
Figure 1. The political spectrum in 2008, 2012 and 2016 municipal elections  
 




Figure 3. The political spectrum in 2016 municipal elections  
 
 
Urban investment programs, data and methodology 
 
In order to test any potential bias towards electoral tampering and capture, we examined the 
distribution of two urban investment programs from the central government to the 52 
comunas of the SMA over the period 2009-2017: the Urban Improvement Program (UIP) 
and Participatory Paving (PP)
12
. The programs are comparable in size, aims and scope. The 
average investment per capita is 4.4 and 3 thousand Chilean pesos in UIP and PP, 
respectively (a chart of the mean investment by year can be found in Annex 1). In addition, 
both intend to improve the standard of living of the vulnerable population by concentrating 
on areas that lack basic infrastructure, although the UIP finances social equipment (health 
infrastructure, street lightning, paving, parks, green areas, sports grounds, community 
centers, etc.), whereas PP focuses on street paving. A final point, the assignment process 
follows a similar path; in both procedures, the National Investment System evaluates 
projects on a technical and socioeconomic basis. Nevertheless, a striking difference 
between them ensures an appropriate case selection to test the hypothesis outlined above. 
                                                          
12
 In Spanish, Programa de mejoramiento urbano and Pavimentos Participativos, respectively. 
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While municipalities present proposals to regional institutions for UIP funds, in the case of 
PP ad-hoc created citizen committees submit proposals directly to the Ministry of Housing 
and Urbanism, without going through local governments. Committees have to co-finance 
between 5 and 30 percent of the construction costs, except for the most vulnerable 
committees and for 50 municipalities with the highest poverty rate. 
  
These two programs were selected as dependent variables, whereas data on political 
outcomes, the presence of community-based organizations and a set of area characteristics 
were included as independent variables. We did consider seven political determinants. First, 
since the Intendente is appointed by the central government, we calculated a dummy that is 
equal to 1 if the mayor is from the regional government political party, and 0 otherwise. 
Second, we incorporated mayor’s Periods in charge as a measure of the possible capacity 
of mayors re-elected to exercise power. Previously, Pribble (2015) evinced that the mayor’s 
length of tenure had a significant effect on local institutions’ administrative capacity 
because re-elected mayors that seek a political career get involved in a more effective 
institutional performance. We further analyzed the interaction between Intendente and 
mayor’s periods since, hypothetically, long-lasting strongholds were to be benefitted 
whereas powerful rival mayors have damaged. Fourth, we included the Victory margin in 
municipal and national elections to evaluate whose electoral prospects were backed through 
tactical distribution. The vote margin in municipal elections was selected to show mayors’ 
pressure over central policy-making supported by their electoral results, whereas the victory 
margin in national elections would illustrate the central government’s strategic behavior. 
We covered the interaction between Intendente and the Victory margin in municipal and 
national elections too, i.e., the influence of vote margin in those municipalities politically 
aligned with the regional governor. The latter was introduced to signal which areas should 
result benefitted. If investment appeared to be channeled where the victory margin is 
higher, that would be indicative of core areas being compensated for their support, whereas 
a negative sign would indicate central disburser’s strategy to support loyal areas where 




The results of local and national polls were taken as exogenous to investment decisions 
since polling dates are fixed and decided aside the wishes of local and national authorities. 
In Chile, mayors are elected by simple majority and councilors by a proportional 
representation system. Municipal elections are held on the last Sunday of October once 
every four years and the newly elected authorities take office on the 6
th
 of December. 
National polls also take place in the last Sunday of October, but a distance of a year 
separates local and national ballots. The sample includes the results of three local (2008, 
2012 and 2016) and three national elections (2009, 2013, 2017).  
 
Since the second purpose of the research strategy was to test the potential consequences of 
social capital, we examined four indicators associated with social cohesion: two for the 
presence of community-based organizations (total number of Associations per capita and 
Neighborhood associations per capita) and two that reflect the absence of social cohesion 
(the Crime rate and the Homicide rate). While Associations per capita is a proxy for the 
local social capital as it brings into a single variable the organizational density in the 
comuna, Neighborhood associations per capita shows the presence of institutions on 
specific urban issues. From the theoretical discussion, we hypothesized that a dense 
network of associations could increase accountability and reduce incumbents’ margin for 
tactical distribution, whereas the presence of neighborhood associations could be indicative 
of interest organizations trying to attract urban investment. The Homicide rate gathers the 
number of homicides per 100,000 inhabitants and the Crime rate encompasses various 
forms of crimes of greater social connotation per 100,000 inhabitants, including aggravated 
assault, murder, rape, robbery, burglary, motor vehicle theft, etc. Past research in Chile has 
considered these two indexes to be negative indicators of social cohesion (Calo-Blanco, 
Kovárík, Mengel & Romero, 2017). Accordingly, we deemed they could potentially 
explain adverse collective behavior and perform as proxies for negative social capital.   
     
We entered a set of controls related to the socioeconomic conditions of the comuna and the 
urban environment. Socioeconomic variables are poverty, i.e., the percentage of people 
below the poverty line, municipal revenues per capita and professional employees per 
capita. The latter stands for local governments’ technical capacity to formulate projects 
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when competing for funds. Lastly, we added the new housing space constructed since both 
programs intend to finance urban infrastructure. We calculated values in logarithmic terms 
to control for non-linear relations. 
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of the variables  
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
UIP 468 237,477.3 191,125.3 0 1,218,681 
UIP per capita 468 4.40554 6.768986 0 56.97124 
PP 468 236,530.7 379,809.2 0 3,444,969 
PP per capita 468 2.917823 6.85489 0 59.68391 
Intendente 468 0.2200855 0.4147474 0 1 
Period 468 2.309829 1.464845 1 6 
Margin winner Municipal 
election  468 21.19012 15.88665 0.03808 68.09021 
Margin winner Presidential 
election  468 11.60561 21.6133 -61.53358 61.17464 
Neighbourhood associations 
per capita 468 0.000866 0.0009194 0.000007 0.006077 
Associations per capita  468 0.002104 0.0015477 0.000191 0.010791 
Crime rate (per 100,000 
inhabitants) 468 3,333.56 2,505.376 940.8053 19,223.22 
Homicide rate (per 100,000 
inhabitants) 468 2.144666 2.368386 0 21.72968 
Municipal revenues per capita 468 94.96581 100.9248 7.95 542.91 
Professionals per capita 468 0.002764 0.0461981 0.000065 0.004015 
New Housing Space 468 78,709 116,592.3 0 762,233 
Note: All fiscal variables were adjusted to thousand pesos of 2017 and these are found to per capita 
level to compare between comunas. 
 
In order to test the influence of these variables, the following econometric model was 
designed for each of the two urban investment programs:  
 
                                                                  (1) 
 
Where UI represents urban investment and    ,             are vectors that bring together, 
respectively, the variables related with political factors, the presence of community-based 
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organizations and negative social capital, the area’s socioeconomic conditions and urban 
characteristics.  
 
For analytical purposes, we estimated two econometric models for each investment 
program, one that accounted only for main political variables and another that included the 
interactions between key variables too. The models adopted a two-way fixed-effects (FE) 
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation robust estimation with municipal and year time 
effects. Robust standard errors were estimated clustering them at the municipality level to 
control for serial and spatial correlation.  
 
Although a FE strategy provides a sound methodological basis, we conducted an extra test 
to check the robustness of estimations. FE results could be biased if investment is 
endogenous to past compromises, i.e., if higher or lower investment at period t depends on 
previous decisions because several infrastructure projects extend over one period. 
Consequently, we relied on difference-GMM (Arellano & Bond, 1991) to check the 




The results of the econometric analyses are set out in Table 2.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
According to estimations, UIP is exposed to different forms of electoral influence, whereas 
PP lacks political clout. The significance of the variable Intendente signals that 
municipalities aligned with the political party of the regional governor got 66% more UIP 
funds than foe municipalities (Model 1). This result is consistent with the partisan bias 
reported in the academic literature and endorses the first hypothesis. Besides, there is a 
significant negative relation between mayoral Periods in charge and the urban 
infrastructure attracted to the comuna as investment decreases by 26% per additional term. 
Although this outcome may seem contradictory, we should understand it along with the 
political affiliation of the mayors because it is likely that the effect of periods in charge 





Table 2. Fixed-effects estimation results  
Note: Standard errors, clustered by municipality, reported in brackets. ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
 
Model 2 gives additional evidence of how tactical politics is displayed across partisan lines, 
encompassing the influence of time and the vote share in those municipalities ruled by 
mayors belonging to the regional governor party. The Margin of Victory in presidential 
elections affects the funds directed towards loyal municipalities (the interaction between 
Intendente and Margin_presidential), whereas the vote share in local elections is not 
 UIP per capita (ln) PP per capita (ln) 


































































































































N 466 466 280 280 
R-Squared (within) 0.2234 0.2521 0.2988 0.3122 
Number of id 52 52 43 43 
FE Municipalities YES YES YES YES 
FE Year YES YES YES YES 
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significant. This is a striking evidence for partisan favoritism, but it also highlights which 
areas are targeted through grant allocations. The negative coefficient shows investment 
goes towards aligned municipalities where the regional governor party won by a lower 
share, i.e., towards those aligned municipalities that confront stronger competition. 
Therefore, our results side with the empirical research supporting a tactical distribution in 
favor of swing areas. 
 
One important question is to depict whose electoral prospects are furthered though 
distributive politics. We hypothesized that the greater the electoral power of the mayor, the 
greater the investment obtained thanks to its lobbying efforts. We found partial support for 
this hypothesis. The length in office positively affects fund allocations, but the vote share in 
local elections is not significant, indicating that mayoral electoral prospects are not 
credited. In other words, tactical distribution is the result of a top-down agency to support 
the electoral outcomes of the central government, but long-lasting local mayors campaign 
for grant allocation. Beware that the negative sign of the variable Periods turns into 
positive when it is combined with mayoral affiliation to the political party of the regional 
governor (the interaction Intendente and Periods). So, enduring, aligned local strongmen 
attract funds for their constituents backed by their electoral support, but rival, abiding 
mayors are penalized. These results seem to disclose an empirical basis to Borck & Owings' 
(2003) model in which distribution is partly determined by the lobbying efforts of local 
governments, but then the central government makes the final decision bearing in mind its 
own re-election chances.    
 
Equation 2 accounts for the total effects of the above-mentioned interactions. In the case of 
Intendente and Periods, estimations attest that in those comunas governed by mayors 
aligned with the political party of the regional governor, an additional period of governance 
will result, on average, on 3% increase of investment funds. Regarding the distributive 
tactic across stronghold areas, a 1% decrease in the vote margin in aligned comunas will 
lead to 1.26% increase as a way to benefit disputed municipalities.  
 
                                                                               
                                                                                (2) 
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Another research goal was to unravel the role of social capital. Since municipalities present 
project proposals to UIP funds, associations could pressure local incumbents to attract 
grants for the community. As a result, hypothetically, a greater presence of local social 
capital would lead to higher investment. Nevertheless, our estimations show no influence 
by organizations as both variables for the associational density are not significant. 
Relatedly, the two variables that summarize negative social capital turn out to be not 
significant.    
 
In sharp contrast to UIP, PP program is absent from strategic targeting. Not a single 
political variable was found to be significant (Models 3 and 4). Moreover, no statistically 
significant relation was detected for the four indicators that accounted for the local social 
capital. This result is somewhat counterintuitive since we considered as a working 
hypothesis that if transfers were to be geared directly to eligible groups, the presence of 
associations on specific urban issues would help attracting funds because these would work 
to secure grants for the community. Interestingly, no sign of rent seeking is observed. On 
the other hand, there is no statistically robust association for the two variables we used to 
approach negative social capital. We foresaw these indexes to be inversely connected as 
they are proxies for a collective inability to organize around a common goal, but they did 
not report any meaningful influence. 
 
Given these results, we conducted an additional test to contrast further the potential 
influence of community organizations. In this case, we created dummy variables for 
different associational density thresholds. Dummies adopted the value 1 if the density of 
associations in the corresponding comuna was equal or below 20%, 40%, 60% and 80% of 
the comuna with the highest density, respectively. Estimations can be found in Annex 2-5. 
Results match those observed in the previous exercises for every variable: incumbent 
affiliation, the number of mayoral periods and the margin of victory in presidential 
elections remain indicative of a partisan bias in the allocation of UIP funds, whereas when 
beneficiaries administer funds, no sign of appropriation by the local social capital was 
found. There is just a slight variation in the coefficient for a density of neighborhood 
associations above 80%, which turns to be negative and significant for the distribution of 
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UIP, although not for PP. This result seems to indicate that in those comunas in the highest 
associational density quintile, a greater presence of neighborhood organizations is 
beneficial for attracting investment when mayors manage funds. However, if users run 
investments programs, a greater presence of associations remain not significant. Overall, 
these results are consistent and corroborate the influence of political factors when mayors 
act as brokers, though no indication of free riding by community associations is observed. 
These results also bring to light how the institutional design of the transfer system moulds 
the distributive pattern, supplying an empirical underpinning to our fourth hypothesis.     
 
Control variables produced fairly similar results for the two programs. UIP is positively 
related to the area’s poverty rate, a reasonable link since it is intended to improve the 
conditions where vulnerable citizens live, but no statistically significant correlation is 
reported for professionals per capita. The latter is a remarkable outcome since 
municipalities differ strongly in their capacity to develop competitive project proposals and 
UIP allocates funds based on technical considerations. Consequently, we expected 
professionals per capita, a proxy for the technical capacity of local governments, to be 
positively related, but no influence is observed. 
 
Table 3 supplies the difference-GMM results. As discussed, this strategy allows us to 
contrast the scores when taking investment as endogenous to previous decisions. The 
Arellano–Bond tests for AR1 and AR2 reports no second-order serial autocorrelation, 
whereas the Hansen test indicates that instrumental variables are valid. Overall, GMM 
provide additional robust support. For every model, the distribution of UIP is mediated by 
the same political factors identified in FE estimations: fellow mayors are systematically 
over financed, the results of presidential elections are credited but municipal ballot makes 
no difference and, finally, experience is significant for aligned local leaders. GMM 
estimations confirm there is no sign of capture by civil society organizations in any of the 
investment programs analyzed. There is just a slight variation in the performance of the 
vote margin in presidential and municipal elections for PP, which turned to be significant. 
Nonetheless, main political variables remain non-significant, indicating there is no 
interference when users handle funds.           
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Table 3. GMM estimation results  
Note: Standard errors, clustered by municipality, reported in brackets. ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
 
 UIP per capita (ln) PP per capita (ln) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
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N. of instruments 40 38 40 38 
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Implications for metropolitan governance  
 
These results have important implications for the institutional design of grant transfers and 
the governance of metropolitan areas. Decentralized urban investment that goes through 
mayoral control is influenced by partisan and electoral concerns, whereas direct grant 
allocations to beneficiaries have no political interferences. Constituencies voting for the 
party of the regional governor are systematically over financed to back the re-election 
possibilities of the incumbent when transfers are channeled through local governments. The 
electoral tactic that seems to yield the highest returns in the ballot is to concentrate urban 
goods where competition is stronger, since municipalities where the vote margin in 
presidential elections was lower were the most benefitted amongst strongholds. This 
strategy is consistent with previous research reporting a tactical distribution to favor swing 
areas. 
 
Nevertheless, not every investment flow seems akin to distributive politics. Although there 
might be alternative political mechanisms that our research strategy was not able to 
identify, estimations imply that a program designed to distribute funds straight to 
beneficiaries is not hampered by partisanship. We believe there are two reasons why 
decentralized programs are subject to political influence, whereas direct grant allocations 
are not. First, although pork barrel politics is primarily used to cement the electoral 
prospects of the national government, long-lasting local chiefs seek their piece of the cake. 
This intuition is based on the significance of the variables related to presidential elections 
results (and the insignificance of local polls), but also on the influence of the mayoral 
periods in charge. On the contrary, transfers to users are not mediated by tactic concerns, 
even though, hypothetically, the central government could conduct a strategy to maximize 
its own electoral utility favoring stronghold constituencies. A major conclusion is that, 
when mayors act as strongmen knocking the central government’s door, a decentralized 
investment program is rather exposed to political duress. 
 
A second reason for direct assignments to be free from political distortions is the role of 
community-based organizations. Since citizen committees apply for PP funds, strong local 
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leaders have no chance to lobby the central distributor. Besides, there is no signal of 
capture, as the variables related to social capital remain non-significant for both programs. 
Recall that rent seeking could potentially result under the two program designs, in the case 
of decentralized investment by compelling mayors to attract investment, and in the case of 
direct transfers by reaping public goods for the sake of their community. Our results hence 
provide additional evidence of the importance of community-based organizations for 
accountability and control. Regarding the program design, results point to a stronger 
involvement of the civil society in the provision of public goods to back the positive 
outcomes discussed earlier, since no risk of particularistic appropriation is appreciated.  
 
The indications above bring forward important implications for the governance architecture 
of the metropolitan area. Similar to other cities around the world, the SMA is administered 
by a fragmented political geography. Mayors and local councils are selected in competitive 
polls but, above them, there is no elected, metropolitan authority. Contrariwise, the regional 
governor does not have to compete in the ballot as it is appointed by the central 
government, which is to open the door to favouritism in the distribution of public goods. 
An elected metropolitan authority would not be fully absent from political motivations but 
it would introduce another mechanism of checks and balances, hence limiting the scope for 
partisan politics.   
 
Furthermore, the current governance framework faces important limitations. First, although 
decentralization brings decision-making closer to citizens and improves the responsiveness 
of services to local demands, it also leads to large fiscal disparities among local 
governments. In fact, the current vertical and horizontal transfer system barely compensates 
for imbalances between the revenues that municipalities generate on their own and their 
expenditure responsibilities. Second, municipalities held strong administrative, economic, 
social and environmental interdependencies that cannot be properly accommodated in a 
decentralized framework. Third, there are issues that have a metropolitan-wide nature, such 




Alternatively, a two-tier governance framework made of a democratically elected 
metropolitan authority and comuna-level local governments could take advantage of the 
agglomeration benefits of the upper tier, while retaining the flexibility of the bottom tier for 
urban service provision. Obviously, a two-tier structure raises concerns about the 
obligations of each level, the efficiency loses that may be engendered and the lack of 
transparency as duties are diluted. The distribution of responsibilities should be clearly 
defined to avoid duplication and general confusion about who citizens are paying for and 
which tier is responsible when providing services (see Bird & Slack (2007) for a tentative 
distribution of responsibilities in a two-tier model). Nevertheless, if responsibilities are 
clearly demarcated and taxes correctly specified among different government levels, a two-
tier system is likely to render benefits by acquiring economies of scale at the metropolitan 
level and retaining the flexibility of local service delivery. Regarding fund distribution, it 
will reduce the margin for electoral motivations in the distribution of resources across 
areas, although it may well happen that total investment in the entire metropolitan area 
diminishes if the newly elected metropolitan authority is not aligned with the national 




This paper has addressed the consequences of political factors in the distribution of local 
investment from the central government to the municipalities of the Santiago Metropolitan 
Area. Considering one decentralized urban investment program mediated by municipal 
governments and another one that transfers resources directly to self-organized citizen 
committees, the paper has shed light on how fund distribution follows partisan criteria to 
favor aligned areas against foes. The electoral tactic of the central disburser is to over 
finance loyal municipalities where competition is stronger, that is, riskier areas that are 
likely to swing in the next presidential race. 
 
We believe our research contributes in four major ways to a better understanding of 
governance processes. In the first place, there is scant evidence on how partisan alignment 
shapes the distribution of funds across city areas, in spite of the implications it has for 
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urban governance. This piece of work has bridge this gap in the literature showing that 
accountability problems do not circumscribe to intergovernmental relations within a 
country, but also hold on a city scale. We believe understanding the redistributive 
consequences of political discretion deserves further research. If goods are not allocated in 
an equitable manner but instead particular areas get excessive shares, the urban policy aim 
of reducing territorial imbalances is certainly undermined. While being a general concern, 
this issue is particularly pressing in cities of the Global South characterized by strong socio-
spatial disparities.  
 
A second lesson to be learned is how political pressure is exercised in the distributive game. 
The central government benefits loyal areas looking for its own electoral returns, a result 
consistent with the prevailing assumption of a top-down agency to increase the re-election 
intentions of the central disburser. However, several-times elected mayors lobby to attract 
funds supported by their political experience, whereas long-lasting rival mayors are 
punished. This bottom-up influence helps explaining why decentralized investment is rather 
subject to political interferences, whereas there is no meddling when grants are 
administered to beneficiaries.  
 
A third interesting result is the potential benefits of community-based organizations 
reducing the margin for a politically motivated, discretionary distribution of 
intergovernmental transfers. As discussed throughout the paper, the literature on 
participatory governance has signalled the benefits of civic engagement over the 
democratic process, the performance of public services and the responsiveness and 
accountability of local governments, although it also involves threats to local governance 
associated with the risk of capture by specific-purpose associations. Our analysis suggests 
no sign of appropriation, hence, social capital is able to act as a control mechanism to 
confine the influence of local governments over an arbitrary spatial allocation of funds. We 
believe the latter is a contribution to the academic literature since, to the best of our 
knowledge, no research has determined the potential role of the local social capital limiting 
pork barrelling. This outcome also opens a productive venue for future research: what 
institutional conditions allow citizen participation to strengthen government accountability?  
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Finally, the paper has approached the implications for the governance of the metropolitan 
area, discussing the benefits of a two-tier governance system. The actual scenario has to 
come across important planning and accountability problems because the regional governor 
is politically biased. Although not completely free from political leanings, a system made 
of a metropolitan authority and a network of local governments is likely to improve 
metropolitan governance by taking advantage of economies of scale in urban service 
provision, retaining the benefits of a decentralized system and reducing the margin for 
partisanship in the distribution of intergovernmental transfers. A two-tier scheme also 
encounters several bottlenecks, particularly when the two government levels are in gridlock 
or the upper tier cannot co-ordinate efficiently local authorities. Nonetheless, an elected 
metropolitan body will improve democratic practices while introducing a counterweight 
between mayors and the central legislator. 
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Annex 2. FE estimations for associational density equal or below 20% 
  UIP per capita (ln) PP per capita (ln) 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
































































































































N 466 466 280 280 
R-Squared 0.2241 0.2533 0.2921 0.3049 
Number of id 52 52 43 43 
FE Municipalities YES YES YES YES 
FE Year YES YES YES YES 
 




Annex 3. FE estimations for associational density equal or below 40% 
  UIP per capita (ln) PP per capita (ln) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
































































































































N 466 466 280 280 
R-Squared 0.2238 0.2521 0.2925 0.3055 
Number of id 52 52 43 43 
FE Municipalities YES YES YES YES 
FE Year YES YES YES YES 






Annex 4. FE estimations for associational density equal or below 60% 
 UIP per capita (ln) PP per capita (ln) 





























































































































































N 466 466 280 280 
R-Squared 0.2233 0.2516 0.2949 0.3080 
Number of id 52 52 43 43 
FE Municipalities YES YES YES YES 
FE Year YES YES YES YES 




Annex 5. FE estimations for associational density equal or below 80% 
 UIP per capita (ln) PP per capita (ln) 





























































































































































N 466 466 280 280 
R-Squared 0.2261 0.2539 0.2991 0.3117 
Number of id 52 52 43 43 
FE Municipalities YES YES YES YES 
FE Year YES YES YES YES 





Chapter 6: Conclusions  
 
Throughout this Thesis Project, we have developed four investigations to analyze elements 
of political economy that affect territorial inequality. Inequality has many dimensions, and 
one of them arises from an asymmetric distribution of public goods, which ultimately 
results in an uneven distribution of social opportunities. In some cases, this asymmetry is 
the result of historical and geographical processes, whereas in other cases, it is a 
consequence of the interaction between social groups, governments and public policies, that 
is, political economy. 
 
This research, structured in four chapters, evaluated two hypotheses that relate political 
economy to territorial inequality. Chapters 2 and 3 assessed whether the way in which 
human activities are organized in highly unequal cities is related to the distribution of 
public assets and social opportunities. Meanwhile, Chapters 4 and 5 addressed whether 
politicians, motivated by their desire to maintain power, distribute public goods with the 
aim of maximizing their re-election options, affecting the alleged equity of territorial 
policies. 
 
In what follows, we summarize the main conclusions of this Thesis. 
 
Hypothesis 1. The way in which human activities are organized in highly unequal cities 
is related to the distribution of public goods and the social opportunities of residents 
 
Chapters 2 and 3 have corroborated this hypothesis. In highly unequal cities, the 
distribution of public goods and social opportunities are related, among other issues, to the 
organization of urban space.  
 





Hypothesis 1.1. There is a relationship between the characteristics of urban form and 
inequality in the SMA. 
 
Although one of the most studied elements in planning is the relationship between urban 
form and sustainability, the discussion has focused on the benefits and costs of the compact 
city versus the dispersed city. Besides, much of the literature refers to developed countries 
where inequality is not as dramatic as in Latin American cities. Going beyond the 
traditional discussion, Chapters 2 and 3 have demonstrated there is a relationship between 
urban form and inequality in the Santiago Metropolitan Area (SMA), verifying Hypothesis 
1.1. Specifically, Chapter 2 deals with urban form and mobility to show that the accelerated 
growth of the last decades has been spatially and socially uneven, affecting mobility 
patterns. Meanwhile, Chapter 3 describes the contradictions of urban form in the SMA, 
questioning the benefits of densification in a socio-economically polarized city. 
 
Along chapters 2 and 3, the monocentric nature of SMA has been revealed. Over the past 
decades, the city has grown mainly horizontally, which has led to a commuting pattern 
from the periphery to the center. It is in the center where most of the economic activities are 
located, industrial activities remain in the first ring, financial services are even more 
centralized, whereas commercial activities are increasingly decentralized. On the other 
hand, the SMA continues to grow horizontally, unlike many cities in Europe and North 
America. Consequently, the distance of daily commuting is increasing as well as the 
associated environmental costs. 
 
Urban growth in Santiago has been socially and spatially unequal due to two simultaneous 
phenomena. Firstly, horizontal growth has been the result of irregular urban expansion 
driven by low-density suburban residential development. Secondly, the national 
government promoted a housing policy that sought to reduce the quantitative deficit, 
without considering other planning elements. This led to a policy that systematically 
located lower-income population in high-density areas of the periphery. As a result, the 
peripheral rings combine low-density residential areas (north-eastern areas), and high-
density areas with low-income populations (southern and western areas). In sharp contrast, 
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the dense city center has experienced low population growth, much lower than the 
periphery. In short, like in other cities in Santiago, density decreases with the distance from 
the city center, although less acutely due to housing policy and suburban growth. This 
spatial organization of economic activity and housing has reinforced socio-spatial 
inequality. 
 
Hypothesis 1.2. The urban form of SMA affects mobility patterns and access to public 
goods, affecting the social opportunities of residents. 
 
In chapters 2 and 3, we have analyzed the relationship between urban form, mobility and 
access to public goods. These chapters described how the metropolis has faced a rapid 
urbanization process, with strong socio-economic disparities and large differences in 
residential density, expressed in a pattern of unequal mobility and differentiated access to 
public goods. Therefore, the spatial organization influences mobility patterns and the 
uneven access of public goods and the social opportunities of residents, which corroborates 
Hypothesis 1.2. 
 
In fact, since the SMA is a monocentric city, a large part of employment is located in the 
center of the city, while lower-income workers live mainly in the periphery of the city.  As 
a result, the distance and time of journey to work for this population group is usually 
higher. Additionally, suburban residential development for high-income segments has 
generated a decentralization of low-skilled employment (housework, personal services, 
etc.), thereby increasing the imbalance between the location of low-income households and 
low qualification employment. 
 
Accessibility is also dependent on the level of income. The new low-density suburbs of the 
upper classes on the periphery are located around central transport hubs, especially 
highways and roads. Meanwhile, low-class neighborhoods with high density are located in 
areas of low accessibility. A major conclusion in this regards is that in the SMA, 
commuting time is a source of inequality, mainly for those workers who have to travel from 




From an environmental perspective, distance and travel time has effects on pollution, but 
the transport mode has a greater effect. Access to private transport is correlated to income 
levels, i.e., car usage is a matter of social status. The different motorization rates across city 
areas result in unequal access to the social opportunities that the city offers. In turn, the 
accelerated motorization of recent decades has increased traffic congestion and pollution. 
Last, public transport is less competitive than private transport. 
 
In this regards, two phenomena that affect lower income groups were identified. First, there 
is a negative relationship between the competitiveness of public transport and its use, i.e., 
public transport is more competitive in those areas where it is less used. Second, public 
transport is mostly used in the periphery, an area where the lowest income population is 
located. The latter is contrary to the situation of cities in Europe and North America, where 
longer trips are made frequently by car. Consequently, improving the transport network 
would have limited effects, insofar as the urban growth pattern and social conditions are not 
addressed. 
 
Regarding the distribution of public goods, the amount of social infrastructure is positively 
correlated with residential density, which is an expected result because planning takes the 
distribution of population into account. However, differences in the quality of infrastructure 
and equipment between city areas have been identified. These are associated with the 
average income of the commune. If we turn into environmental infrastructure, the scenario 
is even more unequal, with a negative relationship between income and urban vegetation. 
The five richest communes comprise 34% of the total area, while the five communes with 
the lowest income barely exceed 8%. 
 
Hypothesis 1.3. Sub-optimal metropolitan planning plays an important role in the 
unequal provision of public goods. 
 
The results of chapters 2 and 3showed that the city experienced irregular growth due to 
limited planning. This has had significant implications for the provision of public goods, 
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corroborating Hypothesis 1.3. The general recommendation is that metropolitan planning 
should reorient individual preferences and correct the housing policies in order to improve 
social and environmental performance. The main challenges that planning must address in 
this realm are suburban expansion, transportation, and infrastructure distribution. 
 
The first task is to contain the expansion of the city, and above all, not to locate lower 
income groups in the periphery. Compact areas could also be developed where residential 
and economic activities are combined, in order to generate shorter displacements and to 
reduce socio-spatial segregation if the new employment is located closed to low-income 
areas. In a short-term scenario, the planning authority should calculate the availability of 
vacant land and promote redevelopment programs in these areas. A densification policy can 
have a marginal effect if it does not consider other dimensions such as transportation, the 
quality of infrastructure, land use planning and the protection of natural resources. 
 
Improving transportation is key for reducing inequalities in mobility and accessibility. 
Planning should promote the decentralization of some economic activities, in order to 
obtain a spatial balance between employment and housing. International evidence suggests 
that densification favors a more environmentally friendly travel pattern due to wider use of 
public transport. However, in the SMA we have identified low competition of public 
transport and dense areas in the periphery of the city, where there is a wide use of public 
transport. Therefore, metropolitan planning should promote rational transportation options, 
reducing density at the periphery and encouraging densification in areas near the city center 
or around transportation axes. 
 
Regarding the distribution of green areas, planning instruments should reduce the current 
unequal distribution, considering that the SMA has serious pollution problems. This implies 
that the current planning instrument must be corrected, as it favors the proliferation of 
green areas in low-density settlements, setting different standards for low and high density 
settlements. In the former, the minimum green area is 10 m
2
 per inhabitant, while in the 
high-density communes where social housing is located, the average green area is 1.3 to 3.5 
m
2
 per inhabitant. Additionally, the regulation does not define a minimum size of green 
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area. As a result, there is a dispersion of small areas at the expense of large parks, which 
best fulfill the social and ecological functions of green areas. 
 
Finally, the SMA requires a new institutionality. Currently, the SMA does not have 
financial autonomy and the governor is appointed by the president. Municipalities have 
legal autonomy, but in practice, it is limited due to budgetary restrictions. This is 
particularly serious in those districts of the periphery where social housing is located, 
because the main source of financing is territorial taxes, which means that municipalities 
that concentrate social housing collect less. Although there are complementary sources, 
these fail to compensate for the disparities in municipal income. The result is a mechanism 
that increases socio-spatial inequalities in which richer municipalities can provide better 
public goods and attract dynamic activities. 
 
Well-designed instruments run by independent entities could be implemented to redistribute 
wealth. However, we deem necessary a major institutional reform to create an elected 
metropolitan authority. This government authority could adopt fiscal instruments to reduce 
socio-spatial disparities across territories and foster cooperation between municipalities. On 
a metropolitan scale, it could also provide a comprehensive approach to urban planning, 
facing the challenges of urban expansion, transport and infrastructure distribution.  
 
Hypothesis 2: Politicians, motivated by their desire to maintain power, distribute public 
goods with the object of maximizing their reelection options, which affects the equity of 
territorial policies. 
 
Chapters 4 and 5 have corroborated Hypothesis 2, that is, politicians influence the 
distribution of public goods in order to maximize their re-election options, which affect 
territorial development.  





Hypothesis 2.1. There is electoral influence in the distribution of public goods among the 
municipalities of a region and among the different areas that make up the SMA. 
 
In recent decades, several studies have documented how politicians use their control over 
intergovernmental transfers to strengthen their electoral perspectives. Chapters 4 and 5 have 
analyzed the existence of political influence in the distribution of investments from the 
central government to the municipalities of Chile, verifying Hypothesis 2.1. Particularly, 
Chapter 4 analyzed the distribution of the National Regional Development Fund (FNDR) at 
the national level. The FNDR is a social cohesion fund, which aims to reduce territorial 
inequality. The results show that transfers vary in time according to the electoral cycle, both 
for the mayors of the government coalition, and rival mayors. There is a political bias 
because resources increase in those municipalities where the mayor belongs to the coalition 
and also, the greater the margin of victory in the municipal elections, the greater the 
allocation perceived by the commune. Finally, we found that the allocation of the FNDR is 
related to the electoral results of the municipal elections and not to national elections, in 
spite of top-down distribution criteria. This latter result would be indicative of the strong 
influence of local actors. 
 
Chapter 5 analyzed the political influence in the distribution of two urban development 
programs for vulnerable groups. The first is a centralized fund (Participatory Paving), in 
which the Ministry of Housing and Urban Planning and self-organized committees 
participate. The second is a decentralized fund (Urban Improvement Program), where the 
metropolitan government and the mayors participate. The comparative analysis showed 
there is partisan influence in the allocation of public goods when the program is mediated 
by the mayor, the experience of the mayor being a key element to attract resources. Our 
exercise leads us to maintain that decentralized investment is subject to political 
interference, while there is no political influence when the organized community actively 
participates in this process. This seems to indicate that social capital acts as a control 




Our results contributed to the academic discussion, supporting the argument that, at the 
local level, it is possible to identify a electoral distortions since resources are distributed 
unevenly over time and space. Our results from Chapter 4 set aside with international 
evidence, showing the existence of a time cycle in the distribution of transfers. Likewise, 
they align with the academic discussion that supports a tactical distribution in favor of core 
voters. 
 
Chapter 5 also provided a contribution to the academic literature. It has been made clear 
that a partisan bias emerges when resources are mediated by the mayor, whereas if citizen 
participation acts as a control mechanism, such bias vanishes. On the other hand, 
municipalities are over-funded where the mayor has long experience and belongs to the 
governor’s political party. In this case, electoral competition in presidential elections is a 
key element in the allocation of the decentralized fund, while the municipal election has no 
impact. The results are consistent with previous research that reports a tactical distribution 
to favor swing voters. Finally, both chapters engaged in the debate by generating new 
evidence regarding the influence of local actors in top-down investment programs. 
 
In short, the results corroborate the hypothesis that politicians have electoral objectives 
when they assign collective goods. They use resources to improve their reputation in order 
to increase party’s or government coalition’s expectations in national elections. Hence, the 
political credit is shared by mayors and the national government. In this context, it is worth 
understanding how political pressure is exerted in the distributive game, considering the 
influence of local leaders on national policy making. 
 
Hypothesis 2.2. Electoral influence in the provision of public goods has implications for 
the development of metropolises and regions. 
 
To understand whether political bias has implications for territorial development, it is 
important to describe the institutional framework. Vertical transfers are integrated into the 
communal budget and municipalities hold strong dependence of from senior level transfers. 
Institutionality works mainly on two levels (national and local) since the regional or 
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metropolitan government does not have autonomy, represents the interests of the national 
government and does not have revenue raising capacity. At the local level, the communes 
are legally autonomous, but in practice they have limited capacity to make decisions 
because they are highly dependent on the resources that come from the national level. 
 
Chapter 4 corroborated Hypothesis 2.2. This chapter analyzed the distribution of the 
FNDR, which is a social cohesion fund that seeks to reduce territorial disparities. The 
results show that, keeping constant the political variables, municipal income and personnel 
expenditure is positively correlated with FNDR. The social cohesion fund results therefore 
in a regressive territorial policy, since it favors those municipalities that are in a better 
relative position. 
 
We were also able to identified three mechanisms that could reduce discretionality in the 
design of the fund. First, the project approval criterion implies that all projects are 
evaluated under cost-benefit analysis, whereby those territories that are relatively richer or 
concentrate a larger population tend to obtain more investment. Second, municipalities with 
higher income and professionals can present more projects or better quality proposals, so 
small and lagging municipalities are at a disadvantage. Third, since the fund is non-
programmatic, the regional government is responsible for defining the projects’ portfolio to 
be sent to the National Investment System, and this entity can select initiatives according to 
their electoral performance. Indeed, given that the regional government and the National 
Investment System are appointed by the central government, there is ample scope to 
allocate funds for electoral reasons. 
 
The FNDR allocation scheme creates difficulties for local autonomy. Because the approved 
projects must match the guidelines defined by the national level, municipalities cannot 
receive funds if the proposal is not aligned with the priorities of the National Budget Office. 
Besides, given the shortages of municipal revenues, there is a high dependence on 
intergovernmental transfers. Currently, the FNDR has become a source for financing 
operational expenses, despite being intended to finance investment projects. The results 
indicate that the political bias in the distribution of benefits has implications for territorial 
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development, considering that Chile registers the second highest level of territorial disparity 
among OECD countries. 
 
The challenge is to accelerate the decentralization process, empowering regional and local 
governments in the provision of benefits. This institutional change would raise questions 
associated with the distribution of responsibilities between different levels of government 
and the appropriate financial architecture. Although greater local and regional autonomy 
can provide flexible ways of services and infrastructure provision, there are risks that must 
be addressed. Each local government, by pursuing its own electoral objectives in the 
distribution of public goods, can affect metropolitan planning; hence, a global vision to 
solve common problems such as transportation, urban expansion and distribution of public 
goods is needed. There is also a risk in the design of intergovernmental transfers to 
complement municipal revenues, since these transfers constitute a powerful political 
instrument to gain, or retain, power. Lastly, given a scenario of greater local autonomy, 
lobbying could be increased where strong mayors and larger local bureaucratic structures 
have greater capacity to put pressure on the metropolitan authority, at the expense of 
lagging territories. 
 
Hypothesis 2.3. There are institutional mechanisms that can reduce partisan bias in the 
distribution of public goods. 
 
Political bias in the allocation of benefits is a constitutive element of the distributive game 
because politicians are motivated by their results in the polls and the electorate enjoys 
particularistic benefits, even at the expense of the inefficiencies that this concentration can 
generate for the majority of the population. Consequently, there is no silver bullet that 
completely eliminates electoral influence. However, empirical evidence indicates that there 
are institutional mechanisms that can reduce partisan bias, which corroborates Hypothesis 
2.3. 
 
An adequate institutional response to reduce partisan influence requires two complementary 
measures. The first is the implementation of public policies associated with the distribution 
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of resources. The second is the development of a metropolitan governance scheme that 
holds democratic legitimacy. 
 
In this regards, the available literature has identified the following public policy 
recommendations. Firstly, programmatic vertical transfers are less akin to political 
interference because they are based on an agreed formula. Regarding non-programmatic 
assignments, the recommendation is to increase transparency and improve accountability. 
Secondly, vertical transfers should not be allocated to operational expenses as they increase 
dependence between different levels of government. These transfers should encourage the 
development of strategic projects that seek to reverse territorial disparities. Thirdly, the 
entity in charge of carrying out the territorial plan must be autonomous to reduce political 
influence and distribute resources bearing in mind a strategic perspective. Fourthly, the 
implementation of multiannual budgets could contribute to setting aside parochialism while 
providing certainty to local government. Deferring the budget period from the electoral 
political cycle would also help reducing the partisan influence. Fifthly, it is advisable to 
improve local financing to tackle territorial inequality, mainly, increasing horizontal 
transfers in magnitude. The additional resources that lagged municipalities would obtain 
should be directed towards improving local planning and management capacities. Sixthly, 
developing temporary association of municipalities can be a complementary instrument to 
improve the quality of projects in lagging municipalities. These collaborations can help 
developing local technical skills, increase efficiency by economies of scale, and prioritize 
strategic investments, over smaller initiatives. 
 
From the governance perspective, two elements should be jointly developed: strengthening 
community organizations, and a encouraging an institutional reform to elect a metropolitan 
authority in competitive elections. 
 
In the first case, the empowerment of local governments must be accompanied by 
participatory reforms to include citizens in decision-making; citizen participation deepens 
democracy and improves the quality, responsibility and flexibility of services because it 
increases control over public goods. At the local level, better synergies are obtained 
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between citizen organizations and the government. This local synergy allows organizations 
to develop capacities to address social problems, defining better users’ preferences and 
reducing production costs. Local governments also improve responsiveness and 
accountability. 
 
On the other hand, it is essential to advance in political decentralization through the 
democratic election of authority at the subnational level. One of the main problems that has 
been identified throughout the research is that the SMA is managed by a fragmented 
political geography, where mayors are democratically elected but have limited financial 
autonomy, while the metropolitan authority has no autonomy and is designated by the 
central government. In this institutional scenario there is ample space for sub-optimal 
planning and political favoritism. 
 
Our recommendation is that the SMA should move towards a two-level governance 
framework, composed of a metropolitan authority and democratically elected local 
governments. This two-level governance scheme raises some questions about the 
distribution of responsibilities and the provision of public goods. However, if 
responsibilities are clearly demarcated and specified between different levels of 
government, this scheme is likely to have economies of scale and flexibility in the 
provision of local services. With respect to the distribution of public goods, this scheme 
would reduce political influence on the distribution of resources, as it would introduce 
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